United States v. Bernardo Lloyd , 645 F. App'x 273 ( 2016 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4272
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    BERNARDO AUGUSTINE LLOYD,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
    (8:12-cr-00354-RWT-1)
    Argued:   March 1, 2016                   Decided:   April 20, 2016
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED: Jennifer L. Mayer, Richard Alan Finci, HOULON, BERMAN,
    FINCI, LEVENSTEIN & SKOK, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
    Appellant.   Sujit Raman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein,
    United States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United
    States   Attorney,  OFFICE   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES  ATTORNEY,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Bernardo    Lloyd       (“Appellant”)        was   speeding    and     zig-
    zagging       through    traffic       on   the   Baltimore-Washington          National
    Parkway (“Parkway”) when his Lexus sedan struck the back of a
    pickup truck being driven by Juan Lopez Sanchez.                              The truck
    flipped    and    careened       off    the    Parkway.       Sanchez    died    at    the
    scene.        On June 25, 2012, a grand jury indicted Appellant for
    involuntary manslaughter.               He was not arrested until 15 months
    later, on September 23, 2013.                 Eventually, his case proceeded to
    trial and a jury found him guilty.                  Appellant maintains that the
    15-month delay between indictment and arrest violated his Sixth
    Amendment right to a speedy trial.                       He also argues that an
    expert witness was improperly allowed to testify at trial as to
    the cause of the accident, and he maintains he was entitled to a
    sentence reduction because he accepted responsibility for his
    offense.
    We affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence.                          His
    Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because the 15-month
    delay     between        his     indictment        and      his    arrest     was      not
    extraordinary and did not impair his defense.                           We also find
    ample    support    for    the     district       court’s    decision    to   allow    an
    experienced accident reconstructionist to testify, consistently
    with    the    opinion    of   another        expert,    about    the   cause    of    the
    accident.        And, given Appellant’s testimony at trial, during
    2
    which he did not accept responsibility for the accident but,
    rather, testified that he was not driving recklessly, we have no
    quarrel with the district court’s decision not to impose a more
    lenient sentence.
    I.
    On   January    31,   2012,       Appellant   rear-ended    Sanchez’s
    pickup truck.         The front end of Appellant’s vehicle underrode
    the pickup with enough force that material from the car’s bumper
    was   wrapped       around    the    truck’s      rear   axle.       Sanchez’s   truck
    flipped off the road.          Sanchez was killed.
    Police took statements from witnesses at the scene,
    made measurements of the wreckage, photographed the crash site,
    and then impounded the two vehicles.                 About six months later, on
    June 25, 2012, a grand jury in the District of Maryland issued
    an    indictment      charging       Appellant      with,    among    other   things,
    involuntary manslaughter in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1112
    (a). 1
    A    warrant    for    Appellant’s      arrest      issued    the    following    day.
    However, he was not arrested until September 23, 2013, roughly
    15 months later.         Appellant raised the issue of the delay soon
    after being arrested.               Just under a year later, he moved to
    1
    Appellant was also charged with one count of reckless
    driving in violation of 
    36 C.F.R. § 4.2
    , but the jury was
    instructed not to consider that offense if it convicted on the
    involuntary manslaughter charge.
    3
    dismiss       the       indictment,      alleging       a     violation       of    his    Sixth
    Amendment right to a speedy trial.                            Specifically, he claimed
    that,       due    to    the    delay,    his    expert       crash    reconstructionist,
    Wendell Cover, had been unable to inspect the wrecked vehicles
    and, therefore, could not present a theory about the cause of
    the   accident.            Although      the    vehicles       had    been    released      from
    impound       and        were    indeed        unavailable,          the    district       court
    nevertheless            denied    the     motion,      reasoning           that    Appellant’s
    defense would not be impaired.
    The ensuing three-day trial focused on the cause of
    the accident.            The evidence showed Appellant was speeding prior
    to    the    collision.          He     testified      that     he    saw    a     car    rapidly
    approaching in his rearview mirror and, thinking it might be a
    police cruiser, moved into the right-hand lane.                                    The car, a
    Nissan, sped by; Appellant pulled in behind the Nissan and hit
    the gas.          At that point, according to Appellant, he was driving
    fast enough to pass the other cars in the right-hand lane, but
    not as fast as the Nissan, which quickly disappeared into the
    distance.
