United States v. Michael Stevens , 455 F. App'x 343 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4019
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL LLOYD STEVENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-11)
Submitted: November 21, 2011 Decided: November 29, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jacqueline A. Hallinan, HALLINAN LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United
States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Lloyd Stevens appeals his conviction following
a jury trial on one count of conspiracy to retaliate against a
person cooperating with law enforcement, in violation of
18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b)(2), (f) (West Supp. 2011). He argues on
appeal that the district court erred in allowing the Government
to introduce as evidence in its case-in-chief a stipulation of
facts establishing that he and his confederates believed the
intended victim of their planned retaliation was cooperating
with federal law enforcement officials. We affirm.
Following his indictment, Stevens entered into a plea
agreement with the Government, in which he agreed to plead
guilty to the conspiracy charge. Attached to the plea agreement
was a stipulation of facts indicating that Stevens had conspired
with others to retaliate against an intended victim for his
cooperation with federal authorities concerning a federal
offense by assaulting him.
The plea agreement also contains a provision waiving
Stevens’ rights under Fed. R. Evid. 410. Specifically, Stevens
agreed that if he withdrew from the plea agreement or proceeded
to trial on the conspiracy charge, the Government was permitted
to use the stipulation of facts as evidence in its case-in-
chief. Stevens ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. In turn,
the Government introduced the stipulation of facts as evidence
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against Stevens in its case-in-chief at trial. On appeal,
Stevens argues that the district court erred in allowing such
admission.
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides
that any statements made by a defendant in the course of plea
discussions that do not result in a guilty plea are thereafter
not admissible against him. Fed. R. Evid. 410. Because Rule
410 is an exception to the general principle that all relevant
evidence is admissible at trial, its limitations are to be
construed narrowly. United States v. Roberts, ___ F.3d ___,
No. 10–1230–cr, 2011 WL 4489813, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2011).
Moreover, its protections are waivable. United States v.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 195, 205 (1995) (holding that Rule 410, in
effect, creates “a privilege of the defendant, and, like other
evidentiary privileges, this one may be waived or varied at the
defendant’s request” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); accord United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997,
1001-06 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding validity of Rule 410 waiver
and allowing defendant’s plea statements into evidence as part
of the Government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Sylvester,
583 F.3d 285, 289-91 (5th Cir. 2009) (same and citing decisions
from the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits supporting the
proposition that statements made during plea negotiations can be
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waived for use as affirmative evidence of the defendant’s
guilt).
Whether a valid waiver of rights occurred is a
question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Young, 223
F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (addressing a waiver under Rule
410); accord United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 n.3
(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that waiver of the right to counsel is
a question of law reviewed de novo). We review the district
court’s evidentiary ruling admitting statements into evidence
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331,
350 (4th Cir. 2009). A district court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision to admit evidence is arbitrary or
irrational. United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313
(4th Cir. 2002).
Absent fraud, coercion, or some affirmative indication
that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or
involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions
of Rule 410 is valid and enforceable. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at
210. On appeal, Stevens does not suggest the presence of any
fraud or coercion and makes no claim that he entered into the
plea agreement involuntarily. Rather, he suggests that his
agreement to waive Rule 410 was not made knowingly because he
did not know at the time he entered into the plea agreement that
the Government would be required to prove that the law
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enforcement officials with whom the victim cooperated were
federal officials.
We reject this argument because Stevens utterly fails
to explain how any such lack of knowledge affected his ability
to enter into the plea agreement in a knowing fashion. We
further reject as without merit Stevens’ assertion that
information about the federal character of the victim’s
cooperation was unknown to him at the time he entered into the
plea agreement.
Because the waiver was valid and enforceable, the
district court properly allowed to Government to introduce the
stipulation of facts as evidence in its case-in-chief.
Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1001-06; Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289-91.
We reject Stevens’ assertion that the stipulation served “no
fact finding purpose,” as it was relevant to and probative of
Stevens’ criminal culpability on the conspiracy charge. As
such, its admission into evidence enhanced the reliability of
the fact-finding process. See Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 294 (“If
anything, to ignore relevant evidence of culpability simply
because that evidence was discovered during the course of plea
negotiations would arguably undermine the truth-seeking function
of our criminal justice system.”).
Stevens also asserts that the stipulation “improperly
prejudiced the jury” against him. Insofar as Stevens is making
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an argument under Fed. R. Evid. 403, it, too, is without merit.
“Rule 403 only requires suppression of evidence that results in
unfair prejudice — prejudice that damages an opponent for
reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal
to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.” United States
v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks, emphasis, and alteration omitted).
Stevens, however, fails to point to anything in the record to
support the conclusion that the admission of the stipulation of
facts was unfairly prejudicial.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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