Pinchefsky v. Communications Wkrs ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
SELMA PINCHEFSKY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-1898
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.
(CA-95-615)
Submitted: March 31, 1997
Decided: April 11, 1997
Before HALL, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Beverly D. Crawford, Sa'ad El-Amin, EL-AMIN & CRAWFORD,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Kimberly Neeb, COMMUNICA-
TIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Selma Pinchefsky appeals the district court's order granting the
Communications Workers of America AFL-CIO's (CWA) motion for
summary judgment. She claims that the district court erred in finding
that her claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against
CWA was barred by the applicable statute of limitations period. She
also claims that the district court erred in finding that her claim is
barred because she failed to avail herself of the union's internal
appeals procedure. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1994), the statute of limitations period for Pinchefsky's
claim is six months. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983). The issue before us is whether
Pinchefsky should have known of her injury based on an August 3,
1994, meeting she had with the President of her local, in which CWA
claims Pinchefsky was informed that it intended to withdraw its arbi-
tration demand previously advanced on her behalf. Pinchefsky testi-
fied in her deposition that she recalled this meeting, and that she was
informed at this meeting about CWA's internal appeals process.
While Pinchefsky later submitted an affidavit in which she denies
remembering the meeting, we agree with the district court that this
denial is not sufficient to overcome her deposition testimony, or to
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Military Servs. Realty, Inc.
v. Realty Consultants of Virginia, Ltd., 823 F.2d 829, 832 (4th Cir.
1987). We therefore find that Pinchefsky knew or should have known
that CWA was withdrawing its arbitration demand as of August 3,
1994, and that her claim is accordingly barred by the statute of limita-
tions. We further find that Pinchefsky's claim is barred based on her
failure to avail herself of CWA's internal appeals process. See
Clayton v. United Auto. Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981).
AFFIRMED
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