Aaron Private Clinic Management LLC v. Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health , 912 F.3d 1330 ( 2019 )


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  •                Case: 17-15144        Date Filed: 01/04/2019      Page: 1 of 18
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-15144
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-01034-WSD
    AARON PRIVATE CLINIC MANAGEMENT LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FRANK W. BERRY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Georgia
    Department of Community Health, and
    NATHAN DEAL, in his official capacity as Governor of Georgia,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _______________________
    (January 4, 2019)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and GILMAN, * Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
    * Honorable Ronald L. Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    Case: 17-15144     Date Filed: 01/04/2019    Page: 2 of 18
    This appeal requires us to decide whether a limited liability company that
    made preliminary plans to operate a methadone clinic has standing to challenge
    state laws that restrict the licensure of narcotic-treatment facilities. Aaron Private
    Clinic Management sued certain Georgia officials after two Georgia laws
    temporarily suspended the issuance of new licenses for narcotic-treatment facilities
    and imposed additional licensing requirements for future facilities. The district
    court dismissed the action for lack of standing. Because the challenge to the
    moratorium is in part moot and because we agree with the district court that Aaron
    lacks standing to assert its other claims, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Aaron Private Clinic Management is a for-profit company that asserts that it
    “intends to meet the standards to establish an [opioid-treatment program] in
    Georgia.” Frank Berry is the commissioner for the Georgia Department of
    Community Health and, in that capacity, oversees the agency that issues licenses
    for narcotic-treatment facilities in Georgia. Nathan Deal is the governor of
    Georgia, and he has the ultimate authority to direct and control the operations of
    the Georgia Department of Community Health.
    In May 2017, Aaron filed a complaint alleging that two Georgia statutes
    violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 794
    , and Title II of the
    Americans with Disabilities Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 12132
    . First, Aaron challenges a
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    2016 statute, which it calls the “Licensing Moratorium,” that enacted “[a]
    temporary moratorium on the acceptance of new applications for licensure of
    narcotic treatment programs,” O.C.G.A. § 26-5-21(e). The Licensing Moratorium
    prohibited new applications from being accepted between June 1, 2016, and June
    30, 2017. Id. § 26-5-21(f). Second, Aaron challenges a 2017 statute, which it calls
    the “License Cap,” that supersedes the Licensing Moratorium and provides that
    Georgia’s Department of Community Health must establish minimum standards of
    quality for narcotic-treatment programs and provides for annual or biannual open-
    enrollment periods for program applications, see id. § 26-5-40 et seq. The License
    Cap also extended the prohibition on accepting new licensure applications from
    June 30, 2017, to December 1, 2017. Id. § 26-5-46(d).
    Aaron contends that the Licensing Moratorium and License Cap block it
    from establishing an opioid-treatment program and impose “arbitrary restrictions
    and burdens” on methadone clinics. Aaron asserts that it sues on its own behalf and
    “on behalf of its prospective patients who are opiate-addicted, who are qualified
    disabled under the [Americans with Disabilities Act], and who are prospective
    patients of [Aaron].” Counts one through four of the complaint assert that the
    Licensing Moratorium and the License Cap are facially invalid under the
    Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Counts five and six
    assert an equal-protection challenge to the statutes, contending that “the State of
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    Georgia’s actions and disparate treatment . . . cause disproportionate impact to
    [Aaron] and the disabled persons [Aaron] intends to serve.” Aaron requests an
    award of compensatory damages and litigation expenses, a permanent injunction
    enjoining the defendants from continuing to violate the Americans with
    Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by “denying or delaying [Aaron’s]
    ability to locate an [opioid-treatment program]” in Georgia, and a declaration that
    the challenged statutes are void and unenforceable.
    In its complaint, Aaron alleges few facts about its plan to establish a
    methadone clinic. Aaron first alleges that it is a Georgia limited liability company
    with a principal place of business at 4403 Northside Parkway NW, Suite 1413,
    Atlanta, Georgia 30327. This address is the same as that of the law office of
    Aaron’s counsel, James A. Dunlap. Aaron also alleges that it will use the “latest
    medical technologies, including methadone maintenance treatment, to address the
    physical symptoms of [opioid] addiction in combination with . . .