    At some point, though, Appellant caught up with the
    Nissan.           Both    cars   zig-zagged          around    another       driver,      Joseph
    McCann, in short succession: the Nissan passed on McCann’s left,
    straddling two lanes; Appellant’s Lexus then zipped by on the
    right, driving partially on the shoulder.                        And Appellant himself
    4
    testified that, shortly before the accident, he saw the Nissan
    behind him in his side-view mirror.
    McCann estimated that Appellant and the driver of the
    Nissan were traveling over 100 miles per hour.                 David Feser, an
    off-duty police officer trained in speed detection, was also on
    the road that day and testified as a fact witness.                He estimated
    Appellant’s      Lexus   was    traveling    90   to   100    miles   per   hour,
    characterized Appellant’s driving as reckless, and thought it
    likely the car would be involved in an accident.                 Unfortunately,
    he was right.
    Two experts testified for the Government.                Corporal
    Charles       Russell,   an    experienced    accident       reconstructionist,
    analyzed data from the Lexus’ airbag control module, examined
    photographs and measurements taken at the scene, and reviewed
    witness statements about the crash.               From this information, he
    extrapolated that Appellant was driving approximately 100 miles
    per hour before the crash and saw no evidence that Sanchez’s
    actions contributed to the wreck.            As a result, Corporal Russell
    opined, over Appellant’s objection, that the single likely cause
    of the accident was “the excessive speed of the Lexus.”                     J.A.
    252. 2
    2
    Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix
    filed by the parties in this appeal.
    5
    Officer      Ken    Bentivegna     of    the       United      States    Park
    Police (“Park Police”) also testified as an expert.                                   He was
    present at and documented the crash scene, and also examined the
    vehicles in a Park Police impound lot at some point after they
    were        removed   from      the    roadway.        He     reached         no    specific
    conclusion       about     Appellant’s       speed,     but       he    saw    nothing      in
    pictures of the tire marks and other impressions on the road
    that indicated aggressive pre-impact braking by either Appellant
    or Sanchez.           Therefore, he concluded, “[T]he operator of the
    Lexus was going too fast to control his vehicle, failed to brake
    appropriately         to   avoid      the   collision       and    was      driving    in   a
    reckless manner which is what led to the collision between the
    Lexus and” Sanchez’s pickup truck.                S.J.A. 446. 3
    Appellant, for his part, claimed that he rounded a
    bend in the Parkway and moved into the far-right lane.                                 As he
    did so, he observed Sanchez’s truck also move “suddenly” into
    that lane, so Appellant began to drift back into the center
    lane.        J.A. 307.      He says he then saw the Nissan in his side-
    view mirror “pushing its way into the center lane,” 
    id. at 307
    ,
    so     he    returned      to   the    right-hand      lane.           At   that     moment,
    according to Appellant, Sanchez applied his brakes.                                Appellant
    3
    Citations to the “S.J.A.” refer to the Supplemental Joint
    Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
    6
    “tried     to    go       to    the     right    as      fast    as    [he    could],”        but    he
    collided with the truck, sending both off the road.                                      
    Id.
     at 308-
    09.       Appellant            denied    that       he   was     driving      recklessly.            He
    presented        no       expert      testimony          of     his    own        to     counter    the
    Government’s. 4
    The   jury         was    thus        presented        with        two     relatively
    straightforward theories of the case:                            In the Government’s view,
    the evidence indicated that Appellant’s reckless speed caused
    him to rear-end Sanchez’s truck.                         Appellant allowed that he was
    speeding, but denied driving recklessly and maintained he was
    simply     unable         to     avoid    the       truck       when   Sanchez           applied    the
    brakes.      The jury, which found Appellant guilty of involuntary
    manslaughter, evidently credited the Government’s account.
    At sentencing, the district court denied Appellant’s
    request     for       a        downward    adjustment            based       on        acceptance   of
    responsibility            and     imposed       a    63-month         term    of        imprisonment.
    This timely appeal followed.
