United States v. Galdino Ruiz-Hernandez , 890 F.3d 202 ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-40577     Document: 00514467980       Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/10/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-40577
    FILED
    May 10, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                  Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    GALDINO JOSE RUIZ-HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:
    Galdino Jose Ruiz-Hernandez helped Patricia Cervantes, a Mexican
    citizen, enter the United States by first taking a boat across the Rio Grande
    River and then swimming across a ship channel in Brownsville, Texas. While
    crossing the ship channel, Cervantes was struck by a passing Coast Guard
    vessel and killed.
    Ruiz-Hernandez was indicted for one count of conspiracy to bring in,
    transport, and harbor an alien resulting in death and one count of transporting
    an alien within the United States for private financial gain and resulting in
    death. He went to trial and was found guilty of both counts. He now appeals,
    challenging    his    convictions    and   the   application   of   two        sentencing
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    enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.                Ruiz-
    Hernandez makes essentially four arguments on appeal: that he did not act in
    furtherance of Cervantes’s unlawful presence in the country; that he did not
    act for the purpose of financial gain; that Cervantes’s death was not reasonably
    foreseeable; and that his conduct was not the but-for cause of her death. We
    find those arguments unavailing and affirm.
    I.
    A.
    The Brownsville Ship Channel lies just north of the Rio Grande River
    and connects the Port of Brownsville with the Gulf of Mexico.              It is
    approximately 40 feet deep and 500 feet wide. The channel is a high-traffic
    waterway, travelled day and night by various vessels from small fishing boats
    to large tankers. There are no lights along the channel, making it very dark
    at night, and there is no posted speed limit. The nearby Brownsville Shrimp
    Basin, however, a shrimp-boat docking area located on the north side of the
    ship channel, is designated as a “no-wake zone,” meaning that vessels must
    travel slowly to avoid creating a wake that could damage the banks of the basin
    or cause the small shrimp boats to come untied.
    B.
    At 6:15 a.m. on April 24, 2015, Galdino Ruiz-Hernandez approached a
    security guard in the shrimp basin, telling the guard that someone else had
    told him that a person had been hit by a boat and needed help. The guard
    looked for the injured person, but, because it was still dark at the time, was
    unsuccessful. About an hour later, Police Officer Rolando Doria received a call
    from a person who (according to the transcript of Doria’s testimony) identified
    himself as “Galdino Jose Luis Hernandez,” stating that a woman had been
    injured by a vessel in the Brownsville Ship Channel. Doria went to the ship
    channel, where he was flagged down by Ruiz-Hernandez. Ruiz-Hernandez
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    directed Doria to the woman’s body, which was floating in the channel. Her
    body had multiple lacerations and her right foot was severed. She had on her
    person a Mexican voter-identification card identifying her as Patricia
    Guadalupe Garcia Cervantes.
    Later that same morning, Sergeant Jesus Rosas, an investigator with
    the Cameron County Sheriff’s Office, was dispatched to the scene.                     Ruiz-
    Hernandez agreed to provide a voluntary statement, and was taken to the
    sheriff’s office. At the time, he was treated as a witness only and not a suspect.
    He explained to Sergeant Rosas that, at approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning,
    he and his “distant cousin Pati [Cervantes]” swam across the ship channel
    wearing inner tubes. Cervantes had told Ruiz-Hernandez that she could not
    swim very well, but she was about eight feet ahead of Ruiz-Hernandez when a
    large ship—later identified as a Coast Guard vessel— approached them
    “travelling very fast and without any light.”               The ship squarely struck
    Cervantes. Ruiz-Hernandez found her two minutes later, floating upside down
    and unresponsive. He tried, unsuccessfully, to resuscitate her, then went to
    get help. 1
    After reviewing Ruiz-Hernandez’s statement, Sergeant Rosas realized
    that criminal activity could be involved.            Rosas read Ruiz-Hernandez his
    rights, and Ruiz-Hernandez expanded upon his statement. He explained that
    he “was only doing a favor [for his] cousin Pati [Cervantes],” who wanted to get
    away from her abusive husband in Mexico. He said that his other cousin, his
    co-defendant Gabriel Sanchez, had insisted that he help Cervantes. On April
    23, 2015, Sanchez picked Ruiz-Hernandez up from work and drove him to
    Sanchez’s mother-in-law’s house in Mexico where Cervantes was staying.
