Mountaineer Coal Development v. Larry Dingess , 538 F. App'x 367 ( 2013 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2570
    MOUNTAINEER COAL DEVELOPMENT       COMPANY,    INCORPORATED;   WEST
    VIRGINIA CWP FUND,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    LARRY A. DINGESS; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    Respondents.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.
    (12-0034-BLA)
    Submitted:   July 31, 2013                    Decided:   August 30, 2013
    Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Mark J. Grigoraci, ROBINSON & MCELWEE PLLC, Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Petitioners.    Otis R. Mann, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF
    OTIS R. MANN, JR., Charleston, West Virginia; M. Patricia Smith,
    Solicitor of Labor, Rae Ellen James, Deputy Solicitor, Gary K.
    Stearman, Helen H. Cox, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mountaineer           Coal     Development        Company       (“Employer”)
    petitions for review of the Benefits Review Board’s (“Board”)
    decision      and     order     affirming         the    Administrative        Law   Judge’s
    (“ALJ”) award of benefits to Larry A. Dingess under the Black
    Lung Benefits Act (“Act”), 
    30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945
     (West 2007 &
    Supp. 2013).         We deny the petition for review.
    We review the Board’s and the ALJ’s legal conclusions
    de    novo     and    “independent[ly]            review    .    .   .   the    record     to
    determine whether the ALJ’s findings of fact were supported by
    substantial evidence.”                 Island Creek Coal Co. v. Compton, 
    211 F.3d 203
    ,    207-08       (4th      Cir.      2000)   (internal       quotation       marks
    omitted).            “‘Substantial            evidence      is   more      than      a    mere
    scintilla’; it is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might    accept       as     adequate       to    support    a    conclusion.’”           
    Id.
    (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)).
    In conducting this review, we confine ourselves to the grounds
    on which the Board based its decision.                      Daniels Co. v. Mitchell,
    
    479 F.3d 321
    , 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
    Subject     to    the    substantial        evidence      requirement,      we
    defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and “evaluation of
    the    proper       weight      to     accord     conflicting        medical    opinions.”
    Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
    
    678 F.3d 305
    ,    310      (4th    Cir.     2012)    (internal      quotation       marks
    2
    omitted).      The ALJ is not bound to accept any medical expert
    opinion but “must evaluate the evidence, weigh it, and draw his
    own conclusions,” giving consideration to “the qualifications of
    the   experts,        the    opinions’           reasoning,        their      reliance    on
    objectively determinable symptoms and established science, their
    detail    of     analysis,          and      their       freedom       from        irrelevant
    distractions and prejudices.”                 Underwood v. Elkay Mining, Inc.,
    
    105 F.3d 946
    , 949, 951 (4th Cir. 1997), superseded on other
    grounds as stated in Elm Grove Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of
    Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
    480 F.3d 278
    , 287 (4th Cir. 2007).
    Because Dingess was employed in underground coal mines
    for   fifteen    or     more      years,      had       at    least    one    chest    x-ray
    interpreted     as     negative      for      complicated          pneumoconiosis,       and
    demonstrated      that       he     has      a     totally        disabling        pulmonary
    impairment, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he
    is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. *                           See 
    30 U.S.C.A. § 921
    (c)(4); 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.305
    (a) (2013).                            The burden then
    shifted   to    Employer       to   affirmatively            “rebut    such       presumption
    only by establishing that (A) such miner does not . . . have
    pneumoconiosis,        or    that      (B)        his    respiratory         or    pulmonary
    impairment      did    not     arise      out      of,       or   in   connection      with,
    *
    This presumption was restored by the Patient Protection
    and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 
    124 Stat. 119
    , 260 (2010).
    3
    employment in a coal mine.”          
    30 U.S.C.A. § 921
    (c)(4); see 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.305
    (a); Morrison v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 
    644 F.3d 473
    , 479-80 (6th Cir. 2011).           Upon review of the evidence
    submitted in this case, we conclude that substantial evidence
    supports the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to affirmatively
    rebut the presumption.        See 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.201
    (a)(2); Harman
    Mining Co., 
    678 F.3d at 311
    .             Thus, the ALJ did not err in
    awarding benefits under the Act.
    Accordingly, we deny Employer’s petition for review.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument    because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions     are   adequately   presented   in   the   materials     before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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