    psychotherapeutic interventions.” Aaron further alleges that its prospective opiate-
    addicted clients are disabled under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
    Disabilities Act, and that Aaron’s programs will operate as “supervised
    rehabilitation programs” for persons with disabilities as described under federal
    law. And Aaron alleges in each count of the complaint that the challenged statutes
    have caused it to expend additional time and financial resources, to lose the
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    opportunity to conduct its business, and to incur “additional costs and expenses,
    attorney’s fees, interest, and cost of capital” from “interference and delays with
    planning, raising investment funds, hiring, and other normal processes related to
    opening a business.” These allegations are all the complaint contains about
    Aaron’s plan to establish a methadone clinic.
    Although Aaron offers few specifics about its proposed clinic, its complaint
    includes more detailed allegations about the need for methadone clinics in Georgia.
    Aaron alleges that the annual number of opioid overdose deaths in Georgia is
    skyrocketing, rising from roughly 200 in 2006 to nearly 1,000 in 2015. Aaron
    further asserts that many of Georgia’s methadone clinics are currently overcapacity
    and cannot accept new patients. Aaron also contends that the lack of capacity
    causes a variety of harms to opioid-addicted persons, who face price gouging,
    longer travel and wait times, and a lack of competition for treatment options. And
    Aaron cites evidence suggesting that methadone treatment has proven to be
    effective in reducing the number of drug overdoses in a community.
    After Aaron filed its complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss on several
    grounds, including for lack of standing. The district court granted the motion to
    dismiss. The court first determined that the complaint fails to establish that Aaron
    directly suffered an injury in fact that is “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
    ‘hypothetical.’” The court explained that the complaint alleges at most that Aaron
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    was in the early stages of the planning process, not that it would have been
    prepared to offer treatment to its prospective clients but for the challenged statutes.
    The court also stated that, although Aaron labels the requirements imposed by the
    License Cap as “arbitrary and discriminatory,” it fails to identify any “specific
    rules with which it cannot comply, and does not allege why they are discriminatory
    or how they prevent [it] from establishing its clinic in the future.” And the court
    observed that Aaron has not alleged that it had applied for a license and been
    denied, that it would be prevented from participating in the open enrollment for
    new licensure applications, or that it would be unsuccessful in such applications if
    they were submitted. The district court also rejected Aaron’s contention that it had
    third-party standing to assert the injuries suffered by its prospective clients. The
    district court ruled that Aaron’s third-party-standing argument failed because
    Aaron did not establish that it has suffered an injury in fact, that it has a close
    relationship to a third party that is being discriminated against, and that there is
    some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests. See
    Young Apartments v. Town of Jupiter, 
    529 F.3d 1027
    , 1042 (11th Cir. 2008).
    Finally, the district court ruled that, even if Aaron had sufficiently alleged direct or
    third-party standing, it lacks statutory standing to assert these claims under either
    the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo. Culverhouse v. Paulson &
    Co., 
    813 F.3d 991
    , 993 (11th Cir. 2016).
    III. DISCUSSION
    We divide our discussion in three parts. First, we explain that Aaron’s
    request for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the temporary moratorium
    on the acceptance of new licensure applications is moot. Second, we explain that
    Aaron has failed to establish that it has direct standing. Third, we explain that
    Aaron has failed to establish that it has third-party standing to assert the injuries of
    its prospective clients.
    A. Aaron’s Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Regarding the
    Temporary Moratorium is Moot.
    Although the district court did not consider and the parties have not briefed
    the issue of mootness, “[i]t is incumbent upon this court to consider issues of
    mootness sua sponte and, absent an applicable exception to the mootness doctrine,
    to dismiss any appeal that no longer presents a viable case or controversy.” Hunt v.
    Aimco Props., 
    814 F.3d 1213
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Gen.
    Dev. Corp., 
    28 F.3d 1093
    , 1096 (11th Cir. 1994)). “A case is moot when it no
    longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give
    meaningful relief.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Ethredge v. Hail, 
    996 F.2d 1173
    , 1175 (11th Cir.
    1993)). Absent exceptional circumstances, a challenge to the enforcement of a
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    statute becomes moot when that law is no longer effective. See Burke v. Barnes,
    
