United States v. Ramirez , 326 F. App'x 182 ( 2009 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4910
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    MOISES GARZA RAMIREZ,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Asheville.  Lacy H. Thornburg,
    District Judge. (1:08-cr-00042-LHT-1)
    Submitted:    April 20, 2009                     Decided:   May 8, 2009
    Before WILKINSON and      NIEMEYER,   Circuit   Judges,   and   HAMILTON,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Richard E. Cassady, WILLIAMS & CASSADY, PLLC, Sylva, North
    Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
    Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Moises       Garza      Ramirez       appeals    the    district        court’s
    order denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his
    home and his statements to law enforcement officers.                                 Ramirez
    pled guilty to one count of possessing a firearm while being
    illegally    in     the      United     States,      in    violation      of    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(5) (2006), but reserved the right to appeal the denial
    of his suppression motions.              We affirm.
    Ramirez first argues that the district court erred in
    denying   his     motion      to   suppress        the    evidence    seized      from    his
    home.     This court reviews the legal conclusions underlying the
    denial of a motion to suppress de novo, while it reviews the
    factual findings for clear error.                        United States v. Moreland,
    
    437 F.3d 424
    ,      429    (4th     Cir.    2006).        Also,    the      evidence    is
    construed in the light most favorable to the Government, as the
    prevailing party below.               United States v. Seidman, 
    156 F.3d 542
    ,
    547 (4th Cir. 1998).
    Consent given freely and voluntarily is a recognized
    exception    to     the      Fourth    Amendment         warrant    requirement.          See
    Schneckloth       v.   Bustamonte,        
    412 U.S. 218
    ,     219   (1973).         “In
    determining whether consent to search was freely and voluntarily
    given, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent
    must be examined.”            United States v. Lattimore, 
    87 F.3d 647
    , 650
    (4th Cir. 1996).
    2
    Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
    Ramirez freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his
    home    and   the   district     court       properly      denied   his   motion   to
    suppress with respect to the evidence seized from his home.
    Ramirez next claims that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress with respect to his statements
    regarding ownership of the firearm and his immigration status.
    Statements      obtained       from      a       defendant     during      custodial
    interrogation are presumptively compelled in violation of the
    Fifth    Amendment,       unless      the        Government     shows      that    law
    enforcement officers adequately informed the defendant of his
    rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), and
    obtained a waiver of those rights. United States v. Cardwell,
    
    433 F.3d 378
    , 388-89 (4th Cir. 2005).                       We have reviewed the
    record and conclude that Ramirez was not in custody for purposes
    of Miranda at the time he made any of the challenged statements.
    Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Ramirez’s
    motion   to    suppress    his     statements.        We   therefore      affirm   the
    judgment of the district court.                  We dispense with oral argument
    as the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in
    the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3