    4Although Appellant presented Cover’s expert testimony at
    the hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment, he chose
    not to present Cover’s testimony at trial.
    7
    II.
    A.
    Speedy Trial Challenge
    Appellant      first       challenges   the     district      court’s
    decision denying the motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy
    trial grounds.       We review the district court’s factual findings
    for clear error, see United States v. Perry, 
    757 F.3d 166
    , 171
    (4th Cir. 2014), and its legal conclusion about the effect of
    the delay de novo, see United States v. Hall, 
    551 F.3d 257
    , 266
    (4th Cir. 2009).
    The   Sixth    Amendment      guarantees     the   accused    in   all
    criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy trial.                         See U.S.
    Const. amend. VI.         Some delays in bringing a defendant to trial
    are simply too brief to violate the Constitution.                    See Doggett
    v.   United    States,      
    505 U.S. 647
    ,   651-52   (1992).     But    delays
    approaching -- or, as here, exceeding -- one year presumptively
    surpass the bare minimum required to trigger a constitutional
    inquiry.      See 
    id.
     at 651-52 & 652 n.1.                So, like the district
    court, we must “engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing
    process” that assesses the length of the delay, the reason for
    the delay, how vigorously Appellant asserted his speedy trial
    rights, and the extent to which Appellant was prejudiced by the
    delay.     Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530-33 (1972).                    “[N]one
    of the four factors . . . [is] either a necessary or sufficient
    8
    condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
    trial.”     See 
    id. at 533
    .           But if those factors, considered
    collectively, weigh in Appellant’s favor, then we must dismiss
    the indictment lodged against him.             See Vermont v. Brillon, 
    556 U.S. 81
    , 93 (2009) (“The factors identified in Barker have no
    talismanic qualities” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    1.
    Length and Reason for Delay
    We consider the first two factors -- length and reason
    for the delay -- together.        The pertinent delay is the 15-month
    gap between indictment and arrest.          That period of time is long
    enough to merit inquiry into the remaining factors, but not an
    “extraordinary” delay.      Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 657-58
     (eight-and-
    a-half year delay was extraordinary); Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 533
    (delay of over five years extraordinary).                  And the delay is
    attributable solely to the Government -- the authorities knew at
    all times where to find Appellant; arresting him simply was not
    a priority.      Being simply dilatory does not weigh as heavily
    against the Government as a “deliberate attempt to delay the
    trial in order to hamper the defense . . . .”               Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 531
    .      However,   even    a    “more     neutral    reason   such   as
    negligence,” 
    id.,
     still “falls on the wrong side of the divide
    between     acceptable    and    unacceptable      reasons    for    delaying
    9
    criminal prosecution once it has begun,” Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 657
    .
    2.
    Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
    As for the third factor, the Government makes much of
    the fact that Appellant waited nearly a year after his arrest to
    move to dismiss the indictment.                  Yet there is no denying that
    Appellant promptly raised the issue at his arraignment.                                See
    Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 654
     (“[The defendant] is not to be taxed
    for    invoking    his    speedy       trial   right    only   after   his      arrest,”
    where it was unrebutted that defendant was unaware of indictment
    until his arrest.).
    3.
    Prejudice
    That leaves the question of prejudice.                          “Negligence
    over    a   sufficiently          long    period     can    establish       a   general
    presumption that the defendant’s ability to present a defense is
    impaired,      meaning     that    a    defendant    can    prevail    on    his     claim
    despite not having shown specific prejudice.”                      United States v.
    Velazquez, 
    749 F.3d 161
    , 175 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Doggett,
    
    505 U.S. at 658
    .            In Doggett, for example, the Supreme Court
    held    that      an     eight-and-a-half        year      delay   caused       by    the
    Government’s negligence violated the Sixth Amendment because the
    presumed prejudice to the defendant was “neither extenuated, as
    10
    by    the    defendant’s        acquiescence,           . . .        nor     persuasively
    rebutted.”     
    Id. at 658
     (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).
