United States v. Gaither ( 1996 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5617
REGINALD GAITHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5618
FRANKLIN MOYLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 95-5619
WENDELL SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.
(CR-95-92-A)
Submitted: April 9, 1996
Decided: April 22, 1996
Before MURNAGHAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Gregory B. English, ENGLISH & SMITH, Alexandria, Virginia;
Bruce M. Cooper, Washington, D.C.; Alan Yamamoto, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellants. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,
LeDora Knight, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The Appellants Reginald Gaither, Franklin Moyler, and Wendell
Smith appeal their convictions and sentences arising from their
involvement in an assault on a fellow inmate at the Lorton Reforma-
tory. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the Appellant's convic-
tions and sentences.
On March 14, 1995, a disturbance occurred on the ballfield at the
Occoquan Facility of the Lorton Reformatory. Several inmates
attacked and repeatedly struck inmate Andre Jackson with weight
bars, bats, and bricks. Correctional officers saw and responded to the
attack. During the attack on Jackson, correctional officer Frederick
Montanya was struck by a brick thrown by an inmate at Jackson. An
investigation into the attack revealed that the Appellants were Jack-
son's assailants. The Appellants were indicted and received a jury
trial in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The jury found Gaither guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon
with the intent to do bodily harm,1 Moyler guilty of assault2 and
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1 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1988).
2 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1988);D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505(b) (1994).
2
assault with a dangerous weapon,3 and Smith guilty of assault.4 The
Appellants now appeal their convictions and sentences claiming vari-
ous errors.
First, the Appellants contend that the district court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction over the crimes committed at the Lorton
Reformatory and the district court erred in taking judicial notice that
the Lorton Reformatory was within the special maritime and territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States. The Appellants' claim is without
merit. It is well settled that the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia has original jurisdiction for crimes com-
mitted at the Lorton Reformatory.5 Additionally, we find that the dis-
trict court properly took judicial notice that the Lorton Reformatory
fell within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Lorton Reformatory's location was generally known in
the Alexandria Division of the Eastern District of Virginia and verifi-
able from "sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."6
Next, the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that
they could disregard the judicially noticed fact that the Lorton Refor-
matory was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. When the adequacy of jury instructions was not
challenged at trial, a showing of plain error is required.7 The Appel-
lants fail to show that the court's failure to specifically instruct the
jury that they could disregard judicially noticed facts seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial pro-
ceedings and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 8
Finally, the Appellants challenge various evidentiary rulings by the
trial court to admit, exclude, or limit certain witness testimony. Spe-
cifically, the Appellants contend that the trial court's evidentiary rul-
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3 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1988).
4 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1988).
5 United States v. Young, 916 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1990).
6 FED. R. EVID . 201(b).
7 United States v. Venneri, 736 F.2d 995, 996-97 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
8 United States v. Berrojo, 628 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1980).
3
ings denied them the right to confront and effectively examine
witnesses. The Appellants' claims are without merit. The Appellants
were able to examine all witnesses regarding their perceptions and
recollection of the attack on the ballfield, their custody and handling
of physical evidence, their authorship of various reports related to the
incident, and any known inconsistencies. A trial court's evidentiary
rulings are entitled to substantial deference,9 and a court has great dis-
cretion on limiting testimony that leads away from the main
controversy.10 Further, the jurors were able to assess the various wit-
nesses' testimony for bias, and witness credibility lies within the sole
province of the jury and is not subject to appellate review.11 Conse-
quently, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court.
Accordingly, we affirm the Appellants' convictions and sentences.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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9 United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1066 (1993).
10 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); United States v.
McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 956 (4th Cir. 1994).
11 United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
4