Brown v. Smith ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
NATALIE BROWN, in her individual
capacity and as personal
representative of the Estate of
Anthony Brown,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 96-2723
v.
WILLIAM L. SMITH; RICHARD
LANHAM, Commissioner,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
John R. Hargrove, Senior District Judge.
(CA-96-426-HAR)
Submitted: July 15, 1997
Decided: August 5, 1997
Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Donald M. Temple, DONALD M. TEMPLE, P.C., Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
Wendy A. Kronmiller, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Mary-
land, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Natalie Brown, in her individual capacity and as personal represen-
tative of the Estate of Anthony Brown, appeals the district court's
denial of her motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to rein-
state her complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1994). The
complaint was dismissed for failure to respond to Appellees' motion
to dismiss. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Brown filed the underlying complaint, alleging numerous civil
rights violations, after her son was fatally wounded while incarcerated
at the Maryland House of Correction. Following several court-
approved extensions of time, Appellees moved to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Because Brown did not respond
to Appellees' motion, the district court granted Appellees' motion and
dismissed the action.
In the Rule 60(b) motion, Brown's counsel asserts that he was out
of the country when his law office received Appellees' motion to dis-
miss and that, although he was in constant contact with his adminis-
trative assistants, the assistants failed to inform him that Appellees'
motion had arrived. Brown's counsel further asserts that he was not
aware of Appellees' motion until his return and that within a week of
his return, he received the district court's order dismissing Brown's
complaint.
On motion and upon just terms, a court may relieve a party from
final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect,
or any other reason justifying relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief
under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and is invoked only upon a showing
of exceptional circumstances. See Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Auto. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Here, Brown's counsel argues that his assistants' error amounts to
excusable neglect, warranting Rule 60(b) relief. However, "secretarial
negligence" is chargeable to counsel. Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d
78, 81 (9th Cir. 1987). And, as we have previously recognized, coun-
sel's ignorance or carelessness does not present a cognizable ground
for relief under Rule 60(b). See Evans v. United Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 871 F.2d 466, 472 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, we find that the
district court's refusal to grant Brown's Rule 60(b) motion does not
amount to an abuse of the court's discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.
AFFIRMED
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