United States v. Dennis A. Dykes ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4008
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DENNIS A. DYKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:07-cr-00299-RWT-2)
Submitted: September 7, 2018 Decided: October 10, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Meghan Skelton, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert
K. Hur, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Gregory Bernstein, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dennis A. Dykes was charged with violating various conditions of his supervised
release. At a hearing at which Dykes admitted committing four of the violations, * the
district court revoked release and sentenced him to 12 months in prison. Dykes appeals.
“We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is
not ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)). The record
establishes that Dykes was sentenced within the statutory maximum term of three years,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(2), 3583(e)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). The
remaining question is whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.
“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must
first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). Only if we find a sentence to be unreasonable will we consider
whether it is “plainly” so. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court considered
the Chapter Seven policy statement range and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
sentencing factors. Id. A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court
stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id. “A court need not be as detailed or specific
*
The United States dismissed three of the remaining violations, and the court
deferred action on the eighth.
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when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction
sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Dykes’ sentence is procedurally reasonable. The district court
considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the court was aware of Dykes’ policy
statement range of 6-12 months. Contrary to Dykes’ claim, the district court acted
properly when it considered the severity of Dykes’ underlying offense in fashioning the
revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), 3553(a)(1) (2012); United States v.
Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 203-204 (6th Cir. 2011).
Further, we hold that the sentence is substantively reasonable. The court provided
a sufficiently individualized assessment in fashioning the revocation sentence. The court
was particularly concerned about the severity of Dykes’ original offense, his breach of
trust, and the danger he posed to the community. We find no merit to Dykes’ contention
that the district court based the revocation sentence on an unadjudicated criminal charge.
The court specifically stated that it presumed that Dykes was innocent of that charge.
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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