United States v. Grant , 15 F. App'x 49 ( 2001 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
             No. 00-4715
    ISAIAH GRANT, a/k/a Ike Grant, a/k/a
    Reverend Ike,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
    Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
    (CR-99-358)
    Submitted: June 15, 2001
    Decided: June 29, 2001
    Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Walter S. Ameika, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF WALTER S. AMEIKA,
    JR., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Scott Newton Schools,
    United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    2                      UNITED STATES v. GRANT
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Isaiah Grant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in vio-
    lation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1344
     (West 2000). The district court denied
    his motion for downward departure based on physical impairment,
    chronic myopathy of unknown etiology, and declined to award an
    acceptance of responsibility adjustment pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual §§ 5H1.4, 3E.1 (West 1998). The court sentenced
    Grant within the applicable guideline range to thirty-three months
    imprisonment, three years supervised release, restitution of
    $44,629.29, and a special assessment of $100. Grant noted a timely
    appeal. Grant’s attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). Grant filed a pro se motion to set
    aside or vacate his sentence. We affirm the order of the district court.
    A defendant may not appeal a district court’s refusal to depart
    downward at sentencing unless the court’s refusal was based on a
    mistaken view that it lacked the authority to depart. United States v.
    Edwards, 
    188 F.3d 230
    , 238 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bayerle,
    
    898 F.2d 28
    , 31 (4th Cir. 1990). The district court recognized that it
    had the authority to depart, but declined to do so. Therefore, we will
    not review this claim.
    We review the district court’s determination that a defendant has
    not accepted responsibility for clear error. United States v. Randall,
    
    171 F.3d 195
    , 210 (4th Cir. 1999). The defendant has the burden of
    showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the
    adjustment, and entry of a guilty plea is not in itself sufficient. See
    United States v. Nale, 
    101 F.3d 1000
    , 1005 (4th Cir. 1996). The dis-
    trict court declined to award an acceptance of responsibility adjust-
    ment, finding that although Grant pled guilty on the eve of trial, he
    did not admit his true and full role in the crime, as established by the
    testimony of ten or more witnesses and co-conspirators. We find that
    UNITED STATES v. GRANT                         3
    the district court did not err in denying an adjustment in light of the
    evidence.
    As required by Anders, we have independently reviewed the entire
    record and all pertinent documents. We have considered all possible
    issues presented by this record and concluded that there are no non-
    frivolous grounds for this appeal. This court requires that counsel
    inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
    for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
    counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
    may move this court for leave to withdraw from further representa-
    tion. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
    the client.
    Grant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. We deny Grant’s
    motion to set aside his conviction and sentence. We dispense with
    oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
    aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED