United States v. Joseph Shelton , 531 F. App'x 400 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4923
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH KENNARD SHELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00397-WO-1)
Submitted: June 6, 2013 Decided: July 5, 2013
Before KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury indicted Joseph Kennard Shelton
for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006),
and armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)
(2006). Prior to trial, Shelton moved to suppress the evidence
seized the day of his arrest, asserting that the officers who
stopped him did not have reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry *
stop and frisk. The district court denied his motion, and found
Shelton guilty of the offenses following a bench trial. The
district court sentenced Shelton to a total of 156 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Shelton argues that the district court
erred in denying his suppression motion. “In reviewing a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal
conclusions de novo.” United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481
(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). When the district court
denies a defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
*
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). “Moreover, if the officer has a
reasonable fear for his own and others’ safety based on an
articulable suspicion that the suspect may be armed and
presently dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective search
of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for
weapons.” United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The officer must have “at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop” and “must be able
to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
123-24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts
assess the legality of a Terry stop under the totality of the
circumstances, giving “due weight to common sense judgments
reached by officers in light of their experience and training.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). Applying these principles, we conclude that
the arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Shelton
and frisk him for weapons.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
3
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4