United States v. Santana , 286 F. App'x 89 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5112
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSUE SANTANA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00062-JPB-2)
Submitted: June 5, 2008 Decided: July 9, 2008
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William Francis Xavier Becker, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant.
Sharon L. Potter, United States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti,
Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Josue Santana challenges the district court’s pretrial
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his shoe
following a traffic stop, and his 78-month sentence for conspiracy
to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine.
Santana was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack
cocaine, distribution of crack cocaine and cocaine, and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846
(2000). Santana moved to suppress evidence against him that was
seized following a traffic stop, arguing that he was detained and
searched without probable cause. The district court denied the
motion after an evidentiary hearing. Santana was found guilty of
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and distribution of crack
cocaine following a jury trial.
Santana first argues on appeal that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. He contends that the
police lacked probable cause for the stop because it occurred six
hours after the officer observed his vehicle in the driveway of a
known drug dealer. He also argues that the stop was deliberately
prolonged beyond the time necessary to write tickets for his
alleged infractions--excessively tinted windows and a suspended
registration--so that a K-9 officer could come to the scene with a
narcotic-sniffing dog, and that he was unreasonably and
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impermissibly required to remove his shoes, within which the
evidence against him was discovered.
We review the district court’s factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d
212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). When a suppression motion has been
denied, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998). “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred,” regardless of the officer’s
subjective motivations. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810,
813-19 (1996) (citations omitted).
We hold that the stop of Santana’s vehicle was supported
by probable cause. Although the stop occurred significantly after
Santana was observed at the home of a known drug dealer, the stop
was based upon two traffic violations, excessively tinted windows
and a suspended registration. Accordingly, the stop was supported
by probable cause, regardless of the officer’s subjective
motivations.
“[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under
that Amendment.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
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(1973). “[W]here the formal arrest quickly follows the challenged
search, it is not important that the search preceded the arrest.”
United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted). In order for the fruits of the search to be
admissible, the arrest must have been supported by probable cause
at the time that the search occurred. Id. A warrantless arrest is
supported by probable cause “where the facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient for a
reasonable person to believe that a crime has been or is being
committed by the person to be arrested.” Id.We hold that Santana’s detention following the stop and
the search of his shoes were supported by probable cause. After
Santana was stopped for traffic violations, but prior to the search
and arrest, Santana advised the officer that he was staying with a
friend. Based upon the officer’s personal observations, however,
he knew that Santana was staying at a nearby motel. Santana’s
conduct of giving false information constituted probable cause for
his warrantless arrest. Because the arrest was supported by
probable cause, the search of Santana’s person, including his
shoes, was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Santana’s
motion to suppress.
Santana also argues that the district court erred in
enhancing his sentence based upon facts that were determined by the
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court by a preponderance of the evidence. After the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
a district court is no longer bound by the range prescribed by the
sentencing guidelines. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546
(4th Cir. 2005). Under an advisory guidelines scheme, a district
court does not violate the Sixth Amendment by making factual
findings as to sentencing factors by a preponderance of the
evidence as long as the fact-finding does not enhance the sentence
beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute. See
United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding
that “Booker does not in the end move any decision from judge to
jury, or change the burden of persuasion”).
Because the district court treated the Guidelines as
advisory pursuant to Booker, the enhancements based on the court’s
factual findings did not violate Santana’s Sixth Amendment rights.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Santana’s motion to suppress and Santana’s
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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