Gibson v. Allstate Insurance , 64 F. App'x 378 ( 2003 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    RONALD L. GIBSON, d/b/a Gibson         
    Insurance Agency, Incorporated,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                              No. 02-1969
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
    Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge.
    (CA-02-50)
    Submitted: April 21, 2003
    Decided: May 15, 2003
    Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Ronald L. Gibson, MURPHY & CHAPMAN, P.A., Charlotte, North
    Carolina, for Appellant. Brian D. Edwards, ALSTON & BIRD,
    L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina; Robert G. Lian, Jr., AKIN, GUMP,
    STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appel-
    lee.
    2                   GIBSON v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald L. Gibson, an independent contractor insurance agent for
    Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), filed this civil complaint
    against Allstate in which he alleges common law fraud and unfair and
    deceptive trade practices violating North Carolina law.* The district
    court granted Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and dis-
    missed the suit without prejudice. The district court specifically dis-
    missed the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because the complaint was
    not ripe for lack of actual injury and the court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction for lack of a justiciable case or controversy, and pursuant
    to Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint was legally insufficient. By
    separate order also appealed, the district court denied Gibson’s Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion because it did not raise any issue not already
    considered by the court in rendering its decision on the underlying
    action.
    Gibson’s complaint alleges he purchased a "book of business" rep-
    resenting the economic interest in the insurance policies previously
    sold by the former agent, and began operating the agency as his own.
    He asserts that prior to his purchase of this economic interest, Allstate
    set a series of sales and other agency growth and loss ratio objectives
    as part of a scheme to terminate agency contracts, including his, in an
    effort to avoid payment of commissions on previously sold insurance
    contracts. Gibson received a letter from Allstate indicating Allstate
    might terminate his agency contract if the agency was not on track to
    achieve Allstate’s expectations by May 2002. In anticipation of the
    termination of his contract with Allstate, Gibson filed this lawsuit.
    May 2002 came and went and Allstate did not terminate Gibson’s
    contract.
    *The case, originally filed in North Carolina state court, was removed
    to federal court by Allstate.
    GIBSON v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE                       3
    We review de novo the district court’s dismissals pursuant to Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6). Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 
    166 F.3d 642
    , 648 (4th Cir. 1999); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 
    192 F.3d 462
    ,
    467 (4th Cir. 1999). Our review of the record and the parties’ briefs
    reveals that Gibson has not suffered either termination of his contract
    with Allstate resulting in economic loss, or the sale of his agency
    resulting in actual economic loss which may be legally attributable to
    the actions of Allstate. Hence, we find the district court correctly dis-
    missed Gibson’s action without prejudice under Rules 12(b)(1),
    12(b)(6). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
    underlying action.
    We further affirm the district court’s denial of Gibson’s Rule 59(e)
    motion. Collison v. International Chem. Workers Union, 
    34 F.3d 233
    ,
    236 (4th Cir. 1994). Rule 59(e) may not be used to resurrect facts and
    legal theories already considered and rejected by the court. Pac. Ins.
    Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 
    148 F.3d 396
    , 403 (4th Cir. 1998);
    Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 
    885 F.2d 285
    , 289 (5th Cir.
    1989). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED