Lula Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC , 929 F.3d 170 ( 2019 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-1827
LULA WILLIAMS; GLORIA TURNAGE; GEORGE HENGLE;
DOWIN COFFY; FELIX GILLISON, JR., on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated,
Plaintiffs – Appellees,
v.
BIG PICTURE LOANS, LLC; ASCENSION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
DANIEL GRAVEL; JAMES WILLIAMS, JR.; GERTRUDE MCGESHICK;
SUSAN MCGESHICK; GIIWEGIIZHIGOOKWAY MARTIN;
MATT MARTORELLO,
Defendants.
------------------------------
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; NATIONAL INDIAN
GAMING ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIAN
ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT; CONFERENCE OF TRIBAL LENDING
COMMISSIONERS; ONLINE LENDERS ALLIANCE,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF HAWAII;
STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF IOWA; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
MARYLAND; STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF MINNESOTA;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE
OF VIRGINIA; CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
Amici Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:17–cv–00461–REP–RCY)
Argued: May 7, 2019 Decided: July 3, 2019
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Diaz joined.
ARGUED: William H. Hurd, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellants. Matthew W.H. Wessler, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: David N. Anthony, Timothy J. St. George, TROUTMAN
SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Justin A. Gray, ROSETTE, LLP, Mattawan,
Michigan, for Appellants. Kristi C. Kelly, Andrew Guzzo, Casey S. Nash, KELLY &
CRANDALL, PLC, Fairfax, Virginia; Alexandria Twinem, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Pilar M. Thomas, LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER
CHRISTIE LLP, Tucson, Arizona; Derrick Beetso, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, Washington, D.C., for Amici National Congress of American
Indians, National Indian Gaming Association, and National Center for American Indian
Enterprise Development. Sarah J. Auchterlonie, BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER
SCHRECK LLP, Denver, Colorado; Brendan Johnson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
Luke A. Hasskamp, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amicus
Conference of Tribal Lending Commissioners. Brian Foster, Michael Nonaka,
Luis Urbina, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Online
Lenders Alliance. William Corbett, Diane M. Standaert, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, Durham, North Carolina, for Amicus Center for Responsible
Lending. Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General,
Caroline S. Van Zile, Deputy Solicitor General, Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant
Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C.; George Jepsen, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, Hartford,
Connecticut; Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
2
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois; Janet T. Mills, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MAINE,
Augusta, Maine; Maura Healey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
Boston, Massachusetts; Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Trenton,
New Jersey; Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina;
Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont; Russell A. Suzuki, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF HAWAII,
Honolulu, Hawaii; Tom Miller, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF IOWA, Des Moines, Iowa; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Lori Swanson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, St. Paul, Minnesota;
Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK, New York, New York; Josh Shapiro, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Mark R. Herring, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Amici District of Columbia, State of Connecticut,
State of Hawaii, State of Illinois, State of Iowa, State of Maine, State of Maryland,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Minnesota, State of New Jersey, State of New
York, State of North Carolina, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of Vermont, and
Commonwealth of Virginia.
3
GREGORY, Chief Judge:
The Lac Vieux Desert Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“the Tribe”)
formed two business entities under tribal law. This appeal arises from a suit brought by
five Virginia residents against those entities, Big Picture Loans, LLC and Ascension
Technologies, LLC (collectively “the Entities”). In the underlying action, the Virginia
residents claimed that they obtained payday loans on the internet from Big Picture and
that those loans carried unlawfully high interest rates. The Entities moved to dismiss the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that they are entitled to sovereign
immunity as arms of the Tribe. After concluding that the Entities bore the burden of
proof in the arm-of-the-tribe analysis, the district court found that the Entities failed to
prove that they are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
The Entities now appeal that decision. Although the district court properly placed
the burden of proof on the Entities claiming tribal sovereign immunity, we hold that the
district court erred in its determination that the Entities are not arms of the Tribe. We
therefore reverse the district court’s decision and remand the case with instructions to
dismiss the complaint.
I.
The Tribe entered the business of online lending in 2011 when it organized Red
Rock Lending as a tribally owned LLC. Two members of the Tribe managed Red Rock,
and the Tribe was its sole member. Red Rock provided loans to consumers from its
offices on the Reservation and was subject to the Tribe’s Tribal Financial Services
4
Regulatory Code, which is enforced by the Tribal Financial Services Regulatory
Authority. Red Rock contracted with Bellicose, a non-tribal LLC, to provide vendor
management services, compliance management assistance, marketing material
development, and risk modeling and data analytics development. Matt Martorello, a non-
tribe member, was its founder and chief executive officer. 1
Two years after the formation of Red Rock, in February 2013, the New York
Department of Financial Services sent cease and desist letters to several lending entities,
including Red Rock, accusing them of “using the Internet to offer and originate illegal
payday loans to New York consumers, in violation of New York’s civil and criminal
usury laws.” Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 974 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Tribe and entities sought a preliminary
injunction based in part on a claim that New York’s regulation would infringe on tribal
sovereignty. The district court denied the request, however, finding that the entities had
not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because their online lending to New York
customers constituted off-reservation activity and could thus be properly regulated under
New York’s anti-usury law. See id. at 360–61. The Second Circuit affirmed this
decision in October 2014. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin.
Servs., 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
Around the same time, the Tribe formed three entities central to this appeal. On
August 26, 2014, months before the Second Circuit’s decision in Otoe-Missouria, the
1
Bellicose assigned its interest in the contract to SourcePoint, a Bellicose
subsidiary, in 2012. J.A. 158.
5
Tribe organized Big Picture as an independent tribal lending entity that would ultimately
consolidate the activities of its other lending entities, including Red Rock. On February
5, 2015, the Tribe Council formed another entity, Tribal Economic Development
Holdings, LLC (“TED”), to operate the Tribe’s current and future lending companies.
Also on February 5, 2015, the Tribe formed Ascension as a subsidiary of TED for the
purpose of engaging in marketing, technological, and vendor services to support the
Tribe’s lending entities. The Tribe was the sole member of TED, and TED became Big
Picture’s and Ascension’s sole member.
Also in early 2015, Martorello and the Tribe agreed on a basic framework for the
sale of Bellicose: a seller-financed transaction with non-fixed payments over a seven-
year term, with any outstanding amount due to be forgiven at the end of that term. Prior
to that time, the Tribe and Martorello had engaged in multiple conversations about the
potential sale of Martorello’s consulting companies to the Tribe, which would allow the
Tribe to engage in online lending without relying on outside vendors for support services.
The seller-financier would be Eventide Credit Acquisitions, LLC, a company managed
and majority-owned by multiple entities of which Martorello was the president. In short,
Eventide would provide a $300 million loan to TED, which TED would then use to
purchase Bellicose.
After continuing negotiations, the parties reached a final agreement in September
2015, memorializing the terms of the deal in a loan agreement and a promissory note.
Under those terms, Big Picture would first make a distribution to TED of its gross
revenues. TED would then distribute 2% of those revenues to the Tribe and reinvest an
6
additional 2% of gross revenues in growing Big Picture’s loan portfolio. The parties
agreed to increase the monthly distribution to the tribe from 2% to 3% in September
2016, and the agreement also provided that the percentage distribution would increase to
6% when half the loan had been repaid. In January 2016, the Tribe completed its
purchase of Bellicose and acquired all of Bellicose’s data and software. By September
2017, TED had distributed approximately $20 million in loan payments to Eventide and
nearly $5 million to the Tribe.
TED now oversees both Big Picture and Ascension, and all three entities have
their headquarters on the Reservation. Big Picture currently employs 15 tribal members
on the Reservation, and Ascension employs 31 individuals, most of whom work outside
the Reservation. An Intratribal Servicing Agreement sets forth the relationship between
Big Picture and Ascension, with Ascension handling certain day-to-day aspects of the
loan operations for Big Picture. Michelle Hazen and James Williams, both Tribe Council
members, co-manage all three companies. Hazen is also chief executive officer of Big
Picture, but Ascension’s president is a non-tribal member.
In June 2017, Plaintiffs Lula Williams, Gloria Turnage, George Hengle, Dowin
Coffy, and Felix Gillison, Jr. brought a putative class action against Big Picture and
Ascension, as well as individual defendants who are not parties to this appeal. Plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Big Picture charges interest rates on
its loans that are substantially–50 times–higher than would be allowed if Virginia law
were applicable. Before the district court, the Entities appeared specially to claim that
7
they are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, submitting documentation in support of
their assertion that they are arms of the Tribe.
Following jurisdictional discovery, the district court rejected the Entities’
invocation of arm-of-the-tribe immunity. In reaching its decision, the district court
determined that the driving force behind the formation of Big Picture and Ascension was
“to shelter outsiders from the consequences of their otherwise illegal actions.” J.A. 222.
The district court placed the burden of proof for the immunity issue on the Entities. The
Entities timely appealed.
II.
On appeal from a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), we review “the district court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for
clear error and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom de novo.” In re KBR, Inc., Burn
Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if we
are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 337 (4th Cir. 2012).
“Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign
authority over their members and territories.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (quoting Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831)). The Supreme Court has recognized that tribal immunity
may remain intact when a tribe elects to engage in commerce using tribally created
entities, i.e., arms of the tribe, but the Court has not articulated a framework for
8
determining whether a particular entity should be considered an arm of the tribe. See
Inyo Cty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S.
701, 704, 705 n.1 (2003) (holding that a tribe and its wholly-owned gaming corporation,
an arm of the tribe, were not “persons” who could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). This
Court has recognized the existence of arm-of-the-tribe immunity but has likewise never
applied the doctrine to determine whether an entity qualifies as an arm of a tribe. See
United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Inyo County).
III.
A.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the proper allocation of the burden of proof
in the arm-of-the-tribe analysis. The district court held that Big Picture and Ascension, as
the parties claiming arm-of-the-tribe immunity, bore the burden of proving their
entitlement to immunity. Big Picture and Ascension contend that this was in error,
arguing that the tribal documents establishing the Entities should create a presumption of
immunity to be rebutted by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue, by contrast, that the district court
properly looked to arm-of-the-state doctrine in reaching its decision as to the burden of
proof. We agree with Plaintiffs on this point.
In determining the proper burden allocation in this context, this Court’s arm-of-
the-state doctrine guides our analysis. Given the unique attributes of sovereign
immunity, we have held that the burden of proof falls to an entity seeking immunity as an
9
arm of the state, even though a plaintiff generally bears the burden to prove subject
matter jurisdiction. Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).
The same burden allocation applies to an entity seeking immunity as an arm of the tribe.
Placing the burden of proof on the defendant entity aligns with our reasoning in Hutto
that sovereign immunity is “akin to an affirmative defense” and gives proper recognition
to the similarities between state sovereign immunity and tribal sovereign immunity. Id.
Moreover, such an allocation recognizes that an entity that is formally distinct from the
tribe should only be immune from suit to the extent that it is an arm of the tribe. Unlike
the tribe itself, an entity should not be given a presumption of immunity until it has
demonstrated that it is in fact an extension of the tribe. Once a defendant has done so, the
burden to prove that immunity has been abrogated or waived would then fall to the
plaintiff. Finally, as a practical matter, it makes sense to place the burden on defendants
like Ascension and Big Picture, as they will likely have the best access to the evidence
needed to demonstrate immunity. For these reasons, the district court properly
determined that Ascension and Big Picture must prove that they are entitled to tribal
immunity as arms of the Tribe by a preponderance of the evidence.
B.
Turning to the arm-of-the-tribe immunity analysis, the district court applied the
factors set forth in Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino &
Resort, 629 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2010). Those non-exhaustive factors are: (1) the
method of the entities’ creation; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and
management; (4) the tribe’s intent to share its sovereign immunity; (5) the financial
10
relationship between the tribe and the entities; and (6) the policies underlying tribal
sovereign immunity and the entities’ “connection to tribal economic development, and
whether those policies are served by granting immunity to the economic entities.” Id. at
1187. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the first five Breakthrough factors to analyze arm-
of-the-tribe immunity and also considers the central purposes underlying the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity. See White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.
2014). The parties did not and do not dispute that these factors should guide our analysis.
Like the Ninth Circuit, we adopt the first five Breakthrough factors to analyze
arm-of-the-tribe sovereign immunity and allow the purpose of tribal immunity to inform
our entire analysis. The sixth Breakthrough factor, whether the purposes underlying
tribal sovereign immunity would be served by granting an entity immunity, overlaps
significantly with the first five Breakthrough factors. Thus, the extent to which a grant of
arm-of-the-tribe immunity promotes the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity is too
important to constitute a single factor and will instead inform the entire analysis.
Here, we find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings. Reviewing the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo, however, we hold that the Entities are entitled
to sovereign immunity as arms of the Tribe and therefore reverse the district court’s
decision.
1. Method of Creation
In considering the “method of creation of the economic entities,” we focus on the
law under which the entities were formed. Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1191–92.
Formation under tribal law weighs in favor of immunity. Id. at 1191; see also White, 765
11
F.3d at 1025. Here, as the district court found, Big Picture and Ascension were both
organized through resolutions by the Tribe Council, exercising powers delegated to it by
the Tribe’s Constitution, and the Entities operated pursuant to the Tribe’s Business
Ordinance. It is therefore undisputed that Big Picture and Ascension were “created under
tribal law,” which “weighs in favor of the conclusion that these entities are entitled to
tribal sovereign immunity.” Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1191. Accordingly, this factor
weighs in favor of tribal sovereign immunity for both Entities. See Breakthrough, 629
F.3d at 1191–92 (finding first factor weighed in favor of immunity where entities were
created under tribal law).
