United States v. McLaughlin ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 94-5759
JAMES MCLAUGHLIN, a/k/a Mac,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.
(CR-94-47)
Submitted: December 12, 1995
Decided: April 24, 1996
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
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COUNSEL
William P. Robinson, ROBINSON, BANKS & ANDERSON, Nor-
folk, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,
Laura M. Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
James McLaughlin appeals his conviction and sentence of life
incarceration for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 1 McLaughlin con-
tends that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw
his guilty plea and that his sentence was too severe because the evi-
dence used in determining his sentence was unreliable and false. The
information to which McLaughlin pleaded guilty also contained a for-
feiture provision under 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988). Although
McLaughlin consented to the forfeiture of drug-related assets in his
plea agreement, he seeks to challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the
evidence linking certain real property to criminal activity. We find
that McLaughlin knowingly and freely waived his right to appeal and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea; consequently, we affirm the order denying
McLaughlin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the
appeal.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
McLaughlin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 2 Withdrawal of a
guilty plea is not a matter of right.3 McLaughlin stated at sentencing
that he was satisfied with his counsel's actions and that there was no
other agreement with the Government other than the plea agreement.
McLaughlin's statements under oath at the FED . R. CRIM. P. 11 hear-
ing are presumptively trustworthy and credible affirmations,4 and
McLaughlin makes no showing that those statements were false.
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1 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988).
2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e); United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1393
(4th Cir. 1992) (in banc).
3 United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 857 (1991).
4 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
2
Because McLaughlin provides no credible evidence or claim of inno-
cence to support his claim that the Government breached the plea
agreement or that he was unduly pressured by his attorney to accept
the plea, McLaughlin does not meet his burden of showing a fair and
just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, even if the government
would not be prejudiced.5
At the FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 colloquy, the district court thoroughly
questioned McLaughlin to ensure he was competent to enter a plea
and that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea. Spe-
cifically, the court inquired into McLaughlin's education, mental
health, use of drugs or medication, and whether McLaughlin under-
stood all the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty. McLaughlin
acknowledged that he understood his rights, consulted with counsel,
understood the consequences of his plea, and was freely and voluntar-
ily pleading guilty. The plea agreement will be upheld because
McLaughlin made an intelligent and informed decision when he vol-
untarily pled guilty.6
Additionally, the court asked McLaughlin if he understood that he
was waiving the right to appeal his sentence. McLaughlin answered,
"Yes, ma'am, I do." Further, the court inquired whether he understood
that he would not be able to withdraw his plea even if his sentence
was more severe than he or his attorney expected. Again, McLaughlin
answered, "Yes, ma'am." Because the court fully questioned
McLaughlin during the Rule 11 hearing regarding waiving his appel-
late rights, the waiver of appellate rights is valid and enforceable.7
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying
McLaughlin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the
appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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5 FED. R. CRIM . P. 32(e); Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.
6 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
7 United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990).
3
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
4