    1At trial, a forensic pathologist testified that Cervantes’s death was caused by boat-
    propeller trauma and drowning. She further testified that Cervantes’s injuries were
    consistent with being struck by the propellers of the Coast Guard vessel.
    3
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    They stopped along the way to purchase two inner tubes. A ranchero arrived
    at the house a little while later, who informed Ruiz-Hernandez that he would
    charge 6,000 pesos to take Ruiz-Hernandez and Cervantes across the Rio
    Grande. The ranchero then took Ruiz-Hernandez and Cervantes to a ranch
    near the river, where they waited until approximately 9:30 p.m. before crossing
    by boat. When they left the boat, Ruiz-Hernandez and Cervantes walked
    through brush for four or five hours to get to the ship channel. They inflated
    their inner tubes and began to swim across. Ruiz-Hernandez insisted that he
    “just wanted to help [his] cousin cross[] the river and that no one offered to pay
    [him] any money in return.”
    On April 28, 2015, the Coast Guard contacted Homeland Security
    Investigations (“HSI”) to assist in investigating Cervantes’s death. HSI agent
    Luz Gonzalez then interviewed Ruiz-Hernandez, who provided a similar
    account to the one he had provided to Sergeant Rosas. Gonzalez also ran a
    database query for money-service businesses and discovered that there had
    been a $650 wire transfer from Eleazar Leon Fernandez in New York to
    Gabriel Sanchez at a Western Union wire-transfer outlet in Brownsville on
    April 22, 2015. Fernandez explained to Gonzalez that he had paid Sanchez a
    $650 smuggling fee to bring Cervantes—who was his wife’s relative—into the
    country because she was being abused by her husband. Of that $650, $300 was
    converted into pesos and given to Ruiz-Hernandez, who then gave it to the
    ranchero who brought Ruiz-Hernandez and Cervantes across the Rio Grande.
    In the course of his investigation, Gonzalez obtained a pink inner tube
    that had been recovered by the Coast Guard near where Cervantes’s body was
    found. At trial, he testified that the inner tube was not big enough to fit around
    an adult’s waist, and that it appeared to be a floatation device intended for
    children to use in a swimming pool.         He also testified that, during his
    investigation, he learned that Ruiz-Hernandez was not related to Cervantes.
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    Ruiz-Hernandez was not related to Sanchez either, though they knew each
    other because they worked together at the nearby Port of Brownsville.
    C.
    Ruiz-Hernandez was indicted on one count of conspiracy to bring in,
    transport, and harbor an alien resulting in death and one count of transporting
    an alien within the United States for private financial gain and resulting in
    death. He went to trial and, after two days of evidence, was found guilty of
    both counts. The jury answered three special interrogatories, indicating that
    they found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the conspiracy count (Count 1)
    resulted in the death of a person; (2) the substantive count (Count 2) resulted
    in the death of a person, and (3) the substantive count (Count 2) was committed
    for private financial gain.
    In calculating Ruiz-Hernandez’s Guidelines sentencing range, the pre-
    sentence report (“PSR”) added six points to his base offense level pursuant to
    § 2L1.1(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines for creating a substantial risk of
    death or serious bodily harm and another 10 points pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(7)
    for a resulting death. 2 Ruiz-Hernandez objected to the enhancements, but the
    district court overruled his objections. The district court did, however, grant
    Ruiz-Hernandez’s motion for a downward departure based on § 5K2.16 for
    voluntary disclosure of the offense prior to its discovery. Ruiz-Hernandez was
    sentenced to 80 months, 17 months below the low end of the applicable
    Guidelines range.
    2The PSR also added an additional two points under § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice,
    which is not at issue in this appeal.
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    II.
    A.
    Ruiz-Hernandez first argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to
    support his convictions for conspiracy to transport an alien resulting in death
    (Count One) and transporting an alien for private financial gain and resulting
    in death (Count Two). Because he did not move at trial for a judgment of
    acquittal, we review only for whether the convictions constitute a “manifest
    miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Avants, 
    367 F.3d 433
    , 449 (5th Cir.
    2004). “Such a miscarriage ‘exist[s] only if the record is “devoid of evidence
    pointing to guilt,” or . . . “because the evidence on a key element of the offense
    [i]s so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.”’”        United States v.
    McDowell, 
    498 F.3d 308
    , 312 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.
