United States v. Crandle , 274 F. App'x 324 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4522
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMETRIUS A. CRANDLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 07-4523
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VADRIEN TONISSA TYLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman,
District Judge. (4:06-cr-00137-JBF)
Submitted: March 31, 2008 Decided: April 22, 2008
Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David M. Tichanski, Hampton, Virginia; Michael S. Nachmanoff,
Federal Public Defender, Larry M. Dash, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellants. Chuck Rosenberg,
United States Attorney, Richard Cooke, Scott W. Putney, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Demetrius A. Crandle and
Vadrien T. Tyler appeal their jury convictions for conspiracy to
make false statements and obstruct an official proceeding, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (Count One); Crandle also
appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm and ammunition
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2000) (Count Three), and obstructing a federal grand jury, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2000) (Count Four). Finding
no error, we affirm.
Crandle and Tyler’s first claim is that there was
insufficient evidence to support their convictions. A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden.”
United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997).
“The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
This court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence,’ in the context of
a criminal action, as that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc)). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence,
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this court does not review the credibility of the witnesses and
assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony
in favor of the government. United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359,
364 (4th Cir. 1998). This court reviews both direct and
circumstantial evidence and permits “the government the benefit of
all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to
be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021
(4th Cir. 1982).
Under Count One, Crandle and Tyler were found guilty of
conspiracy to corruptly influence grand jury proceedings. In order
to prove that a defendant was involved in a conspiracy in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government must prove there was an
agreement between two or more people to commit a crime and an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Ellis, 121
F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir. 1997). The evidence of a conspiratorial
agreement does not need to be direct, but rather may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. Id. “Circumstantial evidence
tending to prove a conspiracy may consist of a defendant’s
‘relationship with other members of the conspiracy, the length of
this association, [the defendant’s] attitude [and] conduct, and the
nature of the conspiracy.’” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858 (quoting United
States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1984)). Proof of
a “tacit or mutual understanding” between the conspirators is
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sufficient to uphold a conspiracy conviction. Ellis, 121 F.3d at
922.
In this case, the object of the conspiracy was to
corruptly obstruct, influence, or impede grand jury proceedings, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). Therefore, to support a
conviction for conspiracy to violate § 1512(c), the Government must
prove the conspirators agreed to corruptly obstruct or impede an
official proceeding and committed an overt act in furtherance of
this agreement. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 372
(4th Cir. 1997) (analyzing analogous statutory language under 18
U.S.C. § 1503); see also United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 185
(2d Cir.) (defendant’s conduct “must have the natural and probable
effect of interfering with the due administration of justice”),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 115 (2007).
At trial, the Government produced a series of recordings
of telephone conversations between Crandle and Terry Gray, as well
as calls between Crandle and Tyler, that occurred while Crandle was
incarcerated in the Newport News City Jail. While Tyler and
Crandle assert that these conversations do not provide clear
evidence of a conspiracy to present false testimony before the
grand jury, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
their convictions on this count. The telephone conversations
between Crandle and Gray indicate that they were both frustrated
with Tyler’s reticence to appear before the grand jury, as Crandle
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demanded that Gray bring her to the jail so Crandle could convince
her to testify. Crandle also rehearsed his account of the events
on the night in question with Gray, as he claimed that all three of
them were in the car at the same time that evening and that Crandle
was not seated in the front passenger seat. Crandle also told Gray
that any fingerprints that may be found on the firearm could be
explained by the fact that he previously helped Tyler clear a jam
in the chamber. This account is repeated by Tyler before the grand
jury; however, Tyler’s testimony not only conflicted with Gray’s
testimony at trial and before the grand jury, but also with Tyler’s
statement to the arresting officer that she mistakenly left the
firearm in the car that morning and had not been in the vehicle
that evening.
While there is little evidence regarding direct
communications between Crandle and Tyler, there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence that Crandle used Gray, as his contact and
co-conspirator outside of the jail, to help convince Tyler to
testify before the grand jury and lie about Crandle’s possession of
her firearm. See United States v. Tucker, 376 F.3d 236, 238 (4th
Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 1428
(4th Cir. 1987)) (knowledge and participation in a conspiracy may
be proven by circumstantial evidence); Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858.
Tyler’s contradictory testimony before the grand jury, as well as
her false remarks regarding her contact with Crandle and the status
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of their relationship, provided further evidence that Tyler
fabricated her testimony at Crandle’s behest in order to avoid
charges against him for possession of a firearm by a felon. See
Collazo, 732 F.2d at 1205. While there are other reasonable
interpretations of the telephone conversations and testimony in
this case, it is left to the jury to decide which interpretation to
credit. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862. Accordingly, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and taking
all reasonable inferences therefrom, we conclude there was
sufficient evidence to support Crandle and Tyler’s convictions for
conspiracy to make false statements and obstruct an official
proceeding.