2. Purpose
The second Breakthrough factor incorporates both the stated purpose for which the
Entities were created as well as evidence related to that purpose. 629 F.3d at 1192–93.
The stated purpose need not be purely governmental to weigh in favor of immunity as
long as it relates to broader goals of tribal self-governance. For example, in
Breakthrough, the Tenth Circuit found that this factor weighed in favor of immunity
where the stated purpose of a casino was to financially benefit the tribe and enable it to
engage in various governmental functions–even though the entities themselves engaged
in commercial activities. Id. at 1192; see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572
U.S. 782, 789 (2014) (holding that tribal immunity extends to “suits arising from a tribe’s
commercial activities, even when they take place off Indian lands”).
Here, the district court accurately noted that the Tribe has stated a purpose for
each Entity that relates to broader goals of tribal self-governance separate from the
12
Entity’s commercial activities, i.e., tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.
Big Picture’s stated purpose, included in its articles of organization, is to “engage in the
business of operating one or more Tribal lending business(es)” as part of the Tribe’s
“strategic economic development efforts” aimed at “diversify[ing] the economy of the
Tribe’s Reservation in order to improve the Tribe’s economic self-sufficiency.” J.A. 365,
370. Similarly, Ascension’s stated purpose, also included in its articles of organization,
is to “engage in the business of operating one or more Tribal marketing, technology and
vendor service business(es),” thereby fulfilling the same tribal economic development
efforts. J.A. 380, 387. Thus, the stated purpose of the Entities supports the conclusion
that this factor weighs in favor of immunity.
In holding otherwise, the district court reasoned: (1) the formation of the
businesses was “for the real purpose of helping Martorello and Bellicose to avoid
liability, rather than to help the Tribe start a business”; and (2) Big Picture and Ascension
“do not fulfill their stated purposes in practice.” J.A. 206–07. Neither rationale holds up.
The record indeed shows that the Tribe created Big Picture and Ascension
following the Second Circuit’s adverse ruling and the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s enforcement action against another online lender, Western Sky, that claimed
immunity based on its relationship with another tribe. See J.A. 1321–22 (Martorello
emailing Tribal Council members and the Tribe’s counsel regarding his concerns about
the CFPB and New York enforcement actions); J.A. 1329 (emails after the enforcement
actions between Martorello and the head of the Tribal Council scheduling a time to
discuss “a potential bigger deal for [the Tribe] learning the Servicing business”).
13
However, the evidence does not support the district court’s conclusion that the creation of
the Entities was only or primarily intended to benefit Martorello or that the creation of
Big Picture and Ascension was solely the product of Martorello’s design and urging.
Indeed, the district court recognized that both Martorello and the Tribe “looked for ways
to restructure Red Rock’s lending operations to reduce exposure to liability.” J.A. 201.
The email communications among Martorello, the Tribe Council members, and the Tribe
also indicate that the Tribe and Martorello were both interested in avoiding a potential
CFPB enforcement action so that the lending operations could continue. As the district
court found, the evidence “does not indicate that Martorello himself has received any
substantial economic benefit from Big Picture.” J.A. 212.
While Martorello certainly stood to benefit from the creation of Big Picture and
Ascension and the continuation of the Tribe’s lending operation, so too did the Tribe.
Thus, the district court’s conclusion that the “real purpose” of Big Picture and Ascension
was simply to protect Martorello does not hold up (and is in fact contradicted by other
findings in the district court’s order). Unlike the tribe in People ex rel. Owen v. Miami
Nation Enters, a California Supreme Court case relied upon heavily by the district court,
the Tribe here did not create Big Picture and Ascension solely, or even primarily, to
protect and enrich a non-tribe member. See 386 P.3d 357, 378 (Cal. 2016). Rather, the
Tribe created Big Picture and Ascension so that its lending operations could continue,
along with the economic benefits associated with that continuation. The fact that the
Tribe created Big Picture and Ascension in part to reduce exposure to liability does not
necessarily invalidate or even undercut the Tribe’s stated purpose, i.e., tribal economic
14
development. Indeed, in order to reach its stated goal, the Tribe may have deemed it
necessary to reduce its exposure to liability. The district court therefore erred in finding
this factor weighed against tribal sovereign immunity on this basis.
The district court’s reasoning as to the fulfillment of the Entities’ stated purposes
was also in error. The district court determined that Big Picture and Ascension do not
fulfill their stated purposes, because: (1) the Tribe’s explanation as to how revenue from
Big Picture is used is too vague, and the revenue received by the Tribe is a sliver of Big
Picture’s total earnings; (2) Ascension does not employ Tribe members; and (3)
Ascension and Big Picture’s compensation structures indicate that the Entities primarily
benefit individuals and entities outside of the Tribe.
