United States v. Haskell , 350 F. App'x 791 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4497
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRANDON HASKELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:08-cr-00147-PMD-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Peter Thomas
Phillips, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Haskell pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to being a felon in possession of a firearm and
ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The
district court sentenced Haskell to a seventy-month term of
imprisonment, a sentence in the middle of the advisory
guidelines range. On appeal, Haskell’s counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that, in her view, there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. Counsel questions, however, whether the district court
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Haskell’s plea
and whether the sentence is reasonable. Haskell was informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done
so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of
the plea hearing but identifies no deficiencies in the district
court’s Rule 11 inquiries. Our careful review of the record
convinces us that the district court fully complied with the
mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Haskell’s guilty plea and
ensured that Haskell entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily
and that the plea was supported by an independent factual basis.
See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th
Cir. 1991).
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Haskell’s counsel also questions whether Haskell’s
sentence is reasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness
under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). This review
requires appellate consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. In determining
whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable, this court must
first assess whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s advisory guidelines range. Id. at 596-97. This
court then must consider whether the district court considered
the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), analyzed the
arguments presented by the parties, and made “an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
597; United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court committed no procedural error in this case.
Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we
presume that a sentence imposed within the properly calculated
guidelines range is reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 347 (2007); United States v. Smith, 566 F.3d 410, 414 (4th
Cir. 2009). Applying the presumption of reasonableness to
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Haskell’s within-guidelines sentence, which Haskell fails to
rebut on appeal, we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing,
of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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