United States v. Lorenzo Solomon , 581 F. App'x 270 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4557
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LORENZO MICHAEL SOLOMON, a/k/a Badda, a/k/a Mikey, a/k/a
Mike,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:11-cr-00199-RWT-2)
Submitted: July 31, 2014 Decided: August 18, 2014
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Julie L.B. Johnson,
Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Kristi O’Malley, Adam Ake,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Colin Allred, Third Year Law
Student, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Lorenzo Michael Solomon was
convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2012); attempted possession with intent to
distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); conspiracy to import
500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963(2012); and importation of 500 grams or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(a)(1), 952(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2012). The district court sentenced Solomon to concurrent
sentences of 188 months of imprisonment on each count. Solomon
appeals his convictions and sentence. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Solomon contends that the district court erred in
permitting Special Agent Brian Pruitt of the Department of
Homeland Security to testify about what Joelene Small and Ronnie
George told him during his investigation and to bolster their
credibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires that, to
preserve for appellate review an objection to evidence, the
objection must be specific, timely, and of record. See United
States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 751 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 783 (4th Cir. 1983).
Solomon’s objections at trial were insufficient to preserve the
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alleged error on appeal; accordingly, we review Solomon’s claim
for plain error. See Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 751.
Under the plain error standard of review, Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(b) “authorizes an appeals court to correct a
forfeited error only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is
plain, and (3) the error affects substantial rights.” Henderson
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). Because Rule 52(b) is
permissive, we will correct such an error only if it “seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 1127 (internal quotations marks and
brackets omitted).
Solomon’s reliance on this court’s decision in United
States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1990), is misplaced.
In Bolick, we reversed the defendant’s conviction after
concluding that the government agent had improperly testified
that three impeached witnesses told him that the defendant was
their source for cocaine. Id. at 140-43. Importantly, we found
that the government’s entire case against Bolick relied
exclusively on the observations of those three witnesses, whose
“character for veracity . . . was extremely doubtful.” Id. at
140. However, in Ross v. Saint Augustine’s Coll., 103 F.3d 338(4th Cir. 1996), we held that Bolick is distinguishable from a
case in which the underlying witness was not particularly
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suspect and was subject to cross-examination, and the statements
at issue were corroborated by other evidence. Id. at 342. The
instant case is more akin to Ross than Bolick; thus, the
district court did not plainly err in admitting the agent’s
testimony regarding the statements of Joelene Small and Ronnie
George. We likewise conclude that the district court’s failure
to exclude certain limited remarks pertaining to the
truthfulness of the same two witnesses, several of which were
made in response to defense counsel’s own questions and to which
Solomon did not object, did not “seriously affect[] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1127.
Solomon next asserts that the district court violated
his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause by
denying his requests to cross-examine Ronnie George regarding
three violations of the terms of George’s pretrial supervised
release. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b), “[c]ross-
examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s
credibility.” We review a district court’s limitation on the
scope of the cross-examination of a government witness only for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452,
458 (4th Cir. 2014). The district court “possesses wide
latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination,
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premised on such concerns as prejudice, confusion, repetition,
and relevance.” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 221 (4th
Cir. 2006).
Our review of the record convinces us that there is no
such abuse of discretion in this case. The district court
reasonably concluded that none of the cited violations pertained
to George’s character for truthfulness, and discussion of those
purported violations risked the danger of confusing and
misleading the jury. We thus conclude that the trial court
properly restricted defense counsel’s cross examination of
George.
Solomon next contends that the district court
committed plain error when it failed to arraign him on the
superseding indictment. Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that a defendant be apprised in open
court of “the substance of the charge” before being called upon
to plead. However, technical noncompliance with the procedural
requirements of the rule does not warrant reversal of a
conviction if not raised before trial. See United States v.
Reynolds, 781 F.2d 135, 136 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986). “A failure to
arraign only warrants a reversal if it causes prejudice or
impairs a substantial right.” United States v. Williams, 152
F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Garland v. Washington, 232
U.S. 642 (1914)).
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In Solomon’s case, the additional importation charges
in the superseding indictment spanned the same time frame as the
original charges and involved the same activities. The parties
addressed all of the charges through argument and the
introduction of evidence. Moreover, Solomon’s attorney had
received a copy of the superseding indictment. We find that
Solomon has failed to establish either prejudice or the
impairment of a substantial right.
Finally, Solomon asserts there is an unwarranted
sentencing disparity because his codefendant, Ronnie George,
received a shorter sentence than Solomon. We review sentences
for procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The district court acted within its broad discretion
when it imposed on Solomon a 188-month sentence; as the district
court observed, Solomon’s role in the offense, his efforts to
obstruct justice, and George’s cooperation with the Government
warranted the challenged disparity. Moreover, we, along with
numerous other circuits, have recognized that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6) (2012) is aimed at eliminating national sentencing
disparities, not disparities between codefendants. United
States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007)
(collecting cases).
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For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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