United States v. James Martin , 581 F. App'x 314 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4132
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES WILLIAM MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00191-WO-2)
Submitted: August 7, 2014 Decided: August 22, 2014
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James William Martin pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams
or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). Martin asked the district court to
vary downward from his sentencing range of 168-210 months. The
district court agreed that a variant sentence was appropriate
and sentenced Martin to a 150-month term of imprisonment.
Martin challenges the reasonableness of this sentence on appeal.
We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46,
51 (2007). Martin contends that the sentence imposed by the
district court was unreasonable because it was greater than
necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012). Martin’s substantive unreasonableness claim,
in essence, is that the district court should have varied
further downward. A sentence within or below the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011). Moreover, Gall mandates that we “give due deference to
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the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the
appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different
sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of
the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Martin argues that his sentence is higher than
necessary in consideration of two factors: one, that the drug
quantity attributed by the court was increased based on his
confession to law enforcement at the time of his arrest; and
two, that the court did not adequately consider avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities amongst defendants with
similar criminal records and found guilty of similar conduct.
Martin points to his co-defendant, Rafael Garcia Olvera,
receiving a lesser sentence on the drug charge. The district
court carefully considered each of these arguments and imposed a
below-Guidelines sentence that accounted for these, and other
concerns.
At bottom, Martin asks this court to reweigh the
sentencing factors to reach a result different than that of the
district court. This we cannot do. See United States v.
Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 943-44 (4th Cir. 2014) (“We must defer
to the district court and affirm a reasonable sentence, even if
we would have imposed something different.”). The extent of the
variance reflects the court’s concerted effort to balance the
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seriousness of the offense with the need to treat similarly
situated defendants similarly. The district court varied
downward from the bottom of the Guidelines range, 168 months, to
150 months’ imprisonment.
The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors in
light of Martin’s personal circumstances and the offense. The
record reflects that the district court performed an
individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors as they
applied to the case. The district court amply justified its
decision to vary downward from the Guidelines range by eighteen
months, rendering the variance reasonable. See United States v.
Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007)
(reviewing a non-Guidelines sentence requires that this court
evaluate both the reasonableness of the decision to vary or
depart and “the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range”).
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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