United States v. Watson ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    No. 95-5521
    JAMES WATSON, a/k/a Jay the
    Jamaican,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    No. 95-5570
    ROBERT WASHINGTON KINNEY, a/k/a
    Kinney Boy,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
    Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
    (CR-94-143)
    Submitted: June 4, 1996
    Decided: June 26, 1996
    Before MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, and HAMILTON,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    J. C. Powell, POWELL LAW OFFICES, Charleston, West Virginia;
    G. Ernest Skaggs, SKAGGS & SKAGGS, Fayetteville, West Vir-
    ginia, for Appellants. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney,
    John C. Parr, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Vir-
    ginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    James Watson ("Watson") and Robert Kinney ("Kinney") each
    entered a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to
    possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. They
    appeal their sentences. Kinney claims that the district court clearly
    erred in refusing him a downward adjustment for acceptance of
    responsibility. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
    Manual, § 3E1.1 (Nov. 1994). Watson also claims that he was entitled
    to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and that
    the district court erred in giving him an obstruction of justice
    enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1. Finding that the district court did
    not clearly err in making its sentencing determinations, we affirm.
    After entering plea agreements Kinney and Watson pleaded guilty
    at Rule 11 proceedings. During the Rule 11 hearings, they both admit-
    ted their involvement as drivers and delivery men in a cocaine con-
    spiracy run by Anthony Roberts ("Roberts"). After their Rule 11
    hearings, but prior to sentencing, Watson and Kinney filed motions
    to withdraw their guilty pleas. The district court denied the motions.
    In support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Kinney
    claimed that he never knowingly delivered drugs for Roberts and tes-
    2
    tified that he could make a credible argument of innocence. Based on
    these statements and Kinney's efforts to withdraw his guilty plea, the
    district court declined to award Kinney a downward adjustment for
    acceptance of responsibility.
    At Watson's sentencing hearing, the government called Roberts to
    testify about Watson's involvement in the conspiracy. In response,
    Watson testified that his involvement in the conspiracy was very min-
    imal and he only participated under duress from Roberts. This testi-
    mony directly contradicted Roberts's testimony, which outlined
    Watson's extensive involvement in the operation. The district court
    found Roberts's testimony to be more credible. Additionally, the
    court found that Watson, during his testimony, attempted to mislead
    the court in an effort to minimize his involvement in the conspiracy.
    The court further found that Watson also minimized his involvement
    during the preparation of the presentence report investigation. Based
    on these findings, the district court awarded Watson a two-level
    enhancement for obstruction of justice. Further, the court found that
    Watson, due to his actions, was not entitled to a downward adjust-
    ment for acceptance of responsibility.
    A sentencing court's determinations regarding adjustments for
    acceptance of responsibility and obstruction of justice are primarily
    factual and, thus, this court applies a clearly erroneous standard of
    review. United States v. Daughtrey, 
    874 F.2d 213
    , 217 (4th Cir.
    1989). In addition, the sentencing court's determination of whether it
    should reduce a sentence is entitled to great deference. 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3742
     (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); United States v. Cusack, 
    901 F.2d 29
    , 31 (4th Cir. 1990).
    The Guidelines allow a two-level reduction in a defendant's
    offense level if the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and
    affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal con-
    duct. USSG § 3E1.1. The defendant must prove by a preponderance
    of the evidence that an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is war-
    ranted. United States v. Gordon, 
    895 F.2d 932
    , 935 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    498 U.S. 846
     (1990). To qualify for the reduction, a defendant
    must make a voluntary and truthful admission of the related conduct,
    a complete explanation of all circumstances surrounding the offense,
    and a genuine acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Taylor,
    3
    
    937 F.2d 676
    , 679-80 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Moreover, a guilty plea does
    not automatically entitle a defendant to a reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility. United States v. Harris, 
    882 F.2d 902
    , 905 (4th Cir.
    1989); United States v. White, 
    875 F.2d 427
    , 431 (4th Cir. 1989).
    In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Kinney denied involve-
    ment in the conspiracy and denied any knowledge of the conspiracy.
    Kinney's attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, and his statements in
    support thereof, directly rebut his contention that he made an affirma-
    tive acceptance of personal responsibility for his conduct. Therefore,
    the district court did not clearly err in denying Kinney a reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility.
    The district court properly imposed an obstruction of justice
    enhancement on Watson pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1. At sentencing
    and during the preparation of the presentence report, Watson went to
    great lengths to minimize his role in the conspiracy. The district court
    found that Watson was "trying to mislead the court." For his misinfor-
    mation at sentencing, Watson properly received an obstruction of jus-
    tice enhancement under section 3C1.1. See United States v.
    Dunnigan, 
    507 U.S. 87
    , 95-98 (1993) (willful presentation of false
    testimony constitutes obstruction of justice). The district court's con-
    clusion was not clearly erroneous; thus, the two-level enhancement
    for obstruction of justice was proper.
    The acceptance of responsibility adjustment is not ordinarily avail-
    able to a defendant who obstructs justice, USSG§ 3E1.1, comment.
    (n.4), and this is not an extraordinary case in which both adjustments
    might be warranted. United States v. Miller, 
    77 F.3d 71
    , 74 (4th Cir.
    1996). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in denying
    Watson a downward adjustment.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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