As to the first conclusion, the district court found that the money generated by Big
Picture constitutes more than 10% of the Tribe’s general fund and may contribute more
than 30% of the fund within the next few years. Despite this evidence that Big Picture’s
revenue constituted a significant percentage of the Tribe’s general fund, the district court
nevertheless deemed the information provided by the Tribe as to the specific uses of
those funds to be too vague. Without pointing to any evidence casting doubt on Hazen’s
assertions, the district court hypothesized that Big Picture’s revenue might not actually
fund the “governmental essential services” identified by Tribe Council member Hazen.
J.A. 208.
The district court’s conclusion on this front was wrong for three reasons. First,
one of the primary purposes underlying tribal immunity is the promotion of tribal self-
governance, which counsels against courts demanding exacting information about the
15
minutiae of a tribe’s budget. That these funds constitute a significant portion of the
Tribe’s general fund in and of itself suggests that Big Picture’s revenue has contributed to
the Entities’ stated purpose of tribal economic development.
Second, even applying the district court’s exacting standard, the record shows–and
the district court recognized–the specific Tribal activities that Big Picture’s revenue has
funded. Indeed, the district court explicitly recognized that Big Picture’s funds had been
used, in whole or in part, to:
• meet requirements necessary to secure $14.1 million in financing for the
Tribe’s new health clinic;
• refinance casino debt;
• fund college scholarships and pay for educational costs for members such
as student housing, books, school supplies and equipment;
• create home ownership opportunities for members through tribally
purchased homes;
• subsidize tribal members’ home purchases and rentals;
• provide a bridge loan to complete the new tribal health clinic that offers
services to the regional community;
• fund new vehicles for the Tribe’s Police Department;
• fund an Ojibwe language program and other cultural programs;
16
• provide foster care payments for eligible children, propane assistance, and
assistance for family care outside of the community; cover burial and other
funeral expenses for members’ families;
• fund renovations and new office space for the Tribe’s Social Services
Department; fund youth activities;
• renovate a new space for the Tribe’s Court and bring in telecom services for
remote court proceedings;
• and fund tribal elder nutrition programs and tribal elder home care and
transport services. J.A. 179–80.
In deeming the Tribe’s evidence “far too general,” the district court appeared to
require a breakdown of exactly what percentage of the Tribe’s budget went to each of
these activities and exactly what percentage of the funding for these activities constituted
Big Picture revenue. Such a requirement is at odds with policy considerations of tribal
self-governance and economic development.
The district court also erred in determining that this factor weighed against tribal
sovereign immunity on the basis that the Tribe did not receive enough of a benefit from
Big Picture compared with Eventide. The district court found that the promissory note
between TED and Eventide limits the funds available to the Tribe to 5% of Big Picture’s
total monthly earnings–a 3% monthly distribution and a 2% reinvestment amount. The
district court also found that Big Picture has given the Tribe a little under $5 million
(about $3 million in distributions and $2 million for reinvestment) and that TED has
made loan repayments to Eventide of approximately $20 million. On these facts, the
17
district court concluded that “the Tribe has only received about 20% of Big Picture’s total
revenue, still a relatively small percentage.” J.A. 210. The district court further
recognized that Big Picture will not owe Eventide anything after the note terminates in
seven years. Nevertheless, based on these facts, the district court concluded that the
“revenue distribution disparity” between Big Picture and Eventide was so great that it
weighed against a finding of immunity. We disagree.
As an initial matter, the district court cited to no authority suggesting that a tribe
must receive a certain percentage of revenue from a given entity for the entity to
constitute an arm of the tribe. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Tribe would not
have been able to finance a loan operation on its own and thus entered a loan agreement
with a non-tribal entity in order to obtain revenue both now and in the future. Indeed,
when the loan was originally signed, the Tribe received a one-time reinvestment of $1.3
million. J.A. 1346. Currently, the Tribe receives 5% of Big Picture’s gross revenue
distribution, and this percentage will increase to 8% upon payment of half the loan. 2
Finally, after seven years, the remaining balance will be forgiven, with all net revenue to
the Tribe. At that time, in only a few years, not only will all revenue belong to the Tribe,
but it will own outright all of the components of the commercial lending enterprise.
