United States v. Graves , 311 F. App'x 638 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4598
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SCOTTIE LEE GRAVES,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 08-4599
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SCOTTIE LEE GRAVES,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 08-6834
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SCOTTIE LEE GRAVES,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:00-cr-00123-JAB-1; 1:04-cr-00220-JAB-
1; 1:06-cv-00940-JAB-RAE)
Submitted: January 14, 2009 Decided: February 19, 2009
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant in
Nos. 08-4598; 08-4599. Scottie Lee Graves, Appellant Pro Se in
No. 08-6834. Michael Francis Joseph, Angela Hewlett Miller,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Scottie Lee Graves was charged with violating the
terms of his supervised release. At his supervised release
revocation hearing, Graves admitted that he had committed the
violations as charged. The district court revoked release and
sentenced Graves to concurrent eighteen-month prison terms.
Graves now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court abused its discretion in revoking release and
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Graves has filed a
pro se brief raising additional issues. We affirm.
Graves initially contends that the district court
erred in revoking his supervised release. We review the
district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
Cir. 1999). The district court need only find a violation of a
condition of release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d
392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). In light of Graves’ admission that he
committed the release violations as charged and the statutory
requirement that release be revoked when a defendant, like
Graves, possesses a controlled substance, see 18 U.S.C.
3
§ 3583(g) (2006), revocation of release was not an abuse of
discretion.
Graves also contends that his sentence is
unreasonable. A sentence imposed following revocation of
supervised release will be affirmed if it is within the
applicable statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir 2006). Here,
our review of the record reveals that Graves’ revocation
sentence falls below the statutory maximum of twenty-four
months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006) (authorizing
revocation sentence of up to two years when underlying offense
is a Class D felony). Further, the sentence is procedurally
reasonable: the district court considered both the Chapter 7
advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See Crudup,
461 F.3d at 438-40. Furthermore, the sentence is substantively
reasonable, for the court adequately explained its reasons for
imposing the concurrent eighteen-month sentences. See id. at
440.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in these cases and have found no meritorious issues for
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appeal. * We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel=s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on his client. Graves’ “Emergency Extraordinary Writ for
Release,” or motion for bail, and his motion for “Emergency
Extraordinary Writ for Immediate Modification/Reduction of Term
Imposed” are denied. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
The issues Graves raises in his pro se brief are without
merit.
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