Layfield v. Roadway Express Inc ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    MONTE L. LAYFIELD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                                    No. 97-1021
    ROADWAY EXPRESS, INCORPORATED,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
    (CA-95-3767-S)
    Submitted: April 14, 1998
    Decided: May 20, 1998
    Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Hans S. Goerl, Hagerstown, Maryland, for Appellant. David F.
    Albright, Franklin T. Caudill, ALBRIGHT, BROWN, GOERTEMIL-
    LER & CAUDILL, L.L.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Monte L. Layfield appeals the district court's orders granting sum-
    mary judgment to his former employer, Roadway Express, Inc.
    (Roadway), and denying his motion for reconsideration. Layfield
    claimed that his termination from his job as a dockworker at Road-
    way's Hagerstown, Maryland, terminal constituted race discrimina-
    tion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
    amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp.
    1998), and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     (1994). Because Layfield did not estab-
    lish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under either stat-
    ute, we affirm.
    I
    Layfield worked for Roadway at the Hagerstown terminal from
    September 6, 1989, until July 13, 1994. He repeatedly violated com-
    pany rules throughout his tenure with Roadway. His employment
    record reflects numerous instances of arriving to work late, failing to
    notify his employer that he would not be at work, abusing company
    time, not performing his job responsibilities, and refusing to follow
    direct orders. For these infractions, Layfield received warning letters,
    suspensions of between one and five days, and discharges which,
    prior to his termination, were reduced to suspensions.
    On July 13, 1994, Layfield tore his sweat pants in the crotch area.
    He was not wearing underwear, and he found himself in an embar-
    rassing and potentially dangerous predicament. Layfield asked per-
    mission to leave work early. His terminal operations manager
    suggested that Layfield change clothes on his lunch break approxi-
    mately one hour later. The manager offered to move the only female
    worker away from the area where Layfield was working. Layfield,
    who believed his absence would be excused, clocked out and went
    home. His supervisors, on the other hand, believed that Layfield
    walked off the job.
    Because of Layfield's infraction, Roadway designated his absence
    a "voluntary quit" and removed him from the seniority list. Pursuant
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    to a collective bargaining agreement, Layfield submitted a grievance
    to a committee comprised of members of his union and representa-
    tives of Roadway. Following a hearing, the committee unanimously
    denied the grievance and upheld Roadway's revocation of seniority
    rights.
    Layfield then filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that his
    discharge constituted race discrimination in violation of Title VII.
    Because an investigation disclosed no violation of Title VII, the
    EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Layfield then filed this action alleg-
    ing race discrimination under Title VII and § 1981. The district court
    granted summary judgment to Roadway and denied Layfield's motion
    for reconsideration. Layfield timely appeals.
    II
    Layfield contends that white employees with similar disciplinary
    records were not terminated for their infractions. He therefore alleges
    a disparate treatment claim. To prevail, Layfield must satisfy the test
    articulated in the line of Supreme Court cases following McDonnell
    Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973). Under that test, the
    plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The
    employer may then respond by providing a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
    tory reason for its employment action. Finally, the employee may
    rebut this response by producing evidence that the employer's reason
    is pretextual. See 
    id. at 802-804
    . The McDonnell Douglas scheme
    applies with equal force to a § 1981 claim of race discrimination in
    employment. See Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 
    47 F.3d 676
    , 680 (4th Cir.
    1995).
    Under Title VII, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
    intentional discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. To
    meet his burden with circumstantial evidence, he must show that:
    (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his
    job and was performing his work satisfactorily; (3) he was fired; and
    (4) others outside the protected class were retained under apparently
    similar circumstances. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 
    48 F.3d 1376
    , 1383
    (4th Cir. 1995).
    We review summary judgment orders de novo; if there is no genu-
    ine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to sum-
    3
    mary judgment as a matter of law. See Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
    
    61 F.3d 270
    , 274 (4th Cir. 1995). "An employer is entitled to sum-
    mary judgment if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of
    discrimination or fails to raise a factual dispute regarding the employ-
    er's proffered reasons for the alleged discriminatory act." 
    Id.
     "[T]he
    mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
    position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
    could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    447 U.S. 242
    , 252 (1986).
    III
    Layfield presented no direct evidence of race discrimination.
    Therefore, he had to meet the four-part test identified above to estab-
    lish, though circumstantial evidence, a prima facie case of discrimina-
    tion. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 
    48 F.3d at 1383
    .
    We agree with the district court that Layfield did not meet his bur-
    den. He concedes in his brief that his overall disciplinary record was
    not good. Given his pattern of repeatedly being disciplined for violat-
    ing company policy and his walking off the job on the day he was
    fired, he was not performing his job at a satisfactory level.
    Further, Layfield did not demonstrate that white employees with
    comparable employment records were retained while he was dis-
    charged. On appeal, Layfield points to the disciplinary history of Billy
    Bunch. On July 1, 1994, Bunch had a loud argument with supervisors,
    then left work without permission. Bunch was fired and then rein-
    stated. In his brief, Layfield also mentions three white employees who
    received permission to leave the premises on a particularly busy
    night. Finally, Layfield includes in the appendix the disciplinary his-
    tory of a fifth white employee, K. E. Martin, who was not fired. Lay-
    field, however, does not mention Martin in his brief.
    A plaintiff need not present comparatives with precisely the same
    employment problems when attempting to establish that others out-
    side his protected class were retained in the face of similar conduct.
    Nonetheless, the problems must be similar. See McDonald v. Santa
    Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
    427 U.S. 273
    , 282 (1976); see generally Hughes
    v. Bedsole, 
    48 F.3d at 1384
    . None of the white employees whom Lay-
    4
    field identifies were similarly situated. Only one incident involving
    Bunch is referenced. In contrast, the record is replete with Layfield's
    infractions. Martin, unlike Layfield, never walked off the job, and he
    never was terminated and then reinstated. Finally, the three employ-
    ees who left the jobsite are not similar to Layfield because they
    received permission to leave. Moreover, other information about
    those three employees' disciplinary histories is not included in the
    record. Layfield simply presented no evidence to show that white
    employees with comparable records were retained while he was fired.
    Thus, we find Layfield has failed to prove that others outside his class
    were retained under similar circumstances. See Hughes, 
    48 F.3d at 1383
    .
    IV
    We accordingly affirm the decision of the district court. We dis-
    pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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