Thus, the facts of this case are a far cry from the circumstances in Miami Nation,
where the evidence indicated that the tribe received barely any revenue, and the entities
could not identify the percentage of profits from the lending operations that flowed to the
2
This total includes a distribution of 6% of Big Picture’s gross revenues to the
Tribe plus 2% for reinvestment into Big Picture. See J.A. 1607.
18
tribe or how those profits were used. 386 P.3d at 378. Even more importantly, policy
considerations of tribal self-governance and self-determination counsel against second-
guessing a financial decision of the Tribe where, as here, the evidence indicates that the
Tribe’s general fund has in fact benefited significantly from the revenue generated by an
entity.
In addition to its concerns about revenue sharing, the district court found the
Entities’ employment opportunities and compensation structures to be problematic.
While the district court recognized that Big Picture’s employees consist mainly of the
Tribe’s members, it noted that Ascension does not employ any Tribe members, instead
relying on employees who previously worked at Bellicose. The district court reasoned
that this “composition may have been justified when Ascension was formed in 2015
because the company needed individuals with certain technical knowledge for the
required support services, and Bellicose’s employees were the perfect candidates.” J.A.
211. The district court found the current lack of tribal employees unacceptable, however,
and faulted the Tribe for doing “little more than encourag[ing] tribal members to pursue
educational opportunities that would allow them to work for Ascension and Big Picture
in the future.” J.A. 211. At the same time, the district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument
that the Tribe should have started training programs for tribal members to work at the
company, because there was no indication that the Tribe had the capacity or funds to do
so. The district court nevertheless found that Ascension had failed to contribute to the
Tribe’s stated purposes for the Entities, because Ascension only supported Big Picture’s
19
“minimal revenue generation” and did not provide hiring opportunities for tribal
members. J.A. 211.
While employment of tribe members may be an indication that an entity is
contributing to a tribe’s self-governance or economic development, it is not required for
this factor to weigh in favor of immunity. As the district court noted, there is no evidence
that the Tribe had the capacity to train its members to take on skilled employment at
Ascension, but the district court nonetheless faulted the Tribe for not doing more to
increase tribal employment. More importantly, Ascension’s support of Big Picture’s
lending operations, which the evidence indicates is important to Big Picture’s operations,
is directly related to achievement of the Tribe’s stated purposes.
As to the compensation structures at Ascension and Big Picture, the district court
found it problematic that Tribe Council member Hazen has been paid more than other
tribal members at Big Picture and that Ascension’s employees are paid more than Big
Picture’s employees. The district court determined that these differences “lead to the
conclusion that Big Picture and Ascension primarily benefit individuals and entities
outside the Tribe, or only one tribal leader, both of which are inconsistent with the goal of
economic development.” J.A. 212. The Entities accurately point out that Hazen is chief
executive officer of Big Picture and that it should therefore not be surprising that she is
paid more than other Tribe members at the company. The district court also found that
Big Picture’s employees require less technical training than Ascension employees, which
may naturally lead to a pay differential. At any rate, the district court erroneously
determined that these pay differences necessitate a conclusion that the Entities primarily
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benefit individuals and entities outside the Tribe. Such a conclusion disregards the
substantial revenue that the Tribe has received (and will continue to receive) in the form
of payouts and reinvestments.
In sum, because Big Picture and Ascension serve the purposes of tribal economic
development and self-governance, this factor weighs in favor of immunity for both
Entities.
3. Control
The third Breakthrough factor examines the structure, ownership, and management
of the entities, “including the amount of control the Tribe has over the entities.” 629 F.3d
at 1191. Relevant to this factor are the entities’ formal governance structure, the extent to
which the entities are owned by the tribe, and the day-to-day management of the entities.
Here, the district court found that this factor weighed against a finding of immunity for
both Entities. We conclude, however, that this factor weighs in favor of immunity for
Big Picture and only slightly against a finding of immunity for Ascension.
Big Picture is an LLC managed by two Tribe Council members, Hazen and
Williams, who were appointed by majority vote of the Tribe Council and must be
removed in the same way. As co-managers, Hazen and Williams are granted broad
authority to bind Big Picture individually and “to do and perform all actions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the business of Big Picture including but not limited
to the power to enter into contracts for services, to manage vendor relationships, and to
manage personnel issues and affairs of Big Picture.” J.A. 458. Hazen and Williams are
precluded only from selling Big Picture’s assets or waiving its sovereign immunity. J.A.
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450–51. The district court found that the Tribe has a substantial role in the operations of
Big Picture, “as the entity employs a number of tribal members”–including Hazen as its
chief executive officer–and “conducts all of its operations on the Reservation.” J.A. 214.
