United States v. Evans ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                       No. 96-4100
    CONSTANCE SERENE EVANS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
    William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge.
    (CR-91-234-G)
    Submitted: October 29, 1996
    Decided: November 19, 1996
    Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    William E. Martin, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Scott P. Mebane, Assis-
    tant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    In 1992, Constance Serene Evans pled guilty to one count of bank
    embezzlement, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 656
     (West Supp. 1996).
    She had embezzled $23,000 from the bank where she worked as a
    teller. After a brief confinement, Evans commenced a five-year period
    of supervised release and began to pay $200 per month toward
    $23,000 in restitution imposed by the district court.
    Since January 1994, the district court has held four hearings moni-
    toring Evans's compliance with the terms of her supervised release,
    specifically over her failure to make timely payments, file timely
    monthly reports, and keep the probation office informed of her
    employment. The district court found the violations as alleged, but
    three times allowed Evans to remedy her failures. At the fourth hear-
    ing, the district court found that Evans willfully failed to comply with
    the terms of her supervised release, by failing to make timely payment
    toward restitution, failing to appear at a scheduled meeting with the
    probation office, and applying for consumer credit without prior
    approval from the probation office. Evans was sentenced to nine
    months imprisonment, with the entire amount of restitution due and
    owing. She appeals that revocation.
    We review the district court's revocation of supervised release for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Stephenson , 
    928 F.2d 728
    , 731
    (6th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Copley, 
    978 F.2d 829
    , 831 (4th
    Cir. 1992) (applying the standard). Evans first challenges the district
    court's restitution order in the underlying judgment, arguing that the
    court improperly delegated the authority to establish a payment
    schedule to the probation officer in violation of United States v.
    Johnson, 
    48 F.3d 806
    , 809 (4th Cir. 1995). We hold that this claim
    is not properly before this court.
    2
    An unappealed sentence or a sentence upheld on appeal is pre-
    sumed valid until vacated under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     (1994), amended
    by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
    No. 104-132, 
    110 Stat. 1214
    , the exclusive remedy for challenging the
    validity of a sentence. United States v. Almand , 
    992 F.2d 316
    , 317-18
    (11th Cir. 1993). Evans did not appeal her conviction and sentence,
    nor has she filed a motion under § 2255. She has therefore improperly
    raised this claim on this appeal.
    Evans next argues that the district court erred in finding that she
    willfully failed to pay the restitution, when in fact she was unable to
    pay. See Bearden v. Georgia, 
    461 U.S. 660
    , 672-73 (1983). But the
    record is clear that the district court's decision was based on the
    monthly financial reports Evans submitted to the probation office and
    Evans's own testimony. Counsel for Evans declined to argue that
    Evans could not make the payments. Further, supervised release was
    revoked for reasons other than the financial one. The district court's
    actions were in full compliance with Bearden.
    Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in revoking Evans's supervised release, and we affirm that deci-
    sion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3