Westmoreland Coal Company, Inc v. DOWCP , 548 F. App'x 840 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1198
WESTMORELAND COAL COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; HASKELL SWINEY,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.
(12-0126-BLA)
Submitted: September 19, 2013 Decided: September 27, 2013
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul E. Frampton, Thomas M. Hancock, BOWLES RICE LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Petitioner. Joseph E. Wolfe,
Ryan C. Gilligan, WOLFE, WILLIAMS, RUTHERFORD & REYNOLDS,
Norton, Virginia, for Respondent Haskell Swiney.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Westmoreland Coal Company (“Employer”) petitions for
review of the Benefits Review Board’s (“Board”) decision and
order affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) award of
benefits to former employee Haskell Swiney under the Black Lung
Benefits Act (“Act”), 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 2007 & Supp.
2013). We deny the petition for review.
We review the Board’s and the ALJ’s legal conclusions
de novo and “independent[ly] review . . . the record to
determine whether the ALJ’s findings of fact were supported by
substantial evidence.” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Compton, 211
F.3d 203, 207-08 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “‘Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla’; it is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
In conducting this review, we confine ourselves to the grounds
on which the Board based its decision. Daniels Co. v. Mitchell,
479 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
Subject to the substantial evidence requirement, we
defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and “evaluation of
the proper weight to accord conflicting medical opinions.”
Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
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678 F.3d 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2012). The ALJ is not bound to
accept any medical expert opinion but “must evaluate the
evidence, weigh it, and draw his own conclusions,” giving
consideration to “the qualifications of the experts, the
opinions’ reasoning, their reliance on objectively determinable
symptoms and established science, their detail of analysis, and
their freedom from irrelevant distractions and prejudices.”
Underwood v. Elkay Mining, Inc., 105 F.3d 946, 949, 951 (4th
Cir. 1997), superseded on other grounds as stated in Elm Grove
Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 480 F.3d
278, 287 (4th Cir. 2007).
If a miner was employed in underground coal mines for
fifteen or more years, has had a chest x-ray interpreted as
negative for complicated pneumoconiosis, and demonstrates that
he has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment,
he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he is totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis (“fifteen-year presumption”). * 30
U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(a) (2013). Once the
miner has established entitlement to the presumption, the
employer “may rebut such presumption only by establishing that
*
This presumption was restored by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556, 124 Stat.
119, 260 (2010).
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(A) such miner does not . . . have pneumoconiosis, or that (B)
his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or
in connection with, employment in a coal mine.” 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 921(c)(4); see 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(a).
Employer does not dispute that Swiney was employed in
underground coal mines for fifteen or more years and that all of
the chest x-rays were interpreted as negative for complicated
pneumoconiosis. Employer does dispute that Swiney demonstrated
that he has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment. Specifically, Employer argues that the ALJ erred in
discounting the contrary medical opinions of its expert
physicians on the issue of total disability.
A miner may prove total disability through qualifying
pulmonary function tests, qualifying arterial blood gas studies,
a showing of cor pulmonale with right-sided congestive heart
failure, or medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(2)(i)-(iv)
(2013); see 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(c) (requiring miner to prove
total disability in accordance with § 718.204). The ALJ must,
however, consider any contrary probative evidence in deciding
whether the miner has met his burden. 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.204(b)(2); see 30 U.S.C. § 923 (b) (“In determining the
validity of claims . . ., all relevant evidence shall be
considered . . . .”). “If contrary evidence does exist, the ALJ
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must assign the contrary evidence appropriate weight and
determine whether it outweighs the evidence that supports a
finding of total disability.” Lane v. Union Carbide Corp., 105
F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1997).
Upon review, we conclude that the ALJ complied with
the Administrative Procedure Act and fully discussed and
considered the opinions of Employer’s physicians in finding that
the medical opinions were insufficient contrary evidence to
outweigh the qualifying arterial blood gas studies that the ALJ
found established Swiney’s total disability. See Milburn
Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 532 n.9 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“An ALJ has discretion to disregard an opinion unsupported by a
sufficient rationale.”). We are not permitted to reweigh the
medical evidence. Id. at 536. Thus, we conclude that the ALJ
did not err in finding that Swiney was entitled to the fifteen-
year presumption.
The burden then shifted to Employer to affirmatively
“rebut such presumption only by establishing that (A) such miner
does not . . . have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his respiratory
or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection
with, employment in a coal mine.” 30 U.S.C.A. § 921(c)(4); see
20 C.F.R. 718.305(a); Morrison v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 644
F.3d 473, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2011). Upon review of the evidence
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submitted in this case, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Employer failed to affirmatively
rebut the presumption. See 20 C.F.R. 718.201(a)(2); Harman
Mining Co., 678 F.3d at 311. Thus, the ALJ did not err in
awarding benefits under the Act.
Accordingly, we deny Employer’s petition for review.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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