United States v. Walker , 374 F. App'x 408 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4292
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO DEON WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (4:08-cr-00079-RGD-FBS-1)
Submitted: February 25, 2010 Decided: April 16, 2010
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert
Edward Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport
News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Deon Walker appeals from the 360-month
sentence imposed following his jury conviction on one count of
conspiracy to obstruct, delay, and affect interstate commerce by
robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(2006) (“Count 1”), one count of obstructing, delaying, and
affecting interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Count 2”), and one count of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006) (“Count 3”). Walker’s counsel
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court abused its
discretion in not permitting Walker’s counsel to inquire whether
a Government witness expected favorable consideration at
sentencing in an unrelated state prosecution. Walker filed a
pro se supplemental brief, arguing that the Government failed to
prove that the alleged robbery affected interstate commerce and
questioning the credibility of the witnesses. The Government
has not filed a brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
“[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is
a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
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475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the district court has “wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.” Id. at 679. Thus, we review the district
court’s limitations on cross-examination for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th
Cir. 2002). “The critical question . . . is whether the
defendant is allowed an opportunity to examine a witness[’]
subjective understanding of his bargain with the government, for
it is this understanding which is of probative value on the
issue of bias.” United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 176 (4th
Cir. 1996).
We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in preventing Walker’s counsel from questioning the
Government witness about the details of an unrelated state
murder investigation. The record clearly demonstrates that
counsel was given the opportunity to fully question the witness
about his deal to cooperate with the Government for favorable
consideration as a consequence of his testimony against Walker
in the present case. Allowing counsel to delve further into the
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details of the witness’ cooperation in the state murder
investigation for favorable consideration at a possible state
sentencing would have served no real purpose, as counsel had
already established that the witness sought favorable treatment
for his cooperation both in the prosecution against Walker and
in the unrelated state investigation.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Walker argues that
the Government failed to prove that the alleged robbery affected
interstate commerce and questions the credibility of the
witnesses implicating him in the robbery. A jury’s verdict
“must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the
view most favorable to the Government, to support it.”
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The court
“may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses [because] [t]hose functions are reserved for the
jury.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.
1997) (internal citation omitted).
A conviction under the Hobbs Act requires the
government to prove “(1) the underlying robbery or extortion
crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.” United
States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 2003). However,
“the impact on commerce [may be] small, and it may be shown by
proof of probabilities without evidence that any particular
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commercial movements were affected.” United States v. Brantley,
777 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1985). The interstate commerce
requirement has been broadly interpreted and courts have found
it “satisfied even where the effect on interstate commerce is
indirect, minimal and less than certain,” although the effect
must be “reasonably probable.” United States v. Buffey, 899
F.2d 1402, 1404 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, we have held that
“[d]rug dealing . . . is an inherently economic enterprise that
affects interstate commerce. For this reason, the robbery of a
drug dealer has been found to be the kind of act which satisfies
the ‘affecting commerce’ element of the Hobbs Act.” Williams,
342 F.3d at 355 (internal citation omitted).
We conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Government, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the Hobbs Act. The victim, the co-conspirator,
and a witness all testified that Walker was involved in the
robbery. Moreover, the victim admitted that he was a known
crack dealer, which Walker’s co-conspirator confirmed, and that
he earned at least some of the cash stolen by selling crack
cocaine. Accordingly, we find that the jury’s verdict is
supported by substantial evidence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Walker, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Walker requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Walker. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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