Burman Mathis v. David Goldberg , 538 F. App'x 310 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1455
BURMAN Y. MATHIS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DAVID S. GOLDBERG, Esq.; STUART MUNTZING SKOK,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:12-cv-01777-DKC)
Submitted: August 13, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013
Before KING, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Burman Y. Mathis, Appellant Pro Se. James Edward Dickerman,
Lauren Elizabeth Marini, ECCLESTON & WOLF, PC, Hanover,
Maryland; James Xavier Crogan, Jr., SCHENKER, KRAUSE, CROGAN &
LOPEZ, Owings Mills, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Burman Mathis brought this civil action in the
district court seeking damages from the arbitrator and a witness
who testified in state arbitration proceedings related to
Mathis’ divorce. The district court granted the Defendants’
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. We affirm.
Some of Mathis’ claims are, in essence, an attempt to
challenge the results of the arbitration proceeding. He twice
sought to challenge that proceeding in state court. The first
action resulted in a state court decision confirming the
arbitration agreement, and Mathis entered into a settlement
agreement in the second state court action. Lower federal
district courts generally are not empowered to review state
court proceedings, and this case provides no exception to the
general rule. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); District of Columbia Ct. of
App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
We next address Mathis’ claims for damages arising
from the Defendants’ conduct during the arbitration proceedings,
rather than the result of the proceedings. Those claims are not
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia
2
Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). However,
we conclude that these claims lack merit. 1
Defendant Goldberg, the arbitrator, is immune from
damages because he was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. See
Gill v. Ripley, 724 A.2d 88, 92 (Md. 1999) (recognizing the
common law doctrine of judicial immunity); see also Olson v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that courts of appeals have uniformly extended judicial
and quasi-judicial immunity to arbitrators; collecting cases).
Similarly, it long has been established that witnesses are
absolutely immune from damages for their testimony given in
legal proceedings. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36
(1983). Therefore, Defendant Skok is immune from damages as
well. 2
Mathis also asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judicial notice and a hearing, his
1
The district court analyzed these claim under the doctrine
of non-mutual collateral estoppel. Although we express no
disagreement with this analysis, we may affirm on any basis
apparent on the face of the record. See MM ex rel. DM v. School
Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002).
2
We note that Defendant Skok did not raise a defense of
immunity in the district court. In any event, the claim against
her is meritless. Mathis cannot make out a claim for fraud
because he has not made a plausible showing that he relied to
his detriment on the testimony of Skok, a witness for his
ex-wife, and reliance is an essential element of fraud.
Gross v. Sussex Inc., 630 A.2d 1156, 1161 (Md. 1993).
3
request for sanctions, and his motion to recuse. We affirm the
denial of these motions based on the reasoning of the district
court. Mathis v. Goldberg, No. 8:12-cv-01777-DKC (D. Md. Mar.
25, 2013).
In sum, finding no error, we affirm. We deny leave to
file a “CD supplement.” We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
material before this Court and argument will not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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