Hunt v. Sandhir , 295 F. App'x 584 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6457
ROY HUNT, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SANDHIR, M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center; THOMPSON, M.D.,
Wallens Ridge State Prison; LUCY DOSSETT, M.D., International
Radiology Group, LLC; STANFORD, Registered Nurse, Wallens
Ridge State Prison; COLLINS, Registered Nurse, Wallens Ridge
State Prison; CLARK, Registered Nurse, Wallens Ridge State
Prison; BROWN, Correctional Officer Sergeant, Wallens Ridge
State Prison; DAVID ROBINSON, Warden, Wallens Ridge State
Prison; FRED SCHILLING, Health Service Director; KING, M.D.;
A. WARREN,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
JOHN DOE, on 2/23/06 M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center; A.J.
UNKNOWN, on 2/2/06, M.D., Powhatan Correctional Center,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00539-RLW)
Submitted: August 27, 2008 Decided: September 29, 2008
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Roy Hunt, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Carlene Booth Johnson, PERRY LAW
FIRM, PC, Dillwyn, Virginia; Rodney Seth Dillman, HANCOCK, DANIEL,
JOHNSON & NAGLE, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Susan Bland Curwood,
Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Roy Hunt, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order
granting the various Defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) suit, alleging
deliberate indifference regarding his fractured elbow. We affirm
the district court’s order as to all Defendants except for Dr.
Thompson. As to Thompson, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
Hunt’s complaint alleged that, after he fractured his
elbow, he received improper treatment at two different
institutions. With regard to Thompson, Hunt asserted that Thompson
took him off pain medication on April 30, 2006, and only resumed
his medication when he was ordered to by “Richmond” on July 16.
Hunt describes his pain as “unthinkable” and asserted that his
elbow was not healing, but instead was getting worse. He alleged
that he continued to seek medical treatment or medication to no
avail. In addition, Hunt alleged that Thompson refused him pain
medication, at least in part, because Thompson was annoyed that
Hunt had been transferred while he had an injury and upset that
Hunt had been filing grievances. Further, Hunt averred that, after
he reinjured his elbow in late July, he informed Thompson that he
had been unable to sleep, due to the severe pain, for four days.
In response, Thompson did not examine him and instead told him that
he would be seeing a orthopedic specialist and could take up the
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issue with him. Finally, Hunt states that he told Thompson that
his elbow and knee braces had been confiscated by a nurse, that
they had been prescribed by other doctors, and that he was in pain
without them. Thompson allegedly responded that Hunt would have to
take that up with the nurse. The district court granted Thompson’s
motion to dismiss.
We review the district court’s decision to grant a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Brooks v. City
of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). The factual
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be accepted as true
and those facts must be construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244
(4th Cir. 1999). Although a complaint need not contain detailed
allegations, the facts alleged must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).
We find that Hunt has sufficiently alleged that he
suffered from a serious medical need — a fractured elbow. See
Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
broken hand is serious injury and permanent harm or “lingering
disability” could result absent proper evaluation, possible
realignment, and treatment). In addition, Hunt asserts that his
medical treatment was delayed based on non-medical reasons,
specifically that Thompson was inconvenienced and annoyed by both
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Hunt’s grievances and his initial transfer. See Monmouth County
Corr. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that
deliberate indifference can be shown when medical treatment is
delayed for non-medical reasons). Moreover, Hunt contends that,
after his fractured elbow was reinjured, he was not treated by
Thompson for at least nine days* causing him terrible pain and
rendering him unable to sleep. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t., 865 F.2d
198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (failure to treat dental problems for
three months); H.C. ex rel. Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080,
1086-87 (11th Cir. 1986) (three-day delay in medical treatment for
shoulder injury); Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir.
1984) (failure to treat infected tooth causing “severe pain” for
twelve days).
Construing all the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to Hunt, we conclude that Hunt has stated a
claim against Thompson for deliberate indifference to his fractured
elbow. He alleges that Thompson ended his pain medication because
he was irritated that Hunt had been transferred; that he delegated
the decision as to whether Hunt should be permitted to use
prescribed braces to a nurse; and that, when Hunt reinjured his
fractured elbow, Thompson did not treat him for at least nine days.
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that Thompson
knew of Hunt’s injuries and chose to ignore them, or at least to
*
On the ninth day, Hunt filed the instant complaint.
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unnecessarily prolong Hunt’s pain. Accordingly, we vacate this
portion of the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
With regard to the remaining Defendants, we have
carefully reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. See Hunt v. Sandhir, No. 3:06-cv-00539 (E.D. Va. Feb. 29,
2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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