Clinchfield Coal Co v. Long ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
DONALD E. LONG; DIRECTOR,
No. 95-1805
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
(92-2590-BLA)
Submitted: December 19, 1995
Decided: January 12, 1996
Before HAMILTON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Timothy Ward Gresham, PENN, STUART, ESKRIDGE & JONES,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Petitioner. Donald E. Long, Respondent Pro
Se; Patricia May Nece, Jill M. Otte, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Donald Long filed an application for black lung benefits under 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995). Clinchfield Coal
Co. (Clinchfield) raised a statute of limitations defense under 20
C.F.R. § 725.308(a) (1995). The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled
that the claim was timely filed, but that Long had not established that
he suffered from pneumoconiosis or that he was totally disabled by
the disease. Long did not appeal this decision, but Clinchfield sought
to appeal to the Benefits Review Board (Board). Clinchfield urged the
Board to affirm the ALJ's ruling on the merits, but to reverse his
holding that the claim was not time-barred. The Board dismissed the
appeal, holding that there was no justiciable controversy. Clinchfield
appealed to this court.
We affirm the Board's action dismissing the appeal. Under the rel-
evant regulations, only a party or party in interest aggrieved by an
ALJ's decision may appeal to the Board. A prevailing party may file
a cross-appeal to challenge any "adverse findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law." 20 C.F.R. § 802.201(a), (b) (1995). The Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Director) contends that
under these regulations, Long is the aggrieved party. Clinchfield is the
prevailing party, as it has not been held liable for benefits. The fact
that the company was not persuasive on each one of its defensive
arguments does not render it an aggrieved party. The Board's inter-
pretation of its own regulations is generally entitled to deference on
judicial review. Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369
(4th Cir. 1994).
Clinchfield's argument that it will be unfairly bound by the statute
of limitations ruling in any future actions by Long is not persuasive.
The ruling of the ALJ would not operate as a bar, because Clinchfield
did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and had no
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opportunity to obtain review of the ALJ's decision. See In re DES
Litig., 7 F.3d 20, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28(l) (1982) (relitigation of an issue not precluded if
party could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review). Thus,
Clinchfield was not an aggrieved party with standing to challenge the
ALJ's ruling in its behalf, and the Board correctly dismissed the
appeal.
The Board's opinion contains ambiguous language suggesting that
it affirmed the ALJ's decision on the merits as well as dismissing
Clinchfield's appeal. We vacate that judgment and remand to the
Board so that it may eliminate that language and make clear that the
appeal is dismissed. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
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