Nettles v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. , 33 F. App'x 670 ( 2002 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SUSAN Q. NETTLES,                      
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PROCTOR & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING                   No. 01-2109
    COMPANY; PROCTOR & GAMBLE
    DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
    Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
    (CA-99-4197-9-23)
    Argued: February 26, 2002
    Decided: April 16, 2002
    Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Daniel Elmer Henderson, PETERS, MURDAUGH, PAR-
    KER, ELTZROTH & DETRICK, P.A., Hampton, South Carolina, for
    Appellant. Robert Watson Foster, Jr., NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY
    & SCARBOROUGH, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-
    lees. ON BRIEF: Ronnie L. Crosby, PETERS, MURDAUGH, PAR-
    KER, ELTZROTH & DETRICK, P.A., Hampton, South Carolina, for
    2                   NETTLES v. PROCTOR & GAMBLE
    Appellant. Susan M. Glenn, NELSON, MULLINS, RILEY & SCAR-
    BOROUGH, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Susan Nettles sued Proctor & Gamble ("P&G") in the
    District of South Carolina in 1999, alleging that P&G’s Vicks Sinex
    Nasal Spray caused optic nerve damage resulting in her blindness. In
    support of her claim, Nettles proffered the expert testimony of Dr.
    Alfredo Sadun, a neuro-opthalmologist, on the issue of causation of
    her injuries. P&G responded with a motion to exclude the proposed
    expert testimony, and it also moved for summary judgment. In exer-
    cising its function as gatekeeper under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
    of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
     (1993), the district court found Dr. Sadun’s testimony inad-
    missible and granted P&G’s motion to exclude it. Absent this evi-
    dence, Nettles was unable to link the nasal spray with her blindness,
    and the court therefore awarded summary judgment to P&G.
    As an elementary legal principle, decisions on the admissibility of
    expert testimony are committed to the sound discretion of the trial
    court. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
    522 U.S. 136
    , 139 (1997). We have
    consistently accorded these determinations appropriate deference, see
    United States v. Barnette, 
    211 F.3d 803
    , 816 (4th Cir. 2000), given
    the Supreme Court’s admonition that "the trial judge must have con-
    siderable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
    determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable." Kumho
    Tire, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
    526 U.S. 137
    , 152 (1999). A trial court
    abuses its discretion in excluding expert testimony only if its "conclu-
    sion is guided by erroneous legal principles, or rests upon a clearly
    erroneous factual finding," or if, after considering all the evidence, the
    NETTLES v. PROCTOR & GAMBLE                         3
    reviewing court possesses a "definite and firm conviction that the
    court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
    reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Westberry v. Gis-
    laved Gummi AB, 
    178 F.3d 257
    , 261 (4th Cir. 1999). Even if we
    "might have ruled differently on the matter in the first instance,"
    United States v. Dickerson, 
    166 F.3d 667
    , 678 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d
    on other grounds, 
    530 U.S. 428
     (2000), we are constrained by "a sig-
    nificant measure of appellate deference to the judgment calls of trial
    courts." United States v. Pittman, 
    209 F.3d 314
    , 316 (4th Cir. 2000);
    see also United States v. Mason, 
    52 F.3d 1286
    , 1289 (4th Cir. 1995)
    ("Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substi-
    tute its judgment for that of the district court; rather, we must deter-
    mine whether the court’s exercise of discretion, considering the law
    and the facts, was arbitrary or capricious.").
    In this instance, the court conducted a thorough analysis of the per-
    tinent facts and legal principles, and we are unable to say that its deci-
    sion against admissibility was either arbitrary or capricious. For
    example, as required by Daubert, the court analyzed the reasoning
    and methodology underlying Dr. Sadun’s opinions in seeking to
    determine whether they were scientifically valid and properly applied
    to the facts. Daubert, 
    509 U.S. at 595
    . In undertaking this review, the
    court relied upon the lack of peer-reviewed articles linking oxymeta-
    zoline (the active ingredient in the nasal spray) with anterior ischemic
    optic neuropathy (the disease causing Nettles’s blindness). Addition-
    ally, it considered and weighed the fact that Nettles had only minimal
    exposure to the nasal spray, and it concluded, in declining to autho-
    rize the admission of the evidence, that "the medical causation expert
    has ‘inferred causation’ from a situation-specific occurrence."
    Upon full and deliberate review of the record in this appeal, along
    with our consideration of the briefs and argument of counsel, we per-
    ceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling against the admissi-
    bility of this evidence. We therefore affirm its ruling thereon, and its
    concomitant entry of summary judgment in favor of P&G. Nettles v.
    Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., Order, C.A. 99-4197-9-23 (D.S.C. Aug.
    2, 2001).
    AFFIRMED