    Knezek, 
    964 F.2d 394
    , 400 n.14 (5th Cir. 1992)). And as always when we review
    the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is deferential to the verdict, viewing
    all evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, giving the
    government the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility choices.”
    
    Id. (quoting Knezek,
    964 F.2d at 400 n.14). Applying these standards, we
    conclude that there was no miscarriage here.
    1.
    Ruiz-Hernandez first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
    his conviction for the conspiracy charge. To obtain a conviction for conspiracy
    to transport an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), “the government must
    establish that the defendant[] ‘agreed with one or more persons to transport or
    move illegal aliens within the United States in furtherance of their unlawful
    presence . . . knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that such aliens had
    come to, entered, or remained in the United States in violation of law.” United
    6
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    States v. Chon, 
    713 F.3d 812
    , 818 (5th Cir. 2013) (alteration omitted) (quoting
    United States v. Ahmed Khan, 258 F. App’x 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2007)).
    Ruiz-Hernandez argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
    conviction because it fails to establish either that he knew that Cervantes’s
    presence in the country was unlawful or that he agreed to act in furtherance
    of her unlawful presence. However, there was ample evidence from which a
    rational jury could infer that Ruiz-Hernandez either knew or acted in reckless
    disregard of the fact that Cervantes’s presence was unlawful. They entered
    the country by crossing the Rio Grande, walking for hours across brush, and
    swimming across a busy ship channel, all in the middle of the night. A rational
    jury could conclude that “if [Cervantes] were entitled to enter the United States
    legally, [s]he would not have utilized this dangerous method of entry.” United
    States v. Cardenas-Meneses, 532 F. App’x 505, 512 (5th Cir. 2013).
    Furthermore, while Ruiz-Hernandez argues that he acted for the
    purpose of helping her escape her abusive husband rather than furthering her
    unlawful presence, § 1324(a)(1)(A) is concerned only with intent, not motive.
    “While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution
    or determination to do it. When the intent to do an act that violates the law
    exists, motive becomes immaterial.” Intent, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
    2014). Here, there was evidence from which a rational jury could infer that
    Ruiz-Hernandez agreed to transport Cervantes in furtherance of her unlawful
    presence. For example, there is evidence that he knew or should have known
    that she was not lawfully entitled to enter the country and that he paid a
    smuggler to bring himself and Cervantes across the Rio Grande and into the
    country. Accordingly, we affirm Ruiz-Hernandez’s conspiracy conviction.
    2.
    Ruiz-Hernandez also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
    his conviction for the substantive transportation charge. He simply repeats
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    his argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew or
    recklessly disregarded the fact that Cervantes’s presence in the United States
    was unlawful. For the reasons stated above, this argument fails.
    3.
    Next, Ruiz-Hernandez contends that the evidence is insufficient to
    support the statutory financial-purpose enhancement because there was no
    evidence that he actually received any of the money transferred to Sanchez.
    Section 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) of Title 8 increases the maximum penalty for
    transportation of an alien from 5 years to 10 if “the offense was done for the
    purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”          8 U.S.C. §
    1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Because § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i) increases the applicable statutory
    maximum sentence, it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, see
    United States v. McMillon, 657 F. App’x 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 476 (2000)), and we review the
    enhancement along with the underlying conviction itself for sufficiency of the
    evidence, see United States v. Williams, 
    449 F.3d 635
    , 646 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The
    ‘financial gain’ fact is an ‘element’ of a separate, greater offense.”); see also
    United States v. Allende-Garcia, 407 F. App’x 829, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2011)
    (reviewing proof of financial-purpose element for sufficiency of the evidence).
    The financial-purpose element requires the government to prove that the
    defendant sought “to profit or otherwise secure some economic benefit from
    [the] smuggling endeavor.” United States v. Garcia, 
    883 F.3d 570
    , 574 (5th Cir.
    2018) (construing identical language in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)). It does
    not require proof of actual payment, only evidence that the smuggling activity
    was undertaken for the purpose of financial gain. See 
    id. at 575;
    United States
    v. Kim, 
    435 F.3d 182
    , 185 (2d Cir. 2006). Furthermore, a jury is free to infer
    such a purpose from circumstantial evidence, including evidence that the
    defendant did not previously know the individuals being smuggled, see Garcia,
    8
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    , and evidence that others in the same smuggling operation had
    received or would receive money, see Allende-Garcia, 407 F. App’x at 833–35.
    Here, there was such evidence. Ruiz-Hernandez had no prior relationship with
    Cervantes, and there is evidence that his co-conspirator, Sanchez, received
    money in exchange for bringing Cervantes into the country. In light of that
    evidence, there was no miscarriage of justice and we affirm.
    4.
    In Ruiz-Hernandez’s final challenge to his convictions, he argues that
    the evidence was insufficient to support the statutory enhancement for
    transportation resulting in death. As with the financial-purpose element, the
    resulting-in-death element, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv), increases the
    applicable statutory maximum sentence and thus must be submitted to the
    jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    Williams, 449 F.3d at 645
    . As
    an “‘element’ of a greater aggravated offense,” 
    id., we review
    the resulting-in-
    death element for sufficiency of the evidence, see Cardenas-Meneses, 532 F.
    App’x at 509–10; United States v. De Jesus-Ojeda, 
    515 F.3d 434
    , 444–45 (5th
    Cir. 2008).
    Section 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) increases the applicable statutory maximum
    sentence to death or life imprisonment in the case of a violation “resulting in
    the death of any person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv). Ruiz-Hernandez argues
    that, in order for that enhancement to apply, the government was required to
    prove that the resulting death was reasonably foreseeable and that the
    government failed to do so. We have previously declined to decide whether §
    1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) requires foreseeability. See De 
    Jesus-Ojeda, 515 F.3d at 444
    –
    45. Finding here that Cervantes’s death was reasonably foreseeable, we again
    decline to decide whether the government was required to so prove.
    Ruiz-Hernandez argues that it was not reasonably foreseeable that a
    Coast Guard vessel—which he contends was operating in violation of speed
    9
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    limitations, wake restrictions, and lighting requirements 3—would strike a
    person swimming across the ship channel. The thrust of his argument is that
    it is unforeseeable that a government vessel, the presence of which is intended
    to enforce the law and to protect and assist persons present in the channel,
    would operate in violation of the law and, in so doing, cause harm.                     We
    recognize the tragic irony of the circumstances of Cervantes’s death, but, as a
    legal matter, Ruiz-Hernandez confuses the foreseeability of harm with the
    foreseeability of the manner in which harm ultimately occurs.                          The
    foreseeability inquiry turns on whether “harm of a general sort to persons of a
    general class might have been anticipated by a reasonably thoughtful person.”
    In re Signal Int’l, LLC, 
    579 F.3d 478
    , 492 (5th Cir. 2009). “The precise nature
    of the [resulting] injury and the manner of its infliction is immaterial . . . , so
    long as the injury is of a type that, in the circumstances, might reasonably have
    been expected to occur.” Hall v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
    504 F.2d 380
    , 385 (5th Cir. 1974). Here, it was reasonably foreseeable that a person
    swimming across a high-traffic ship channel in the dark of night would be
    struck by a passing ship.
    That the ship’s lights were, we assume, not on at the time of the accident
    does not change our conclusion. The negligent acts of others are foreseeable
    and thus do not break foreseeability. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Hess Tankship
    Co. of Del., 
    661 F.2d 1044
    , 1060 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“A subsequent negligent
    act does not excuse prior negligence except in most unusual circumstances.”).
    A ship travelling at night without lights is not so “extraordinary” that a
    3 As summarized above, the evidence at trial showed that there was no speed limit
    posted in the ship channel and that it, unlike the nearby shrimp basin, is not designated as
    a no-wake zone. As to lighting, the evidence presented at trial, derived from Ruiz-
    Hernandez’s statement to Sergeant Rosas, was that the ship was travelling “without any
    light.” That was later disputed in the PSR. For purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence, however, we assume that the ship’s lights were not on.
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    reasonable person would not foresee it, see Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 
    586 F.3d 358
    , 372 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that only “highly extraordinary” actions
    will constitute a superseding cause of harm), and does not render Ruiz-
    Hernandez’s conviction a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we
    affirm Ruiz-Hernandez’s conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv).
    B.
