Bacon v. Greene , 319 F. App'x 256 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7358
DWAYNE DION BACON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN GREENE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:06-cv-00261-AW)
Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 24, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dwayne Dion Bacon, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith Lane-
Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dwayne Dion Bacon, a Maryland prisoner, alleged in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint that correctional officers at
the Eastern Correctional Institution failed to intervene during
an assault and that Kathleen Greene, the warden, ignored his
request for the names of officers on duty during the incident.
Greene moved for summary judgment, asserting Bacon failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The district court agreed and
granted summary judgment to Greene. On appeal, Bacon concedes
that he did not file a request for administrative remedies, but
he argues, as he did in the district court, that he was unable
to pursue these remedies because Greene did not provide him with
the names of correctional officers on duty during the incident.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, “viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary
judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a
prisoner to properly exhaust available administrative remedies
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prior to filing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West
2003); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (requiring
“proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies); Moore v.
Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing
“availability” of remedies). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement is mandatory,” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs.,
Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and “applies to all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 532 (2002).
We have recognized, however, that “an administrative
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner,
through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself
of it.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Thus, “when prison officials
prevent inmates from using the administrative process . . ., the
process that exists on paper becomes unavailable in reality.”
Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006); see also
Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating
administrative remedy rendered unavailable when prison officials
prevent prisoner from using it). Accordingly, the district
court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in exhaustion
were not procured from the action or inaction of prison
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officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225
(10th Cir. 2007).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Bacon, we conclude there is a genuine issue as to the
availability of administrative remedies. Bacon has asserted
throughout the proceedings that Greene ignored his requests for
disclosure of information regarding the officers on duty at the
time of the assault. He further asserted that this lack of
information rendered him incapable of filing a request for
administrative remedy that would comply with institution
procedure. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district
court and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we do
not hold that administrative remedies have been properly
exhausted, but only that there is a genuine issue as to whether
officials withheld information that made an administrative
filing futile or impossible.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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