United States v. Newman , 101 F. App'x 397 ( 2004 )


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  •                          UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            No. 03-4947
    SHANE MICHAEL NEWMAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
    Norman K. Moon, District Judge.
    (CR-03-48)
    Submitted: May 28, 2004
    Decided: June 17, 2004
    Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Roland M. L. Santos, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellant. John L.
    Brownlee, United States Attorney, Joseph W. H. Mott, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    2                    UNITED STATES v. NEWMAN
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Shane Michael Newman was charged with conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2000) (Count One), three counts of using, carrying, and
    possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2000) (Counts Two, Three, and Five), and three
    counts of possession of a firearm while an unlawful user of a con-
    trolled substance, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(3) (2000) (Counts Four, Six,
    and Seven). According to the Government, Counts Three and Four,
    which charged conduct occurring in February 2002, related to Dana
    Lambert’s initial purchase of methamphetamine from Newman in
    February 2002. Counts Five and Six, charging illegal conduct subse-
    quent to the date referenced in Counts Three and Four, related to
    Lambert’s purchase of methamphetamine from Newman later that
    month. Count Two alleged illegal conduct in the summer of 2001, and
    Count Seven alleged a § 922(g)(3) violation on February 24, 2002.
    A jury convicted Newman on all counts, and the district court sen-
    tenced him to 780 months in prison. He now appeals. We affirm.
    I
    Testimony at trial revealed that Newman was an established
    methamphetamine dealer in Woodstock, Virginia, by the summer of
    2001. Newman generally distributed the drug in his apartment bed-
    room. He had a number of regular customers. Jeremy Peace lived
    with Newman from January 2002 until his arrest on February 24,
    2002. Peace testified that Newman offered him cigarettes, gas money,
    and free rent in exchange for Peace’s selling Newman’s methamphet-
    amine to Peace’s regular customers.
    Witnesses testified that Newman had a black handgun, which he
    almost always wore or had near his person when he distributed
    methamphetamine. A law enforcement official stated that a .45 hand-
    gun was properly registered to Newman. Several witnesses testified
    that Newman used methamphetamine frequently; Peace said that
    UNITED STATES v. NEWMAN                        3
    Newman used it more than once each day during the time the two
    men lived together.
    II
    Peace challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts Two,
    Five, and Six. A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
    "bears a heavy burden." United States v. Beidler, 
    110 F.3d 1064
    , 1067
    (4th Cir. 1997)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To
    determine if there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, we
    consider whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the Government, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942). We review both
    direct and circumstantial evidence and permit "the [G]overnment the
    benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those
    sought to be established." United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    ,
    1021 (4th Cir. 1982). Witness credibility is within the sole province
    of the jury, and we will not reassess credibility. United States v.
    Saunders, 
    886 F.2d 56
    , 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
    Counts Two and Five charged Newman with violating § 924(c) in
    the summer of 2001 and in February 2002, respectively. Lisa Hoover
    testified that she and her boyfriend, a methamphetamine user, visited
    Newman’s apartment in the summer of 2001. Newman and her boy-
    friend each had methamphetamine and decided to try each other’s
    drug. When they sat on the bedroom floor to begin sampling the
    drugs, Newman pulled a black handgun from his pants and placed it
    underneath a nearby nightstand. These facts are sufficient to establish
    that the firearm "furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug traf-
    ficking crime." See United States v. Lomax, 
    293 F.3d 701
    , 705 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    537 U.S. 1031
     (2002). The jury could have inter-
    preted Newman’s handling of the gun as a demonstration that he pro-
    tected his drug supply. It is noteworthy that the gun was not far from
    Newman’s person during the time Hoover and her boyfriend were in
    the bedroom.
    Counts Five and Six related to the later of Newman’s two February
    2002 distributions of methamphetamine to Dana Lambert.* Lambert
    *Newman is incorrect when he claims in his brief that the conduct
    charged in Counts Five and Six actually occurred in April 2003.
    4                     UNITED STATES v. NEWMAN
    testified that she bought methamphetamine from Newman two or
    three times between the end of January and February 20, 2002. New-
    man was always armed with a small black handgun, which he either
    wore or had on a nightstand in his bedroom, where the distributions
    occurred. On these facts, the evidence was sufficient to convict New-
    man on Count Five. See 
    id.
     Lambert also testified that Newman was
    using methamphetamine daily, and Peace testified that Newman was
    using methamphetamine more than once a day during this period. The
    evidence thus was sufficient to convict Newman on Count Six. See
    United States v. Jackson, 
    280 F.3d 403
    , 406 (4th Cir. 2002); United
    States v. Purdy, 
    264 F.3d 809
    , 812-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
    III
    Newman had a loose association with the Warlocks, an outlaw
    motorcycle gang. Prior to trial, defense counsel expressed his concern
    that any mention of this association could prejudice the defense, par-
    ticularly in light of recent publicity about the Warlocks in the local
    press. The court asked that no Warlocks connection be played up
    because it was not important to the case.
    The prosecutor, trying to show that Newman possessed the hand-
    gun for the sole purpose of drug distribution, asked Lambert whether
    Newman belonged to a gun club. Lambert replied, "He was associated
    with the Warlocks." Defense counsel objected and, at a sidebar,
    moved for a mistrial. The court instructed the jury to disregard Lam-
    bert’s answer.
    On appeal, Newman contends that Lambert’s unresponsive answer
    unfairly prejudiced the jury and that any curative action short of
    declaring a mistrial was error. We conclude that the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See United
    States v. Dorlouis, 
    107 F.3d 248
    , 257 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating standard
    of review). Lambert’s unresponsive answer was brief and isolated,
    and the district court promptly gave a curative instruction. Jurors are
    presumed to follow a court’s instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 
    528 U.S. 225
    , 234 (2000). Further, contrary to Newman’s position, there
    was substantial evidence against him, and the momentary mention of
    the Warlocks could not have affected the outcome of the trial.
    UNITED STATES v. NEWMAN                        5
    IV
    Newman contends that Counts Four and Seven charge the same
    offense and therefore are multiplicitous. It is clear that Count Seven
    charged a violation of § 922(g)(3) occurring on February 24, 2002,
    and that Count Four charged such a violation during an earlier distri-
    bution to Lambert in February. Thus, the counts do not charge the
    same crime.
    V
    We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
    als before us and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED