United States v. David Wayne Harris ( 2000 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4554
DAVID WAYNE HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.
(CR-94-26)
Submitted: January 18, 2000
Decided: February 11, 2000
Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
William A. Lascara, PENDER & COWARD, P.C., Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Rob-
ert J. Seidel, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
David Wayne Harris appeals from the district court's order revok-
ing his supervised release and sentencing him to thirty-six months of
incarceration. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Harris claims on appeal that the district court abused its discretion
because it did not consider the advisory sentencing range suggested
in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The record reflects that
both parties briefed the court on the recommended guideline range
and that the court made explicit reference to the fact that the guideline
range was advisory and non-binding. Thus, we find that the court did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing Harris to the maximum allow-
able sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994). See United States
v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). We also conclude that we
need not evaluate whether the district court erred by determining that
Harris embezzled from one of his employers. In light of Harris' com-
plete failure to conform his actions to the terms and conditions of his
supervised release, the litany of Harris' violations, and the court's
explicit statement that its revocation and sentencing decisions were
not based upon its finding that Harris committed a felony, any error
that the court may have made in determining that Harris embezzled
from his employer was harmless and would not merit reversal of the
revocation of his supervised release or his sentence. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 52(a).
We affirm the revocation of Harris' supervised release and his sen-
tence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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