United States v. Antoine Carr , 583 F. App'x 226 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4045
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTOINE CHARLES CARR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00098-TDS-1)
Submitted: September 16, 2014 Decided: September 25, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY & JOHNSON, LLP, Greensboro, North
Carolina for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antoine Charles Carr appeals the 210-month sentence
imposed following his conviction by a jury of possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), and possession of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). On appeal, Carr argues
only that the district court erred in imposing a sentencing
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), because he lacked the requisite number
of predicate convictions in light of our decision in United
States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
We review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation involving the application of the ACCA. See
United States v. Washington, 629 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 636, 639 n.4 (4th Cir. 2010).
Similarly, we review issues relying upon the legal
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v.
Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 254 (4th Cir. 2010).
A defendant is classified as an armed career criminal
if he has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony
or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions
different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The
statute does not define “conviction,” except to include juvenile
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delinquency cases involving violent felonies. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(C).
In contrast, a defendant is properly classified as a
career offender if, among other requirements, he “has at least
two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1(a) (2012). At least two of these
convictions must carry sentences that are counted separately
under USSG § 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing
Criminal History). USSG § 4B1.2(c).
In Davis, we held that “a consolidated sentence under
North Carolina law is a single sentence for purposes of the
career offender enhancement.” 720 F.3d at 216. We reached this
conclusion based in large measure upon the plain language of
USSG § 4B1.2(c), requiring predicate convictions to carry
sentences that are counted separately. The ACCA contains no
similar language, but instead requires only three predicate
“convictions.” We are not persuaded by Carr’s argument that
“conviction” and “sentence” are materially indistinguishable;
the term “conviction” primarily focuses on the determination of
a defendant’s guilt or innocence, while “sentence” is mainly
concerned with the punishment imposed upon a finding of guilt.
We also note that the North Carolina statute authorizing
consolidated criminal sentences specifically defines a
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consolidated judgment as resulting from multiple convictions.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.15 (2013). As the district court
properly determined, Davis does not apply to the ACCA, and Carr
had the requisite number of ACCA predicate convictions despite
his consolidated criminal judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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