United States v. Gainey ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                      No. 95-5744
    ONTARIO LAMAR GAINEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
    Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.
    (CR-94-68-H)
    Submitted: May 21, 1996
    Decided: June 18, 1996
    Before HAMILTON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Robert D. Jacobson, Lumberton, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, J. Douglas McCul-
    lough, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Ontario Lamar Gainey was convicted of one count of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (1988). On appeal, he contends the district court erred by deny-
    ing his motions for judgment of acquittal, the Government failed to
    establish drug quantities for sentencing purposes by a preponderance
    of the evidence, and that he should have received a downward adjust-
    ment for being a minor participant in the drug conspiracy. Finding no
    error, we affirm.
    Gainey was indicted with thirty-nine other defendants for taking
    part in a wide-ranging cocaine conspiracy. The conspiracy's admitted
    leader, Berry Bryant, testified that he sold cocaine base ("crack") to
    Gainey on a weekly basis for "nine to 12 months, about a year." Addi-
    tionally, Dwayne Robinson testified that he sold crack he purchased
    from Bryant to Gainey for approximately one-and-a-half years. Rob-
    inson stated that Gainey "dealt drugs for me." Gainey moved for a
    judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government's evidence and
    at the close of all the evidence, but the district court denied both
    motions.
    After conviction, Gainey objected to the amount of drugs attributed
    to him by the presentence report. He stated that he"denied his
    involve[ment] in the entire thing and he just doesn't think he should
    be attributed to any of it." Gainey offered no other basis for his objec-
    tion. Additionally, Gainey requested a two-point downward adjust-
    ment under USSG § 3B1.2 (Nov. 1994) for being a minor or minimal
    participant. The district court denied both motions.
    We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of
    acquittal under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. United States
    v. Brooks, 
    957 F.2d 1138
    , 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    505 U.S. 1228
    2
    (1992). To sustain a conviction, the evidence viewed in the light most
    favorable to the government must be sufficient for a rational jury to
    find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
    United States v. Brewer, 
    1 F.3d 1430
    , 1437 (4th Cir. 1993); see
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1982). To support a convic-
    tion for conspiracy under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , the Government must
    show the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's knowledge of
    and voluntary joinder in that conspiracy. United States v. Bell, 
    954 F.2d 232
    , 236 (4th Cir. 1992). Once the existence of a conspiracy is
    shown, "the evidence need only establish a slight connection between
    the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction." Brooks, 957
    F.2d at 1147 (citing United States v. Seni, 
    662 F.2d 277
    , 285 n. 7 (4th
    Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
    455 U.S. 950
     (1982)).
    The Government presented sufficient evidence to sustain Gainey's
    conviction for conspiracy. The conspiracy's admitted leader, Bryant,
    testified that he sold drugs to Gainey on a weekly basis for "about a
    year." Additionally, Robinson testified that Gainey dealt drugs for
    him--drugs Robinson purchased from Bryant. While Gainey con-
    tends that this Court should seriously scrutinize Bryant and Robin-
    son's testimony, the credibility of witnesses is an issue solely within
    the province of the jury. United States v. Russell, 
    971 F.2d 1098
    , 1109
    (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 1066
     (1993). Thus, the district
    court did not err in denying Gainey's motions for judgment of acquit-
    tal.
    Next, we employ a clearly erroneous standard to review a district
    court's determination of drug amounts, United States v. Goff, 
    907 F.2d 1441
    , 1444 (4th Cir. 1990), and to review its factual findings
    upon a defendant's objection. United States v. McManus, 
    23 F.3d 878
    , 882 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32; United States v.
    Eschweiler, 
    782 F.2d 1385
     (7th Cir. 1986)). While the Government
    bears the burden of proving the quantity of drugs by a preponderance
    of the evidence, Goff, 
    907 F.2d at 1444
    , a defendant challenging the
    amount bears the burden of showing its inaccuracy. United States v.
    Terry, 
    916 F.2d 157
    , 162 (4th Cir. 1990). A mere objection to the
    finding in the presentence report is insufficient. 
    Id.
     Rather, the defen-
    dant has an affirmative duty to show that the information in the report
    is unreliable and articulate the reasons why its facts are inaccurate. 
    Id.
    Without such an affirmative showing, the district court is "`free to
    3
    adopt the findings of the [presentence report] without more specific
    inquiry or explanation.'" 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Mueller, 
    902 F.2d 336
    , 346 (5th Cir. 1990)).
    In challenging the drug quantities noted in the presentence report,
    Gainey failed to specifically articulate the reasons why they were
    erroneous. Rather, he merely stated that he "denied his involve[ment]
    in the entire thing and he just doesn't think he should be attributed to
    any of it." Such a conclusory allegation is insufficient to meet his
    affirmative duty to show that the presentence report's information
    was inaccurate. Thus, Gainey's claim is without merit.
    Additionally, Gainey's claim that the district court failed to make
    specific factual findings as to the drug amounts after his objection
    also is without merit. Because Gainey failed to make an affirmative
    showing of the presentence report's inaccuracies, the district court
    was "`free to adopt the findings of the [presentence report] without
    more specific inquiry or explanation.'" 
    Id.
    Finally, we review a district court's decision not to adjust down-
    ward under § 3B1.2 under the clearly erroneous standard. United
    States v. Daughtrey, 
    874 F.2d 213
    , 218 (4th Cir. 1989). Under
    § 3B1.2, a district court may grant a two-point downward adjustment
    if the defendant played a minor role in the offense. Brooks, 957 F.2d
    at 1149.
    The district court did not clearly err in refusing to grant the adjust-
    ment. The trial testimony established that Gainey was involved in the
    Bryant conspiracy for at least a year and a half. His involvement did
    not comprise a single event, but an extended connection. Addition-
    ally, a drug seller in a drug conspiracy generally cannot be considered
    a minor participant. Id.
    Accordingly, we affirm Gainey's conviction and sentence. We dis-
    pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the material before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4