Mfi-Dplh, LLC v. Jesse Ingram , 468 F. App'x 202 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1588
MFI-DPLH, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JESSE HENRY INGRAM; INGRAM & ASSOCIATES, LLC; JESSE H.
INGRAM, PLLC; JESSE H. INGRAM & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, a/k/a
Jesse H. Ingram, PLLC,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cv-02358-WDQ)
Submitted: February 29, 2012 Decided: March 2, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jesse Henry Ingram, Appellant Pro Se; Damani K. Ingram, INGRAM &
ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants. Gary C.
Adler, ROETZEL & ANDRESS, LPA, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jesse Henry Ingram and Ingram & Associates, LLC
(“Defendants”) appeal the district court’s order granting
partial summary judgment for MFI-DPLH, LLC (“Plaintiff”) on
Plaintiff’s breach of escrow agreement and negligence claims. *
On appeal, Defendants’ sole argument is that the district court
erred by failing to consider certain documents external to
Defendants’ escrow agreement with Plaintiff before concluding
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Defendants were bound by the agreement. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). If the moving party sufficiently supports its motion for
*
The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to
voluntarily dismiss the claims remaining following the partial
grant of summary judgment, and the court entered final judgment
against Defendants.
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summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate “that
there are genuine issues of material fact.” Emmett, 532 F.3d at
297.
Ingram asserts that the district court should have
considered parol evidence in construing the intent of the
parties in entering into the escrow agreement. Generally, parol
evidence is admissible only if there is ambiguity in the
contract. Thomas v. Cap. Med. Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 985 A.2d 51,
64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); see Higgins v. Barnes, 530 A.2d
724, 726 (Md. 1987) (“[P]arol evidence is inadmissible to vary,
alter, or contradict a contract that is complete and
unambiguous.”). “Ambiguity arises if, to a reasonable person,
the language used is susceptible of more than one meaning or is
of doubtful meaning.” Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 710
(Md. 2007). We conclude that, because the agreement between
Plaintiff and Defendants was clear and unambiguous, the district
court correctly declined to consider evidence extrinsic to the
escrow agreement to discern the intent of the parties in
entering into the agreement.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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