    Ruiz-Hernandez next challenges the district court’s application of two
    sentencing enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court
    increased his base offense level pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(6) of the Guidelines for
    creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury and pursuant to §
    2L1.1(b)(7)(D) for conduct resulting in death.         Because Ruiz-Hernandez
    objected to the application of these enhancements below, we review “the
    district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de
    novo” and its “findings of fact and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines
    to those findings of fact . . . for clear error.” United States v. Cedillo-Narvaez,
    
    761 F.3d 397
    , 401 (5th Cir. 2014). “Sentencing enhancements must be proven
    ‘by a preponderance of the evidence.’” United States v. Muniz, 
    803 F.3d 709
    ,
    712 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Juarez, 
    626 F.3d 246
    , 251 (5th
    Cir. 2010)). “A factual finding is ‘not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible
    in light of the record read as a whole.’” 
    Cedillo-Narvaez, 761 F.3d at 401
    (quoting United States v. McMillan, 
    600 F.3d 434
    , 457–58 (5th Cir. 2010)).
    1.
    Section 2L1.1(b)(6) provides for an increased base offense level for a
    defendant convicted of smuggling, transporting, or harboring an alien “if the
    offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
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    or serious bodily injury to another person.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6). 4 Ruiz-
    Hernandez again argues that Cervantes’s death must have been reasonably
    foreseeable in order for § 2L1.1(b)(6) to apply.
    Ruiz-Hernandez is correct as a general matter that § 2L1.1(b)(6) requires
    that a risk of harm be foreseeable. See De 
    Jesus-Ojeda, 515 F.3d at 442
    –43.
    However, it requires only that some risk of death or serious bodily injury be
    foreseeable, not the specific harm that actually occurred.                       After all, the
    enhancement applies for creating a risk of harm; no harm at all need actually
    occur to warrant its application. See, e.g., United States v. Maldonado-Ochoa,
    
    844 F.3d 534
    , 537 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming application of § 2L1.1(b)(6) where
    the defendant “started to drive with unrestrained persons lying in the bed of
    his truck,” even though he was pulled over as soon as his vehicle began to move
    and no one was injured). Accordingly, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether
    the defendant’s conduct “pose[d] inherently dangerous risks to the aliens being
    transported.” United States v. Solis-Garcia, 
    420 F.3d 511
    , 516 (5th Cir. 2005)
    (quoting United States v. Garcia-Guerrero, 
    313 F.3d 892
    , 896 (5th Cir. 2002)).
    The actual results of the defendant’s conduct are irrelevant. See United States
    v. Munoz-Tello, 
    531 F.3d 1174
    , 1185 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In assessing whether
    the enhancement was appropriate, we must focus exclusively on the
    defendant’s conduct, ignoring the results of that conduct.”).                      As discussed
    above, it was reasonably foreseeable that a person swimming across a busy
    ship channel in the dark of night would be struck by a passing ship.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s application of the sentencing
    enhancement under § 2L1.1(b)(6).
    4  Section 2L1.1(b)(6) instructs courts to increase a base offense level “by 2 levels, but
    if the resulting offense level is less than level 18, increase to level 18.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6).
    Here, because Ruiz-Hernandez’s base offense level before application of this enhancement
    was 12, its application resulted in a six point increase to level 18.
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    2.
    Section 2L1.1(b)(7) provides for a ten-point increase in the base offense
    level “[i]f any person died” in the course of the smuggling or transportation
    offense.   U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(7).      Ruiz-Hernandez acknowledges that
    § 2L1.1(b)(7) requires only that a defendant’s conduct be the but-for, not
    proximate, cause of the resulting death. See United States v. Ramos-Delgado,
    
    763 F.3d 398
    , 401–02 (5th Cir. 2014). However, he contends the evidence
    shows that the Coast Guard vessel, and not his conduct, was the but-for cause
    of Cervantes’s death. We disagree.
    But-for causation exists if the result would not have occurred without
    the conduct at issue. See Burrage v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 881
    , 888 (2014).
    A particular result can be caused by multiple necessary factors—multiple but-
    for causes—yet one of those single factors will still be considered a but-for
    cause so long as the result would not have occurred in its absence. 
    Id. Here, while
    the Coast Guard ship was a but-for cause of Cervantes’s death, she would
    not have been in its path but for Ruiz-Hernandez’s conduct in smuggling her
    across the ship channel. Accordingly, his conduct was also a but-for cause of
    her death, and the district court did not err in applying the enhancement under
    § 2L1.1(b)(7).
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Ruiz-Hernandez’s convictions
    and his sentence.
    13