    479 U.S. 361
    , 363 (1987) (explaining that challenges to an expired statute, like
    those made to a repealed statute, are moot). And although the district court did not
    rely on mootness in dismissing the complaint, “[w]e may affirm on any ground
    supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground was relied upon or even
    considered below.” Waldman v. Conway, 
    871 F.3d 1283
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2017).
    As Aaron acknowledged at oral argument, its request for declaratory and
    injunctive relief about the Licensing Moratorium was rendered moot by the
    expiration of the moratorium in June 2017, and its similar request about the
    License Cap’s extension of the moratorium was rendered moot when that provision
    expired in December 2017. Because no exception to the mootness doctrine applies
    to these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, they are moot, and we affirm
    the dismissal of them.
    B. Aaron Has Failed to Establish that It Has Article III Standing.
    The district court ruled, and we agree, that Aaron lacks direct standing
    because it failed to plead facts establishing that it had directly suffered an actual or
    imminent injury in fact. Article III of the Constitution limits the subject-matter
    jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III,
    § 2. Standing “is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the
    power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 498 (1975).
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    “In the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine in an advisory capacity
    about the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, and the court is powerless to continue.”
    CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 
    451 F.3d 1257
    , 1269 (11th Cir.
    2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    To establish its Article III standing, Aaron must satisfy three requirements.
    First, it “must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected
    interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
    conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560
    (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “there must be a
    causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
    has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” 
    Id.
     (alterations
    adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, “it must be likely, as opposed
    to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 
    Id. at 561
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Each element of standing is “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case”
    and “must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
    bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at
    the successive stages of the litigation.” 
    Id.
     “While the proof required to establish
    standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on
    whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when
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    the suit was filed.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
    554 U.S. 724
    , 734 (2008)
    (citation omitted).
    To satisfy its burden at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must “clearly allege
    facts demonstrating each element,” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    , 1547
    (2016) (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and we
    evaluate standing on a motion to dismiss based on the facts alleged in the
    complaint, Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 
    733 F.3d 1323
    , 1335 (11th Cir.
    2013). To adequately allege injury in fact, it is not enough that a complaint “‘sets
    forth facts from which we could imagine an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III’s
    standing requirements,’ since ‘we should not speculate concerning the existence
    of standing, nor should we imagine or piece together an injury sufficient to give
    plaintiff standing when it has demonstrated none.’” Bochese v. Town of Ponce
    Inlet, 
    405 F.3d 964
    , 976 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v.
    Fla. State Athletic Comm’n, 
    226 F.3d 1226
    , 1229–30 (11th Cir. 2000)). “If the
    plaintiff fails to meet its burden, this court lacks the power to create jurisdiction by
    embellishing a deficient allegation of injury.” 
    Id.
    Aaron contends that it suffered three injuries sufficient to establish its
    standing under Article III. First, Aaron asserts that the Licensing Moratorium and
    License Cap precluded or hindered it from developing an opioid-treatment
    program in Georgia and caused it to suffer lost profits. Second, Aaron alleges that
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    the challenged statutes caused it to incur “additional costs and expenses, attorney’s
    fees, interest, and cost of capital” from “interference and delays with planning,
    raising investment funds, hiring, and other normal processes related to opening a
    business.” Third, Aaron alleges that the challenged statutes discriminate against
    and stigmatize it. We address each proffered injury in turn and determine that
    Aaron has failed to establish its Article III standing.
    1. Aaron’s Alleged Injury Based on Lost Profits Is Insufficient to Establish
    Standing.
    We begin with Aaron’s assertion that the challenged statutes thwarted its
    plan to open a methadone clinic and caused it to suffer lost profits. The district
    court concluded that this alleged injury was speculative. We agree with the district
    court.
    Although the complaint alleges that Aaron aspired to open a methadone
    clinic someday, it offers no facts suggesting that the “someday” was imminent or
    that Aaron had any concrete plan in place for bringing its clinic into operation. The
    most that the complaint alleges Aaron has done is form a limited liability company
    that will serve as a management company for future methadone clinics, and it
    vaguely alleges “interference and delays with planning, raising investment funds,
    hiring, and other normal processes related to opening a business.” But these
    allegations are a far cry from alleging that, absent the challenged statutes, Aaron
    immediately intended to bring, and actually could bring, its clinic into operation.
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    And Aaron has failed to allege that it has taken any concrete steps—such as
    selecting a clinic location, securing a lease option, consulting with relevant
    government officials, applying for the necessary permits or certifications, or
    associating with potential clients—that suggest such an immediate intention or
    plan. Because Aaron has alleged only that it intends to found a clinic at some
    unspecified time in the future, its “‘some day’ intention[]—without any description
    of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—
    do[es] not support a finding of . . . ‘actual or imminent’ injury.” Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 564
    .
    Ample precedent makes clear that Aaron must allege more than a bare
    intention to someday found a clinic. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
    Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 
    429 U.S. 252
     (1977), and Jackson v.
    Okaloosa County, 
    21 F.3d 1531
     (11th Cir. 1994), the Supreme Court and this
    Court held that plaintiffs alleging injuries related to proposed housing projects had
    to establish, among other things, a “substantial probability” that the projects would
    come into existence absent the challenged action. See Arlington Heights, 
    429 U.S. at 264
    ; Jackson, 
    21 F.3d at
    1537–38. The plaintiffs in both decisions—unlike
    Aaron—met this burden by pointing to specific and concrete facts that suggested
    such a substantial probability. See Arlington Heights, 
    429 U.S. at
    255–58
    (observing that the developer of a proposed housing project was already in the
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    business of building similar housing projects, had entered into a 99-year lease and
    an accompanying agreement to purchase the land for the proposed project, had
    hired an architect and produced detailed plans for the project, and had submitted a
    variety of detailed plans and reports as a part of a petition for rezoning); Jackson,
    
    21 F.3d at
    1537–38 (observing that the bidding process for the proposed housing
    project was nearly completed, the project’s sources of funding were established,
    and a bidder had submitted a bid to construct the facility at a specific proposed
    site). And, in other factual contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained
    that a plaintiff asserting that it would have engaged in an activity absent the
    challenged statute must establish that it was “able and ready” to do so. See, e.g.,
    Gratz v. Bollinger, 
    539 U.S. 244
    , 262 (2003) (explaining that the plaintiff had
    standing to challenge affirmative-action policies at the defendant university
    because he established that he was “able and ready” to apply once the university
    stopped using race in admissions); Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors
    of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
    508 U.S. 656
    , 666 (1993) (holding that the plaintiffs
    had standing to challenge an ordinance giving preferential treatment to minority-
    owned businesses because they “demonstrate[d] that [they were] able and ready to
    bid on contracts” (emphasis added)); Clements v. Fashing, 
    457 U.S. 957
    , 962
    (1982) (holding that plaintiff officeholders had standing because they credibly
    alleged that they would have announced their candidacy for other offices but for
    13
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    the “automatic resignation” provision they were challenging). It is not enough for
    Aaron to allege that there exists a need for methadone clinics in Georgia in the
    absence of facts that would suggest its readiness to supply that need.
    A plaintiff alleging that it would have opened a business absent the
    challenged action must point to at least some facts suggesting a likelihood that its
    business would have come about absent the challenged action. Aaron has alleged
    no supporting facts suggesting this likelihood. So its first assertion of injury fails.
    2. Aaron’s Alleged Injury Based on Additional Costs and Expenses Related to the
    Challenged Statutes Is Insufficient to Establish Standing.
    Aaron’s second asserted injury—that it incurred “additional costs and
    expenses, attorney’s fees, interest, and cost of capital” from “interference and
    delays with planning, raising investment funds, hiring, and other normal processes
    related to opening a business”—also fails to suffice. The threadbare allegations of
    additional costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees are so vague that they do not
    establish any of the elements of Article III standing. We cannot divine what these
    allegedly incurred costs are referring to, and so we cannot assess whether they give
    Aaron a sufficient stake in this appeal, whether they are fairly traceable to the
    challenged statutes, or whether they will be redressed by a favorable decision. See
    Warth, 
    422 U.S. at 508
     (holding that a plaintiff must plead “specific, concrete facts
    demonstrating that the challenged [action] harm[s] him, and that he personally
    would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention” (emphasis altered)).
    14
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    As to the allegation of “interest[] and cost of capital,” it appears that Aaron is
    suggesting that it has some capital available for its clinic and that the challenged
    statutes have prevented it from putting these funds to productive use. But because
    Aaron has failed to allege a likelihood that its proposed clinic would imminently
    have come into existence absent the challenged statutes, it cannot assert that the
    challenged statutes, instead of Aaron’s lack of concrete plans to establish its clinic,
    caused this injury.
    3. Aaron’s Alleged Injury Based on Stigmatization and Discrimination Is
    Insufficient to Establish Standing.
    We also conclude that Aaron fails to establish its direct standing based on its
    allegation that the challenged statutes discriminate against and stigmatize it. A
    plaintiff alleging a stigmatic injury based on discrimination must point to “some
    concrete interest with respect to which [he] [is] personally subject to
    discriminatory treatment,” and “[t]hat interest must independently satisfy the
    causation requirement of standing doctrine.” Allen v. Wright, 
    468 U.S. 737
    , 757
    n.22 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
    Components, 
    572 U.S. 118
     (2014). Here, even if the challenged statutes
    discriminate against opioid-addicted persons who are disabled, Aaron has not
    established that it is among the class of persons whose concrete interests are
    affected by discriminatory treatment. Aaron is a non-disabled entity, and its claims
    of direct injury are speculative. Because Aaron has not been subjected to
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    discriminatory treatment, we agree with the district court that Aaron’s vague
    assertions of stigma and discrimination cannot establish its direct standing.
    4. Aaron’s Remaining Arguments Regarding Standing Do Not Persuade Us.
    Aaron responds that it has standing because other federal courts have held
    that plaintiffs whose attempts to establish methadone clinics were thwarted by
    local regulations had standing to challenge those regulations, but those other
    decisions involved plaintiffs who had taken far more concrete steps than Aaron has
    allegedly taken. See, e.g., A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cty., 
    515 F.3d 356
    ,
    358–62 (4th Cir. 2008) (observing that the plaintiff “unquestionably” met the
    Article III standing requirements where it (1) was in the business of operating
    methadone clinics, (2) located a particular clinic location and signed a lease, (3)
    consulted with local officials about founding its clinic, (4) applied for the required
    federal and state certifications and permits, (5) submitted detailed plans about the
    requested clinic site to county officials, and (6) associated with specific
    prospective patients who joined as plaintiffs to the lawsuit); see also New
    Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 
    490 F.3d 293
     (3d Cir. 2007);
    Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 
    411 F.3d 399
     (3d Cir. 2005); MX
    Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 
    293 F.3d 326
     (6th Cir. 2002). None of these
    decisions persuades us that Aaron has standing.
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    Aaron asserts that the lack of specific factual allegations about its plan to
    establish a clinic should be excused because, by failing to take actions to establish
    its clinic, Aaron was mitigating its damages in preparation for this suit. Yet Aaron
    has cited no authority suggesting that the Article III requirements for a prospective
    business should be set aside whenever a duty to mitigate might be implicated.
    Aaron must point to “specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged
    [statutes] harm” it, Warth, 
    422 U.S. at 508
    , regardless of any duty it had to mitigate
    damages.
    Aaron argues that the moratorium “preemptively blocked” the formation of
    relationships with potential clients. But in the absence of any non-speculative
    reasons to believe Aaron would have imminently opened a methadone clinic but
    for the challenged statutes, this argument merely piles speculation on speculation.
    Aaron points out that the enforcement provision of Title II of the American
    with Disabilities Act states that an action may be brought by “any person alleging
    discrimination on the basis of disability.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12133
    . Even if this provision
    gave Aaron a cause of action—which we do not decide—“it is settled that
    Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting
    the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Spokeo, 
    136 S. Ct. at
    1547–48 (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    17
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    C. Aaron Has Failed to Establish that It Has Third-Party Standing.
    We also agree with the district court that Aaron lacks third-party standing to
    assert the injuries suffered by its prospective clients. A plaintiff must satisfy three
    criteria to bring claims on behalf of third parties: (1) the plaintiff must have
    suffered an “injury-in-fact” that gives it a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the
    dispute; (2) the plaintiff must have a close relationship to the third party; and (3)
    there must be a hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect its own interests.
    Young Apartments, 
    529 F.3d at 1042
     (citation omitted). Because we have held that
    Aaron lacks an injury in fact, its third-party-standing argument fails. And we need
    not reach the question whether Aaron also lacks statutory standing to assert third-
    party claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the dismissal of Aaron’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-15144

