Riley v. Murdock ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JOHNSIE RILEY, on behalf of herself
    and all others similarly situated;
    JOHN F. RILEY, on behalf of himself
    and all others similarly situated;
    VIRGINIA HARRINGTON, on behalf of
    herself and all others similarly
    situated; DEWEY HARRINGTON, on
    behalf of himself and all others
    similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    DAVID H. MURDOCK; DHM HOLDING
    CORPORATION; MURDOCK INVESTMENT
    CORPORATION; PACIFIC HOLDING          No. 95-2414
    CORPORATION; CANNON HOLDING
    CORPORATION; CABARRUS BANK &
    TRUST COMPANY, Trustee,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    FIELDCREST CANNON MILLS,
    INCORPORATED; CHARLES A. CANNON,
    Charitable Trust Number One;
    CHARLES A. CANNON, Charitable
    Trust Number Two; CHARLES A.
    CANNON, Charitable Trust Number
    Three; CANNON FOUNDATION,
    INCORPORATED; TRUST UNDER THE
    WILL OF CHARLES A. CANNON;
    WILLIAM C. CANNON, Estate of the
    foregoing, individually and as a
    trustee; GEORGE A. BATTE, JR.,
    individually and as a trustee;
    J. HARRIS CANNON, individually and
    as a trustee; OTTO G. STOLZ,
    individually and as a trustee;
    HAROLD P. HORNADAY; DONALD S.
    HOLT, Estate of the foregoing;
    ANDREW W. ADAMS; ALBERT M.
    ALLRAN; JOSEPH C. RIDENHOUR;
    HUBERT J. TAME; JAMES R. JOLLY;
    FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK,
    Trustee,
    Defendants.
    SECRETARY OF LABOR,
    Amicus Curiae.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern Distict of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
    W. Earl Britt, District Court Judge.
    (CA-92-442-5-BR)
    Argued: April 1, 1996
    Decided: April 30, 1996
    Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    2
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Thomas W. Henderson, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
    Appellants. Timothy David Hauser, Senior Trial Attorney, Office of
    the Solicitor, Plan Benefits Security Division, UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
    Rodrick John Enns, Ralph Madison Stockton, Jr., PETREE, STOCK-
    TON, L.L.P., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON
    BRIEF: Thomas F. Taft, TAFT, TAFT & HAIGLER, Greenville,
    North Carolina; Tybe A. Brett, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Norman P.
    Stein, Tuscaloosa, Alabama; David B. Rodes, GOLDBERG, PER-
    SKY, JENNINGS & WHITE, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
    Appellants. Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Solicitor of Labor, Marc I.
    Machiz, Associate Solicitor, Karen L. Handorf, Counsel for Special
    Litigation, Office of the Solicitor, Plan Benefits Security Division,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C.,
    for Amicus Curiae. Jeffrey C. Howard, William E. Wright, PETREE,
    STOCKTON, L.L.P., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Johnsie Riley, a class representative for former employ-
    ees of Cannon Mills Corporation (Cannon), participated in Cannon's
    Retirement Plan (the Plan). Riley asserts that Appellees, David Mur-
    dock and affiliated entities (collectively, Murdock), violated various
    provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
    29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461
     (West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (ERISA), arising
    out of the amendment and termination of the Plan. The gravamen of
    Riley's suit is that Murdock breached his fiduciary duties in purchas-
    ing a group annuity contract from Executive Life Insurance Company,
    which administered the Plan but ultimately went into conservatorship,
    3
    and that Murdock failed to monitor the financial integrity of Execu-
    tive Life subsequent to purchasing the annuity. In a thorough, pub-
    lished opinion, the district court addressed all of Riley's claims and
    granted summary judgment in favor of Murdock regarding all claims
    pertinent to this appeal. See Riley v. Murdock , 
    890 F. Supp. 444
    (E.D.N.C. 1995).
    Before us, Riley advances the same arguments that proved unsuc-
    cessful in the district court. Despite the fact that Riley and her class
    have received every dollar of benefits to which they were entitled
    under the Plan, Riley appeals, specifically positing that Murdock
    breached his fiduciary duties in three ways: (1) he violated the exclu-
    sive purpose requirement of 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 1104
    (a)(1)(A) by purchas-
    ing the cheapest available annuity; (2) he violated the prudence
    requirement of 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 1104
    (a)(1)(B) because he knew or
    should have known that Executive Life did not or would not enjoy
    financial integrity and by failing to monitor Executive Life's financial
    health; and (3) he violated the diversification requirement of 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 1104
    (a)(1)(C) by investing in a single termination policy.
    Additionally, the Department of Labor (DOL) intervened in this
    appeal, urging us to adopt a standard that an ERISA fiduciary must
    select the safest available annuity to assure payment of the benefits
    that a plan promises to its participants. In urging adoption of this stan-
    dard, the DOL relies on its Interpretative Bulletin 95-1, see 
    60 Fed. Reg. 12,328
    , 12,330 (1995) (to be codified at 
    29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1
    ),
    which was published approximately three months prior to the district
    court's judgment and well after the events at issue.
    We have carefully examined the record, the briefs, the parties' oral
    arguments, and the applicable law, and we affirm the grant of sum-
    mary judgment in Murdock's favor based on the well-reasoned opin-
    ion of the district court. Regarding adoption of"the safest available"
    standard urged by the DOL, no federal court has adopted such a stan-
    dard, and the circumstances of this case do not merit application of
    such a demanding standard.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95-2414

Filed Date: 4/30/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021