United States v. Cepeda-Valdez , 61 F. App'x 849 ( 2003 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
              No. 02-4629
    PABLO EDWIN RAFAEL CEPEDA-
    VALDEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
    James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.
    (CR-02-3)
    Submitted: March 21, 2003
    Decided: March 31, 2003
    Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jeanette Doran Brooks, Research
    and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
    Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    2                  UNITED STATES v. CEPEDA-VALDEZ
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Pablo Edwin Rafael Cepeda-Valdez appeals the district court’s
    order sentencing him to sixty-three months imprisonment following
    his guilty pleas to aggravated assault on a United States law enforce-
    ment officer in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 111
     (2000), and illegal re-
    entry into the United States after having been convicted of an aggra-
    vated felony in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(2) (2000). In his
    appeal, filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967),
    counsel for Cepeda-Valdez claims that 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
     is facially
    unconstitutional because it subjects defendants to statutory sentencing
    enhancements in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000).* This claim was not preserved in the district court. Accord-
    ingly, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , __, 
    122 S. Ct. 1781
    , 1785 (2002); United States v. Ford, 
    88 F.3d 1350
    , 1355 (4th Cir. 1996).
    In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
     (1998), the
    Supreme Court held that § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and,
    therefore, a sentence under that section could be enhanced based on
    a prior conviction even if the fact of the earlier conviction was not
    charged in the indictment. Cepeda-Valdez contends that Almendarez-
    Torres may no longer be valid after Apprendi. We disagree. The
    Supreme Court declined to revisit Almendarez-Torres in Apprendi, so
    Almendarez-Torres remains in force. See United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 1202
     (2001);
    United States v. Gatewood, 
    230 F.3d 186
    , 190 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); see
    also Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 
    159 F.3d 151
    , 158 (4th Cir.
    1998) (lower courts should not presume that the Supreme Court has
    overruled one of its cases by implication; courts must follow case that
    *Although Cepeda-Valdez was informed of his right to file a pro se
    supplemental brief, he has not done so.
    UNITED STATES v. CEPEDA-VALDEZ                     3
    directly controls unless clearly overruled by subsequent Supreme
    Court decision). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.
    We have reviewed the record in accordance with Anders and find
    no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
    ment of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform his
    client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
    United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
    be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
    then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from repre-
    sentation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served
    on the client.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED