Owens v. United States ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SHARON DENISE OWENS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                                     No. 95-1685
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
    Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.
    (CA-94-55-4)
    Submitted: February 8, 1996
    Decided: July 11, 1996
    Before RUSSELL and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Sherman Carl Smith, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Helen F. Fahey,
    United States Attorney, David V. Hutchinson, Assistant Director,
    Admiralty Section, Robert H. Schapler, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch,
    Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Sharon Denise Owens appeals the dismissal of her com-
    plaint alleging negligence on the part of appellee United States. The
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
    that the statute of limitations had expired, and it therefore granted the
    United States' motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We affirm.
    On June 17, 1991, Owens, a pipefitter for Newport News Ship-
    building and Drydock Company, slipped, fell, and was injured while
    on board the U.S.S. Enterprise. On June 17, 1993, exactly two years
    later, Owens filed an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
    Because the Federal Tort Claims Act was not the proper vehicle for
    relief, she later amended her complaint to add the Suits in Admiralty
    Act as an additional source of relief.
    On April 20, 1994, the amended complaint was dismissed without
    prejudice for failure to comply with the 120 day requirement for ser-
    vice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j). On May 5, 1994,
    Owens filed a second complaint stating claims under the Federal Tort
    Claims Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, and the Public Vessels Act.
    Because the second complaint was not filed within the two year time
    limitation on admiralty actions, the government moved to have this
    complaint dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Owens
    argued that her first complaint was timely filed, and therefore, the fil-
    ing of the first complaint tolled the statute of limitations.
    This court reviews the district court's dismissal for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction de novo. Ahmed v. United States, 
    30 F.3d 514
    , 516
    (4th Cir. 1994). The district court recognized that actions under the
    Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act must be brought
    within two years from the date that the cause of action arises. The two
    2
    year limitations period under the Suits in Admiralty Act, which also
    applies to suits under the Public Vessels Act through 
    46 U.S.C. § 782
    ,
    is jurisdictional. Williams v. United States, 
    228 F.2d 129
     (4th Cir.
    1955).
    Even accepting as true Owens' contention that the filing of the first
    complaint tolled the statute of limitations, the second complaint was
    not timely filed. The statute of limitations would have been tolled
    from June 17, 1993, the filing date, until April 20, 1994, the date the
    first complaint was dismissed. Because Owens filed the first com-
    plaint on the last day of the limitations period, she would have had
    to have filed the second complaint on the very day the first complaint
    was dismissed. To allow the second complaint to go forward would
    grant Owens longer than two years total to bring her action. The dis-
    trict court was correct to dismiss the second complaint as untimely.
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court's granting of the gov-
    ernment's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(1) is hereby
    AFFIRMED.
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