In addition to his conviction on the conspiracy count,
Crandle was also convicted on a separate count for corruptly
obstructing, influencing, or impeding the grand jury by attempting
to influence Tyler’s testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(2). To support a conviction under § 1512(c)(2), the
Government must prove that Crandle had knowledge or notice of the
grand jury proceedings and acted with intent to obstruct,
influence, or impede the proceedings. See Brooks, 111 F.3d at 372.
Crandle contends that Tyler’s testimony before the grand
jury must “stand on its own,” as there was no evidence of any
discussion between Crandle and Tyler regarding her grand jury
testimony. Crandle also notes that he did not appear before the
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grand jury and that there was no evidence he provided false
testimony. However, Crandle was not charged with perjury; rather,
he was charged with obstructing a grand jury proceeding by
attempting to influence Tyler’s testimony. As discussed above, the
recordings produced at trial indicated that Crandle contacted Gray
in an effort to pressure Tyler to provide false testimony by
claiming possession of the firearm. Furthermore, Tyler’s
contradictory and inconsistent testimony before the grand jury
provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that she was influenced
by Crandle and Gray to provide false statements on behalf of her
husband. Finally, Gray’s testimony, both at trial and before the
grand jury, demonstrated Crandle was attempting to convince Gray
and Tyler to lie to police and the grand jury to avoid prosecution
on the firearm charge. Accordingly, we find there was sufficient
evidence to support Crandle’s conviction for corruptly obstructing
or impeding an official proceeding.
As for Crandle’s conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
Government was required to demonstrate that Crandle: (1) was
previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) knowingly possessed,
transported, or received the firearm; and (3) that the possession
was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had traveled in
interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Langley, 62
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F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). At trial, Crandle
stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony and
that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Accordingly,
the only element before the jury was whether Crandle knowingly
possessed the firearm. Possession of a firearm may be actual or
constructive. See United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435 (4th
Cir. 2005). If the Government seeks to prove constructive
possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it must demonstrate that
the defendant intentionally and voluntarily “exercised dominion and
control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to
exercise dominion and control over the firearm.” Id. at 435-36.
Crandle asserts the evidence regarding the firearm was
“circumstantial and disputed,” as the Government failed to present
any evidence he knowingly and intentionally possessed the firearm.
Crandle contends the firearm belonged to Tyler and that she dropped
it as she left the car. There is no reliable evidence to support
this assertion, however, as Tyler’s testimony was contradictory,
and the jury found it was not credible. See United States v.
Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007). The efforts by Crandle,
Gray, and Tyler to present a false account of the events in
question provide further credence to the Government’s theory that
Tyler gave the firearm to Crandle and subsequently lied about her
possession of the gun in an attempt to mislead the grand jury.
Therefore, viewing the evidence collectively and in the light most
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favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support Crandle’s conviction for being
a felon in possession of a firearm.
Crandle and Tyler’s final claim is that the district
court erred by providing the jury with supplemental instructions
after deliberations had commenced. The necessity, extent, and
character of any supplemental instructions to the jury are matters
within the sound discretion of the district court. United
States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 219 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005). In
evaluating the adequacy of supplemental jury instructions given in
response to a question asked by the jury during deliberations, we
must examine “whether the court’s answer was reasonably responsive
to the jury’s question and whether the original and supplemental
instructions as a whole allowed the jury to understand the issue
presented to it.” Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219,
240 (4th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also United States v.
Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 977 (4th Cir. 1998).
While Crandle and Tyler contend that the district court’s
use of a special verdict form invaded the province of the jury,
this conclusory assertion fails to demonstrate how the district
court abused its discretion in responding to the jury’s inquiry.
The special verdict form directly addressed the jury’s difficulty
in assessing the defendants’ guilt as to Count One, as the form
clearly delineated the two grounds for a finding of guilt on the
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conspiracy charge and instructed the jury to indicate the basis for
their determination. While the jury returned with a verdict
shortly after being provided with the special verdict form, this
does not conclusively demonstrate the form was prejudicial to the
defendants. Rather, as the district court explained, the jurors’
confusion appeared to be related to the dual nature of the charged
conspiracy and their uncertainty as to how to complete the verdict
form. Because the supplemental verdict form was reasonably
responsive to the jury’s inquiry, we find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm Crandle and Tyler’s convictions.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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