    But     significantly      shorter     delays           arising       from        government
    negligence,     like    the     15-month        delay    here,       do    not     excuse   a
    defendant     from    showing    actual     prejudice.              See,    e.g.,     United
    States v. Parker, 
    505 F.3d 323
    , 328-29 (5th Cir. 2007) (17-month
    delay does not obviate need to inquire into prejudice); United
    States v. Clark, 
    83 F.3d 1350
    , 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
    curiam)     (17-month    delay     “insufficient          to    excuse       a    defendant
    from”     showing    prejudice);     United       States       v.    Beamon,       
    992 F.2d 1009
    , 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Although the government did not
    pursue Beamon and McMillin with due diligence, if the delay in
    this case -- only a few months longer than the minimum -- were
    sufficient as a matter of law to relieve the defendant of the
    burden of coming forward with any showing of actual prejudice,
    the presumption of prejudice would be virtually irrebuttable.”).
    Instead     we     consider        whether        the        delay    actually
    impaired     Appellant’s      defense. 5         See,    e.g.,       United       States    v.
    Gregory, 
    322 F.3d 1157
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have held
    that when the government has been negligent and the delay does
    5Other forms of prejudice, such as pretrial incarceration
    and the anxiety caused by living under threat of prosecution,
    are not relevant here because the delay in this case preceded
    Appellant’s arrest and he did not know about the indictment
    until he was arrested.
    11
    not far exceed the minimum time required to trigger the full
    Barker inquiry, we must consider the amount of delay in relation
    to      particularized        prejudice.”            (internal          quotation        marks
    omitted)).         Appellant argues his defense was impaired because
    the   Park      Police     released      the    wrecked          vehicles   from    impound
    before    he     was     arrested.       As     a    result,       Appellant’s      expert,
    Wendell Cover, was unable to inspect the vehicles and testified
    at    a   pre-trial       hearing     that      he       could    not    reconstruct      the
    accident or come to a conclusion about what caused the accident.
    We    struggle,        however,     to   identify          any    actual    prejudice       to
    Appellant’s defense.              The competing theories of this case, as we
    have explained, are that Appellant was driving too fast to avoid
    the truck, or that Appellant had no opportunity to avoid the
    collision when Sanchez hit the brakes.                      Yet a closer examination
    of Cover’s testimony simply does not establish how inspecting
    the wrecked vehicles would have allowed him to prove or disprove
    either of those theories.
    Like    Appellant’s      expert,         Corporal       Russell    did    not
    examine      the       vehicles    involved         in    the     accident.        And     the
    information on which Corporal Russell based his opinion as to
    speed     was    likewise     available         to       Cover,    Appellant’s      expert.
    Further, Cover testified during the pre-trial hearing that “a
    simple speed calculation” was the sort of conclusion that could
    be reached by examining data from the airbag control module,
    12
    even without physically inspecting the vehicles.                                 See J.A. 79-
    81.      It    is    true      that       Corporal       Russell’s       conclusions            about
    Appellant’s         speed    were     based       in    part     on    assumptions         he    made
    about    the    Lexus’       tire     size    and       gear     ratios,    variables           that
    presumably          could      have        been        definitively        established            by
    inspecting      the     vehicles.           But        defense    counsel       ably   explored
    these    limitations          of    Corporal       Russell’s          testimony       on    cross-
    examination.                Moreover,        Corporal          Russell’s        opinion          was
    consistent      with     eyewitness         testimony          about    Appellant’s         speed,
    and,    in     fact,    Appellant          did     not     deny       speeding,       contradict
    Corporal Russell’s estimate, or even object to the validity of
    his calculations.            We therefore fail to see how an inspection of
    the     vehicles       would       have     allowed       Appellant        to    contest         the
    Government’s considerable proof as to his pre-accident speed.
    Nor does Cover’s testimony explain how access to the
    vehicles would have bolstered Appellant’s theory that Sanchez’s
    braking contributed to the cause of the crash.                             Cover emphasized
    that “when you have a case of who crossed the center line or who
    was within their lane of travel at the time of impact, you must
    have a factual and scientific basis as to the point of impact
    and the vehicle’s relationship to those lane lines, you must
    [inspect the damage to the actual vehicles].”                               J.A. 79.             Fair
    enough.        But the position of the vehicles prior to the fatal
    collision       in     this        case     was        never     seriously       in    dispute.
