Jorge Duran-Quezada v. Clark Construction Group, LLC , 582 F. App'x 238 ( 2014 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1069
    JORGE DURAN-QUEZADA;    CARLOS    GALLEGOS;    MARCELINO   MERCADO
    CASTRO,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    CLARK CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC; BALFOUR BEATTY CONSTRUCTION,
    LLC; MANGANARO MIDATLANTIC, LLC,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.     J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
    Judge. (8:13-cv-02963-JFM)
    Submitted:   August 21, 2014                  Decided:   August 29, 2014
    Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Stephen Christopher Swift, Charity C. Emeronye Swift, SWIFT &
    SWIFT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for
    Appellants.   Michael J. Schrier, Katherine A. Calogero, JACKSON
    KELLY PLLC, Washington, DC, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jorge    Duran-Quezada,           Carlos        Gallegos,    and   Marcelino
    Mercado Castro (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district
    court’s order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
    failure      to   state     a     claim    under        Fed.   R.   Civ.    P.   12(b)(6).
    Plaintiffs argue that the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-
    3144, 3146, 3147 (West 2005 & Supp. 2014), confers a private
    cause of action.           Finding no error, we affirm.
    We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing
    a complaint for failure to state a claim, assuming that all
    well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint
    are true.         Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 
    658 F.3d 388
    , 391 (4th Cir.
    2011).       When determining whether a statute implicitly creates a
    private      cause    of    action,       we    focus     on    Congressional      intent.
    Thompson v. Thompson, 
    484 U.S. 174
    , 179 (1988).                            “[U]nless this
    congressional intent [to create a private cause of action] can
    be    inferred     from     the    language        of   the    statute,    the   statutory
    structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for
    implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.”                                Nw.
    Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 
    451 U.S. 77
    , 94 (1981).
    The majority of our sister Circuits to address this
    question have concluded that “neither the language, the history,
    nor    the     structure        of   the       [Davis-Bacon         Act]   supports   the
    implication of a private right of action.”                            United States ex
    2
    rel. Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 
    621 F.2d 1309
    , 1317 (5th
    Cir. 1980); see Gronchowski v. Phoenix Constr., 
    318 F.3d 80
    , 85
    (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting cases); Bane v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
    
    811 F.2d 1504
      (4th   Cir.   1987)    (No.     86-2036)   (agreeing   with
    Capeletti Bros.).     While the decisions of other circuits are not
    binding, their reasoning is persuasive, and we conclude that the
    district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.              We
    dispense     with   oral   argument       because    the   facts   and     legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
    court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3