United States v. Ramirez-Noyola , 145 F. App'x 807 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4335
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SILVESTRE RAMIREZ-NOYOLA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (CR-04-130)
Submitted: August 3, 2005 Decided: August 22, 2005
Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric D. Placke, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Silvestre Ramirez-Noyola was convicted by a jury of one
count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000). Ramirez-Noyola was
sentenced to seventy-six months’ imprisonment. We find no error
and affirm Ramirez-Noyola’s conviction and sentence.
Ramirez-Noyola first contends that the trial court erred
when it admitted, over defense objection, testimony regarding prior
possession of the firearm at issue. Ramirez-Noyola asserts the
testimony was offered to show general bad character and was
therefore inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). He further
asserts that even if the testimony was permissible under Rule
404(b), it should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 as its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
“Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of
evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district
court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996). “We
will find that discretion to have been abused only when the
district court acted ‘arbitrarily or irrationally.’” United
States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993)). To preserve
a claim of error predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence, a
- 2 -
party must make a timely objection “stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the
context.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
51(b). In the context of Rule 404(b), this court has broadly
interpreted the rule, holding that it “‘is an inclusive rule that
allows admission of evidence of other acts relevant to an issue at
trial except that which proves only criminal disposition.’” United
States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Ramirez-Noyola objected to admission of testimony
regarding his possession of the firearm on prior occasions. The
district court found this evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) for
the purpose of determining who had the right to exercise dominion
and control over the firearm. The issue was significant as the
firearm was retrieved by police officers from Ramirez-Noyola’s
companion. After determining that the testimony was admissible for
something other than criminal disposition, the district court
performed the Rule 403 balancing test and found the probative value
substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. We find
the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this
evidence.
Ramirez-Noyola next contends the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2000). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “[t]he
- 3 -
verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
“[W]e have defined ‘substantial evidence,’ in the context of a
criminal action, as that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc)).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court
does not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.
1997). Where “the evidence supports different, reasonable
interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.
1994)). Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has admonished that we
not examine evidence in a piecemeal fashion, but consider it in
cumulative context.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863 (citations omitted).
“The focus of appellate review, therefore, of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support a conviction is on the complete picture,
viewed in context and in the light most favorable to the
Government, that all of the evidence portrayed.” Id.- 4 -
To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
Government must establish that “(1) the defendant previously had
been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed . . . the
firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting commerce,
because the firearm had travelled [sic] in interstate or foreign
commerce at some point during its existence.” United States v.
Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). After
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
conviction.
Accordingly, we affirm Ramirez-Noyola’s conviction and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 5 -