    13
    Appellant did not testify that Sanchez collided with him while
    changing lanes.         As Appellant explained, he saw Sanchez move
    ahead of him into his lane of travel.                 But, even crediting his
    version of events, Appellant still had time to begin to move
    back into the center lane, realize that option was not available
    to him, and drift back behind the truck before Sanchez allegedly
    applied his brakes.
    The relevant question, then, was whether Appellant was
    simply traveling too fast to avoid the collision, or whether
    Sanchez braked too aggressively.               Cross-examination of Officer
    Bentivegna suggested that it may have been possible to examine
    the pickup truck’s brake filaments for evidence of braking.                     But
    Bentivegna    did   not   rule    out   the    possibility      that   the   truck
    braked; he testified that there were no skid marks suggestive of
    aggressive     pre-contact    braking,        while     allowing     that    normal
    application of the brakes would not have left such marks.                      And
    Cover did not explain how examining the actual vehicles involved
    in   the     accident     would    have       enabled     him   to     contradict
    Bentivegna’s observation that the tire marks left on the Parkway
    did not indicate that Sanchez braked aggressively prior to the
    crash. 6
    6 We also note that nothing in the record establishes that
    the vehicles were destroyed after they were released from the
    Park Police impound.      Instead, Detective Wayne Humberson
    (Continued)
    14
    At the end of the day, the Government’s case turned on
    Corporal   Russell’s       estimate   (corroborated     by   other   testimony)
    that   Appellant     was   travelling    upwards   of   90   miles   per    hour,
    together with Officer Bentivegna’s testimony that there was no
    indication Sanchez braked aggressively before impact.                     Cover’s
    testimony simply does not establish how examining the wrecked
    vehicles would have allowed him to contradict those opinions.
    And Appellant’s trial counsel ably pointed out the potential
    weaknesses     in    the    Government’s     expert     opinions     on    cross-
    examination.        We therefore fail to see how Appellant’s defense
    was impaired in anything more than a speculative manner, and
    speculative prejudice will not do.             See United States v. Loud
    Hawk, 
    474 U.S. 302
    , 315 (1986) (“Th[e] possibility of prejudice
    is not sufficient to support respondents’ position that their
    speedy trial rights were violated.” (emphasis supplied)).
    We are thus left with an unremarkable delay, caused by
    the Government’s negligence, to which Appellant objected, but
    testified that the Lexus and the truck were turned over to the
    owners’ respective insurance companies.       Appellant did not
    establish that those insurers thereafter destroyed the vehicles
    or refused to make them available for inspection.           And
    strikingly, given the asserted importance of inspecting the
    wreckage, neither Appellant nor his expert, Cover, testified
    that they made any effort to contact the insurers to inquire
    after the vehicles.    For all the record discloses, then, the
    vehicles may not have been truly lost at all.
    15
    which did not impair his defense.                     Under those circumstances, we
    agree    with      the    district       court’s       conclusion        that   Appellant’s
    Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated.                                   See
    Beamon, 
    992 F.2d at 1014
     (“On balance, we cannot say that the
    government’s        negligence,         which    caused      a    delay    less      than    [24
    months],      in    light       of    the     presumption        of    prejudice     and     the
    tenuous       showing      of        actual    prejudice,         entitles      Beamon       and
    McMillin to relief.”).
    B.
    Appellant’s            remaining       challenges          can    be    readily
    dispatched.
    1.
    Admission of Expert Testimony
    Appellant         first       argues    Corporal        Russell   should       not
    have been permitted to testify that “the excessive speed of the
    Lexus”    was      “the    single       thing”       that   most       likely   caused       the
    accident.          See    J.A.       252.      We    review      the     district     court’s
    decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion.                                  See
    United States v. Fuertes, 
    805 F.3d 485
    , 495-96 (4th Cir. 2015).
    Corporal Russell’s calculation of the Lexus’ likely speed was
    based on observations of data and mathematical calculations to
    which Appellant did not object.                      And Appellant did not dispute
    that    the    Lexus      struck       the    truck.        We    take    it,   then,       that
    Appellant objects to Corporal Russell’s implication that speed,
    16
    rather    than     Sanchez’s     braking,          was    the       primary    cause      of    the
    wreck.
    Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert
    qualified       by    “knowledge,           skill,        experience,          training,        or
    education” may give opinion testimony if it “will help the trier
    of    fact   to    understand     the       evidence          or    to     determine      a    fact
    issue,” so long as the “testimony is based on sufficient facts
    or data” produced by reliable principles and methods that have
    been reliably applied to the facts of the case.                                    See Fed. R.
    Evid.    702(a)-(d).            Corporal        Russell             has     over     20   years’
    experience investigating crashes.                     He based his speed estimate
    on a series of calculations using the airbag control module data
    downloaded from Appellant’s Lexus.                            He also reviewed Officer
    Bentivegna’s report and conclusion, as well as “all the evidence
    that the [P]ark [P]olice had,” including the same photographs
    and   diagrams       of   the   crash       scene    on       which       Officer    Bentivegna
    based    his      testimony.          See    J.A.        227       (“I’ve     looked      at    the
    photographs of the vehicles.                 I’ve looked at the data they have.
    I have seen the diagrams, the witness statements.                                  You know, so
    I examined all the evidence that the [P]ark [P]olice had.”).
    Given    that     Appellant     did    not    object          to    the     admissibility       of
    Corporal     Russell’s      speed      estimate          or    to    Officer       Bentivegna’s
    testimony that Sanchez did not brake aggressively, we fail to
    see   any    abuse    of   discretion         in     admitting            Corporal     Russell’s
    17
    opinion      that     Appellant’s           speed     caused     the      accident.          See
    Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 
    134 F.3d 608
    , 612 (4th Cir. 1998)
    (observing that an expert’s opinion may be “based, not only on
    data   and    direct           observations,      but     also   on      the   opinions      and
    observations of others”).
    2.
    Sentencing
    Finally,           Appellant    argues       the    district      court    should
    have afforded            him    a   two-level     reduction        in    his     base   offense
    level at sentencing for three reasons: he cooperated with law
    enforcement         at     the      scene    of     the    accident        and       thereafter
    willingly gave a statement; he never denied his involvement in
    the accident or that he was speeding; and he went to trial only
    to contest the speedy trial issue and the legal issue of whether
    the    federal      involuntary         manslaughter        statute       applied       to   his
    conduct.      We review the district court’s sentencing decision on
    this point for clear error.                   See United States v. Jeffery, 
    631 F.3d 669
    , 678 (4th Cir. 2011).
    Section            3E1.1   of      the       United        States       Sentencing
    Guidelines provides that a defendant who “clearly demonstrates
    acceptance       of       responsibility”           is    entitled        to     a   two-level
    reduction in the calculation of his offense level.                               See U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1.       “Conviction by trial . . . does not automatically
    preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction.”
    18
    Id. cmt. n.2.           “This may occur, for example, where a defendant
    goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate
    to factual guilt . . . .”               Id.
    In    this     case,    however,       the       evidence      supports        the
    district        court’s       conclusion      that     Appellant         did      dispute      his
    factual guilt.          As the district court explained, the statute in
    question        required       the     Government      to    prove       that     Appellant’s
    conduct was willful and wanton.                     Yet Appellant “took the stand
    and   testified.             Clearly    the    thrust       of   his     testimony       was    in
    denial     of    the    willful        and    wanton      nature    of      his    conduct      in
    attempting       to    in     effect     blame      the    victim      in    this     case     for
    changing lanes.”              J.A. 325.        Indeed, Appellant testified “the
    pickup truck went in front of [him] suddenly,” id. at 307; “the
    brake lights of the truck went on and that’s when the accident
    occurred,” id. at 308; and he was not driving recklessly, see
    id. at 311 (Q: Was the manner in which you were driving reckless
    --    A.    No,        sir.).          Clearly,        Appellant         did      not     accept
    responsibility          for     the    accident.          Accordingly,          the     district
    court did not clearly err in denying Appellant credit for doing
    so.    See United States v. Dugger, 
    485 F.3d 236
    , 239 (4th Cir.
    2007) (“We must give great deference to the district court’s
    decision because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to
    evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
    19
    III.
    For   the   foregoing    reasons,   the   judgment    of   the
    district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    20