West Virginia Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. City of Martinsburg , 483 F. App'x 838 ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-2231
    WEST VIRGINIA CITIZENS DEFENSE       LEAGUE,   INC.,   a   West
    Virginia nonprofit corporation,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF MARTINSBURG, a West Virginia municipal corporation;
    GEORGE KAROS, personally and in his official capacity as the
    Mayor of the City of Martinsburg; MARK S. BALDWIN,
    personally and in his official capacity as the City Manager
    of the City of Martinsburg; KEVIN MILLER, personally and in
    his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the City of
    Martinsburg,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
    Chief District Judge. (3:11-cv-00005-JPB)
    Submitted:   June 7, 2012                 Decided:     June 19, 2012
    Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James M. Mullins, Jr., THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMES M. MULLINS, JR.
    PLLC, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellant.    Floyd M. Sayre,
    III, BOWLES RICE McDAVID GRAFF & LOVE, LLP, Martinsburg, West
    Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    In January 2011, the West Virginia Citizens Defense
    League,    Inc.        (“WVCDL”)          filed        in     the     district          court        a
    preenforcement challenge to § 545.14 of the Code of the City of
    Martinsburg, West Virginia, which imposes certain restrictions
    on the ability to possess a firearm within public buildings.
    The   district        court    stayed      the       case,     invoking      the       abstention
    doctrine first recognized in Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman
    Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
     (1941).                   WVCDL appealed, and the parties’
    dispute    now       centers    upon      two        issues:    (1) whether            WVCDL    has
    standing       to    press    its   current           claims,       and    (2)    whether       the
    district court abused its discretion in staying the case under
    the Pullman          abstention     doctrine.           Because       we    conclude,          on   a
    review    of    the    record,      that    WVCDL       has     standing         and    that    the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under
    Pullman, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    The         Defendants       to          the         suit      (collectively,
    “Martinsburg”)         argue    that      WVCDL        lacks    standing         to    challenge
    § 545.14       on    behalf    of   its    members.            We    review      questions          of
    standing de novo, and the burden of establishing standing “lies
    squarely       on    the    party   claiming          subject-matter          jurisdiction.”
    Frank Krasner Enters., Ltd. v. Montgomery County, 
    401 F.3d 230
    ,
    234 (4th Cir. 2005).
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    An organization bringing suit on behalf of its members
    must     satisfy         three     requirements                 in      order     to      secure
    organizational        standing:             (1)       that   its      members     would        have
    standing to sue as individuals; (2) that the interests it seeks
    to    protect      are   germane       to     the       organization’s          purpose;        and
    (3) that      the    suit     does         not        require     the     participation          of
    individual      members.         Equity          In    Athletics,        Inc.    v.    Dep’t     of
    Educ., 
    639 F.3d 91
    , 99 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1004
     (2012).        With respect to the first of these requirements,
    individual members must show that they suffered “an actual or
    threatened      injury      that      is    concrete,           particularized,         and     not
    conjectural,” and that is fairly traceable to the challenged
    conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.                                    
    Id.
    “When a party brings a preenforcement challenge to a
    statute or regulation, it must allege ‘an intention to engage in
    a    course   of    conduct      arguably         affected        with    a     constitutional
    interest,’      and      there        must       exist       ‘a      credible         threat     of
    prosecution’ under the statute or regulation.”                                  Va. Soc’y for
    Human Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
    263 F.3d 379
    , 386 (4th
    Cir. 2001) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union,
    
    442 U.S. 289
    , 298 (1979)).                 Nevertheless, a plaintiff contesting
    the    constitutionality         of    a     criminal        statute      need     not    “first
    expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
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    challenge the statute that he claims deters the exercise of his
    constitutional rights.”       Babbitt, 
    442 U.S. at 298
    ; Mobil Oil
    Corp. v. Att’y Gen. of Va., 
    940 F.2d 73
    , 76 (4th Cir. 1991).
    Our review of the record convinces us that WVCDL has
    sufficiently alleged that at least one of its members intends to
    engage in conduct for which the prospect of prosecution is not
    merely “imaginary” or “speculative.”        Va. Soc’y for Human Life,
    
    263 F.3d at 386
    ; Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d at 99.                WVCDL
    therefore has standing to pursue the claims it pressed before
    the district court.
    We conclude nevertheless that the district court did
    not abuse its discretion when it determined to stay the case
    under the Pullman abstention doctrine.           See Hennis v. Hemlick,
    
    666 F.3d 270
    , 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (review of a district court’s
    decision to abstain is for abuse of discretion).                Because a
    district court abuses its discretion whenever “its decision is
    guided by erroneous legal principles,” there is “little or no
    discretion to abstain in a case which does not meet traditional
    abstention requirements.”      Martin v. Stewart, 
    499 F.3d 360
    , 363
    (4th Cir. 2007).
    Federal courts “should abstain” under Pullman where a
    case involves an open question of state law that is potentially
    dispositive   inasmuch   as   its   resolution   may   moot   the   federal
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    constitutional          issue.    Va.    Office    for       Prot.      &    Advocacy       v.
    Stewart, 
    131 S. Ct. 1632
    , 1644 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
    Educational Servs., Inc. v. Md. State Bd. for Higher Educ., 
    710 F.2d 170
    , 174 (4th Cir. 1983).                  The doctrine thus both avoids
    impinging        upon    state   sovereignty       and       forestalls            premature
    consideration of sensitive federal controversies.                            Stewart, 
    131 S. Ct. at 1644
     (Kennedy, J., concurring); Nivens v. Gilchrist,
    
    444 F.3d 237
    , 246 n.6 (4th Cir. 2006).
    In this case, WVCDL’s assertion that the record is
    bereft     of    evidence    demonstrating       the    presence        of       thorny    and
    potentially dispositive state law questions is without merit,
    given that WVCDL’s complaint squarely demonstrates the presence
    of   numerous        such   issues.       Nor     do    we    countenance            WVCDL’s
    contention that Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
    520 U.S. 43
    , 75-80 (1997), renders the district court’s reliance on
    Pullman improper.           In our view, the circumstances of this case
    would have supported either certifying a question of state law
    to   the    West     Virginia    state    courts       or    invoking        the     Pullman
    abstention        doctrine.       Because        both       options         were     equally
    available       to   the    district     court,    it       was   not       an     abuse   of
    discretion for the court to choose the latter over the former.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.      We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented    in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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