Citation Numbers: 912 F.3d 1330

Filed Date: 1/4/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (21)

CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 451 F.3d 1257 ( 2006 )

miccosukee-tribe-of-indians-of-florida-a-federally-recognized-indian-tribe , 226 F.3d 1226 ( 2000 )

Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, FL , 529 F.3d 1027 ( 2008 )

angelique-jackson-and-ethel-musgrove-on-behalf-of-themselves-and-all , 21 F.3d 1531 ( 1994 )

Alfred L. Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet , 405 F.3d 964 ( 2005 )

pacific-insurance-company-plaintiff-counter-defendant-appellant-v-general , 28 F.3d 1093 ( 1994 )

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. The Township of Hampton, the ... , 411 F.3d 399 ( 2005 )

new-directions-treatment-services-on-its-own-behalf-and-on-behalf-of-its , 490 F.3d 293 ( 2007 )

Mx Group, Inc. v. City of Covington , 293 F.3d 326 ( 2002 )

A HELPING HAND, LLC v. Baltimore County, MD , 515 F.3d 356 ( 2008 )

jesse-ethredge-v-robert-hail-deputy-base-commander-of-robins-air-force , 996 F.2d 1173 ( 1993 )

Warth v. Seldin , 95 S. Ct. 2197 ( 1975 )

Clements v. Fashing , 102 S. Ct. 2836 ( 1982 )

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing ... , 97 S. Ct. 555 ( 1977 )

Burke v. Barnes , 107 S. Ct. 734 ( 1987 )

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 112 S. Ct. 2130 ( 1992 )

Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General ... , 113 S. Ct. 2297 ( 1993 )

Gratz v. Bollinger , 123 S. Ct. 2411 ( 2003 )

Davis v. Federal Election Commission , 128 S. Ct. 2759 ( 2008 )

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 136 S. Ct. 1540 ( 2016 )

View All Authorities »