On these facts, the district court correctly recognized that this “general structure is to
assure that Big Picture is answerable to the Tribe at every level, which supports
immunity.” J.A. 215. Despite this conclusion, the district court found that this factor
ultimately weighed against immunity for Big Picture, because its structure was
outweighed by Ascension’s substantial role in Big Picture’s operations. We disagree.
The district court’s determination rested on two underlying conclusions: “(1) that
the Tribe’s formal oversight of Big Picture is meaningless given Ascension’s dominant
role in Big Picture’s lending operations; and (2) that, assuming Ascension has such a role,
that entity is not controlled by the Tribe.” J.A. 216.
As to the first conclusion, while Ascension does manage many of the day-to-day
activities associated with Big Picture’s lending, an entity’s decision to outsource
management in and of itself does not weigh against tribal immunity, as the district court
recognized. See Miami Nation, 336 P.3d at 373. The Intratribal Servicing Agreement,
which lays out the relationship between the two Entities, indicates that Big Picture
remains in control of its essential functions. Indeed, the Intratribal Servicing Agreement
expressly forbids Ascension from engaging in origination activities, executing loan
documentation, or approving the issuance of loans to consumers. The Agreement assigns
Ascension the duties to give “pre-qualified leads” to Big Picture and to provide the
“necessary credit-modeling data and risk assessment strategies” used by Big Picture to
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decide whether to issue a loan. J.A. 419. But the Agreement also provides that the
“criteria used to extend funds to individual borrowers will remain within the sole and
absolute discretion” of Big Picture and that Big Picture “shall execute all necessary loan
documentation.” J.A. 420. The district court discounted these facts and instead
speculated that, given Ascension’s responsibility to identify borrowers based on its
credit-modeling system, “it does not appear that Big Picture has much discretion to
exercise when it receives recommendations or documents from Ascension.” J.A. 216–17.
But the Agreement itself provides that Big Picture may always “within [its] sole and
absolute discretion” change the criteria used to extend funds when and if it deems such a
change appropriate. J.A. 420. In other words, the fact that Big Picture currently chooses
to utilize Ascension’s criteria does not mean that it does not have the power to choose
differently in the future.
The district court recognized that Hazen and Williams have been actively involved
in discussing items like Big Picture’s operating budget and employee handbook and have
approved forms sent by employees concerning a variety of policies and procedures. J.A.
217. The district court also discounted this evidence, however, finding that Williams’s
testimony that he was not knowledgeable about certain Big Picture subsidiaries or
customer service representatives demonstrated that the Tribe did not actually control Big
Picture. J.A. 218. Given the evidence of the Tribe’s broad power, through Hazen and
Williams, over Big Picture’s important business decisions and management and evidence
that Hazen and Williams in fact exercised that power with frequency, the district court
erred in concluding that Big Picture was not controlled by the Tribe simply because of
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Hazen and Williams’s outsourcing of certain day-to-day management tasks and their lack
of knowledge of some aspects of the lending operation. Indeed, even assuming Hazen
and Williams lack knowledge as to certain aspects of the operation and did outsource
aspects of day-to-day management to a non-tribal entity, such an arrangement would not
in itself weigh against immunity, given the other evidence of Tribal control. See Miami
Nation, 336 P.3d at 373.
As to Ascension, we agree with the district court that the control question is closer.
Like Big Picture, Ascension is owned by its sole member, TED, and Hazen and Williams
serve as managers of the company with a Tribe Council vote required for their removal.
J.A. 218. Unlike Big Picture, Ascension has a non-tribal president, Brian McFadden, and
it conducts most of its business outside the Reservation with non-tribe members. J.A.
218. McFadden must obtain Hazen’s or Williams’s approval for “changes in operations,
personnel, or distributions,” and the evidence demonstrates that Ascension employees
have submitted request and approval forms to Hazen and Williams for certain business
decisions. J.A. 219. However, Hazen and Williams have delegated to McFadden the
authority to approve Ascension’s strategic direction, execute documents on the
company’s behalf, open and manage Ascension’s bank accounts, and oversee all matters
necessary for the daily management of Ascension. Additionally, the Loan Agreement
prevents TED and Ascension from modifying the Intratribal Servicing Agreement or
terminating or replacing any managers or officers of Ascension without Eventide’s
consent. Given Hazen and Williams’s delegation of authority as to certain aspects of
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Ascension, this evidence, on balance, tends to weigh slightly against a finding of
immunity for Ascension.
In sum, this factor weighs in favor of immunity for Big Picture and slightly against
a finding of immunity for Ascension.
4. Tribal Intent
The fourth Breakthrough factor assesses the tribe’s intent to extend its immunity to
the entities. In some cases, the tribal ordinances or articles of incorporation creating the
entities will state whether the tribe intended the entities to share in the tribe’s immunity.
