United States v. Thomas ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                     No. 96-4625
    DARRYL THOMAS, a/k/a D,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
    Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
    (CR-96-26)
    Submitted: November 25, 1997
    Decided: December 29, 1997
    Before HALL, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Robert G. Cabell, Jr., ROBERT CABELL & ASSOCIATES, Rich-
    mond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attor-
    ney, Nicholas S. Altimari, Assistant United States Attorney, Marc L.
    Penchansky, Third Year Legal Intern, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-
    lee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    After pleading guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to pos-
    session with intent to distribute cocaine base, 1 and maintaining a place
    for distribution and use of controlled substances, 2 Darryl Thomas
    received a sentence of 240 months incarceration. In his plea agree-
    ment, Thomas waived his right to appeal his sentence; however,
    Thomas now appeals claiming that the district court sentenced him
    contrary to law. Specifically, Thomas contends that the district court
    erred by finding him responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack
    cocaine and sentencing him under the federal sentencing guidelines
    for crack cocaine instead of powder cocaine. We find that Thomas
    knowingly and freely waived his right to appeal; consequently, we
    dismiss the appeal.
    A defendant may, as part of a plea agreement, agree to waive his
    right to appeal a sentence imposed under the federal sentencing
    guidelines.3 Thomas's plea agreement provided, in part,
    Defendant is aware that Title 18 United States Code, Section
    3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence
    imposed. Acknowledging all this, Defendant THOMAS
    knowingly waives the right to appeal his sentence (or the
    manner in which it was determined) on the grounds set forth
    in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 or on any
    other ground whatever, in exchange for the concessions
    made by the United States in this Plea Agreement .
    However, the waiver will have no effect unless the record shows that
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
     (1994).
    2 See 
    21 U.S.C. § 856
     (1994).
    3 See United States v. Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
    , 53 (4th Cir. 1990).
    2
    it was knowing and voluntary, and that the court specifically ques-
    tioned Thomas concerning the waiver provision.4
    At the FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 colloquy, the district court thoroughly
    questioned Thomas to ensure he was competent to enter a plea, and
    that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea. Specifi-
    cally, the court inquired into Thomas's education, mental health, use
    of drugs or medication, and whether Thomas understood all the rights
    he was forfeiting by pleading guilty. Thomas acknowledged that he
    understood his rights, consulted with counsel, understood the conse-
    quences of his plea, and was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty.
    Further, the court asked Thomas if the agreed statement of facts accu-
    rately reflected his participation in the criminal conduct to which he
    was pleading guilty. Thomas answered, "Yes, sir." Accordingly, we
    find that Thomas made an intelligent and informed decision when he
    voluntarily pled guilty.5
    Moreover, the court asked Thomas if he understood that he was
    waiving the right to appeal his sentence. Thomas answered, "Yes,
    sir." Further, the court inquired whether Thomas had discussed the
    waiver provision with counsel and fully understood the consequences
    of his action. Again, Thomas answered, "Yes, sir." Because the court
    fully questioned Thomas during the Rule 11 hearing regarding waiv-
    ing his appellate rights, and Thomas's statements at a plea colloquy
    are "strong evidence of voluntariness,"6 the waiver of appellate rights
    is valid and enforceable.7
    Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argu-
    ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
    sional process.
    DISMISSED
    _________________________________________________________________
    4 See United States v. Marin, 
    961 F.2d 493
    , 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United
    States v. Wessells, 
    936 F.2d 165
    , 167 (4th Cir. 1991).
    5 See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 31 (1970); Boykin v.
    Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
    , 242 (1969).
    6 See United States v. Defusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 119 (4th Cir. 1991).
    7 See United States v. Wessells , 
    936 F.2d 165
     (4th Cir. 1991); United
    States v. Wiggins, 
    905 F.2d 51
     (4th Cir. 1990).
    3