Kathleen Camarena v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 14 2021
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KATHLEEN CAMARENA,                                No.    20-36083
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                D.C. No.     1: 19-cv-00094-TJC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
    Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Timothy J. Cavan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 10, 2021**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Kathleen Camarena (Camarena) suffers from multiple medical conditions.
    In October of 2013, she filed an application for social security benefits, stating that
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    as a result of her medical conditions, she has been unable to work since August 8,
    2013.
    An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found in July of 2015 that Camarena
    was not disabled. After Camarena appealed, in 2018 the district court reversed and
    remanded for further proceedings. The ALJ held a new hearing in April of 2019
    and again found Camarena not disabled. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s
    2019 finding in October of 2020, and the plaintiff timely appealed. Reviewing de
    novo, we AFFIRM.
    1. We review a district court order affirming an ALJ’s denial of benefits de
    novo. See Luther v. Berryhill, 
    891 F.3d 872
    , 875 (9th Cir. 2018). “A decision . . .
    to deny disability benefits will not be overturned unless it is either not supported
    by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error. . . .” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    2. It is within the province of the ALJ to weigh the testimony of various
    medical providers and of the claimant. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 
    881 F.2d 747
    ,
    750 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and
    resolving conflicts in medical testimony. . . .”) (citation omitted). An ALJ may
    discount the uncontradicted opinion of a non-treating, examining physician by
    providing “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial
    evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 
    81 F.3d 821
    , 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996), as
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    amended (citation omitted). The opinion of an “other source[]” medical provider,
    such as a nurse, may be discounted if the ALJ provides “germane reasons” for
    doing so. Dale v. Colvin, 
    823 F.3d 941
    , 943 (9th Cir. 2016). The subjective
    testimony of the claimant regarding the severity of her symptoms may be
    discounted by the ALJ if he provides “specific, clear and convincing reasons for
    doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 
    806 F.3d 487
    , 493 (9th Cir. 2015)(citation
    omitted).
    3. The ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of Camarena’s medical
    providers was supported by both substantial evidence and the law.
    The ALJ provided “specific and legitimate reasons” for discounting the
    portions of Dr. Peterson’s opinion that relied on Camarena’s Global Assessment of
    Functioning (GAF) scores, including that GAF scores may vary and are “not
    designed for adjudicative determinations.” Lester, 
    81 F.3d at 830-31
    ; see also
    Garrison v. Colvin, 
    759 F.3d 995
    , 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging the
    limitations of GAF scores). The ALJ provided “germane reasons” for discounting
    Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Wetherelt’s opinions on Camarena’s
    employability, including that the opinion was outside the area of the nurse’s
    expertise and was inconsistent with the claimant’s demonstrated ability to work.
    See Dale, 823 F.3d at 943.
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    4. The ALJ’s decision to discount Camarena’s testimony was supported by
    “sufficiently specific” findings and the ALJ “did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s
    testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation
    omitted). Camarena contends that she has been disabled, and therefore unable to
    work, since August 8, 2013. In 2015, she testified that she “mostly [had] bad
    [days]” with her hands and was often unable to wash her own hair because holding
    her arms up was painful. In 2019, she testified that her condition had worsened.
    However, Camarena admitted that she was working around 20 hours per week at
    various points since 2013, and that despite her worsening condition, her work
    hours have only changed “maybe a couple hours here or there.” Camarena’s work
    history contradicted her testimony regarding her physical limitations and provided
    a non-arbitrary ground on which the ALJ could discredit her testimony. See Ford
    v. Saul, 
    950 F.3d 1141
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ may consider any work
    activity, including part-time work, in determining whether a claimant is disabled,
    and here [Plaintiff’s] own testimony established that she was able to work
    occasional eight-hour shifts.”) (citation omitted).
    5. The ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert incorporated all of
    Camarena’s impairments that were supported by the record. See Martinez v.
    Heckler, 
    807 F.2d 771
    , 775 (9th Cir. 1987), as corrected (upholding the ALJ’s
    4
    determination when the “hypotheticals presented by the ALJ . . . were supported by
    substantial medical evidence found in the record”).
    AFFIRMED.
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