That was the case here. The Tribe unequivocally stated its intention to share its immunity
in Big Picture and Ascension’s formation documents. Before the district court, Plaintiffs
conceded that this factor weighed in favor of Big Picture and Ascension but argued that
the district court should accord it the least weight out of all the factors. The district court
rejected this argument but nevertheless concluded that this factor weighed against a
finding of immunity “because to do otherwise is to ignore the driving force for the
Tribe’s intent to share its immunity.” J.A. 222. This conclusion was in error, because the
district court improperly conflated the purpose and intent factors. This factor focuses
solely on whether the Tribe intended to provide its immunity to the Entities. As Plaintiffs
conceded, it did. This factor thus weighs in favor of immunity for both Entities.
5. Financial Relationship
The fifth Breakthrough factor considers the financial relationship between the tribe
and the entities. 629 F.3d at 1194. As the district court recognized, whether a judgment
against an entity would reach the tribe’s assets is a relevant consideration. However,
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direct tribal liability for an entity’s actions “is neither a threshold requirement for
immunity nor a predominant factor in the overall analysis.” Miami Nation, 386 P.3d at
373. Instead, courts consider the extent to which a tribe “depends . . . on the [entity] for
revenue to fund its governmental functions, its support of tribal members, and its search
for other economic development opportunities.” Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1195. If a
judgment against the entity would significantly impact the tribal treasury, this factor will
weigh in favor of immunity even if the tribe’s liability for an entity’s actions is formally
limited. Id.
Here, as the district court recognized, the Tribe would not be directly liable for a
judgment against Big Picture or Ascension. This fact alone has little significance in the
analysis. Rather, the relevant inquiry evaluates the extent to which the Tribe depends on
these Entities for revenue to fund its governmental functions and other tribal
development. The district court found that this factor weighed against immunity, because
the actual effect on the Tribe of a reduction in Big Picture’s revenue “appears to be
insubstantial” and Big Picture’s revenue “does not play as important a role in the Tribe’s
general fund as in other cases where this factor supported immunity.” J.A. 225.
Neither the cases cited by the district court nor the record support the proposition
that the Tribe does not significantly depend on Big Picture’s revenue. Given that 10% of
the Tribe’s general fund comes from Big Picture, a judgment against Big Picture or
Ascension could in fact significantly impact the tribal treasury, which is at the heart of
this analysis, even if it is unclear what the exact repercussions of that impact might be on
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tribal members and services. 3 Where, as here, a judgment against the Entities could
significantly impact the Tribe’s treasury, this factor weighs in favor of immunity even
though the Tribe’s formal liability is limited. See Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1195.
C.
In summary, we find that all of the factors weigh in favor of immunity for Big
Picture and all but one of the factors weigh in favor of immunity for Ascension.
Accordingly, both Entities are entitled to immunity as arms of the Tribe.
We reach this conclusion with due consideration of the underlying policies of
tribal sovereign immunity, which include tribal self-governance and tribal economic
development as well as protection of “the tribe’s monies” and the “promotion of
commercial dealings between Indians and non-Indians.” Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at
1187–88. The evidence here shows that the Entities have increased the Tribe’s general
fund, expanded the Tribe’s commercial dealings, and subsidized a host of services for the
Tribe’s members. Accordingly, the Entities have promoted “the Tribe’s self-
determination through revenue generation and the funding of diversified economic
development.” Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1195. A finding of no immunity in this case,
even if animated by the intent to protect the Tribe or consumers, would weaken the
Tribe’s ability to govern itself according to its own laws, become self-sufficient, and
develop economic opportunities for its members.
3
As the district court acknowledged, a judgment against Ascension could
“drastically reduce Big Picture’s revenue.” J.A. 226. Thus, a judgment against either
Entity could impact the Tribe’s treasury.
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Although Plaintiffs stress the injuries they allegedly face as a result of the Entities’
commercial activities, an entity’s entitlement to tribal immunity cannot and does not
depend on a court’s evaluation of the respectability of the business in which a tribe has
chosen to engage. Accordingly, the potential merit of the borrowers’ claims against Big
Picture and Ascension–and the lack of a remedy for those alleged wrongs–does not sway
the tribal immunity analysis. It is Congress–not the courts–that has the power to abrogate
tribal immunity. See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 800 (“[I]t is fundamentally Congress’s job,
not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity.”).
Because a proper weighing of the factors demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Entities are indeed arms of the Tribe, Big Picture and Ascension are
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order and remand with
instructions to grant the Entities’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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