United States v. McBee ( 1999 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                         No. 98-4302
    MICHAEL LEE MCBEE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.
    (CR-97-219)
    Submitted: December 22, 1998
    Decided: January 21, 1999
    Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
    Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Assis-
    tant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Clifton T. Barrett,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Lee McBee pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
    crack cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 846
     (West Supp. 1998), and four counts
    of distribution of crack, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (West 1994). McBee
    now appeals his 262-month sentence. Counsel has filed a brief pursu-
    ant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that in his
    view there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising two
    issues: whether the district court correctly calculated the amount of
    drugs attributable to McBee; and whether the district court properly
    gave McBee a three-level enhancement for his role in the offense.
    McBee was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief
    but has not done so. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.
    McBee and at least four others distributed crack to undercover offi-
    cers on various occasions between January 1996 and September 1997.
    The organization operated primarily out of a dilapidated house in
    Rockingham County, North Carolina, owned by McBee's uncle.
    McBee himself distributed crack, set the price that members of the
    organization charged for crack, and supplied the others with the drugs
    that they sold.
    McBee initially objected to the probation officer's finding that he
    was responsible for 237.47 grams of crack. However, at sentencing,
    the parties announced that he agreed with this calculation. Based on
    the amount of crack attributable to McBee, his base offense level was
    34. See U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual§ 2D1.1 (1997). The pro-
    bation officer recommended a four level enhancement because
    McBee was a leader or organizer of the conspiracy. See USSG
    § 3B1.1(a). McBee objected to this enhancement; at sentencing, the
    government stated that it had agreed to recommend only a three-level
    enhancement for being a manager or supervisor. See USSG
    § 3B1.1(b). McBee received a three-level adjustment for acceptance
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    of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1(a), (b). His total offense level
    therefore was 34. With a criminal history category of VI, his guide-
    line range was 262-327 months. He received a 262-month sentence.
    We reject McBee's argument that he was not a manager of the
    organization and therefore should not have received a three-level
    enhancement for his role in the offense. The district court's determi-
    nation concerning his role in the offense is reviewed for clear error.
    See United States v. Arnoldt, 
    947 F.2d 1120
    , 1128 (4th Cir. 1991).
    Here, there was evidence that McBee gave drugs to others in the orga-
    nization to sell, set prices of the crack that the others sold, and
    screened his salesmen's customers. We conclude that the district court
    did not clearly err in finding that McBee was a manager or supervisor
    of the organization.
    We review the district court's factual determination concerning the
    amount of drugs attributable to McBee for clear error. See United
    States v. Lamarr, 
    75 F.3d 964
    , 972 (4th Cir. 1996). As a member of
    a conspiracy, McBee was accountable for all the drugs reasonably
    foreseeable to him. See United States v. Irvin , 
    2 F.3d 72
    , 78 (4th Cir.
    1993). The record discloses McBee's involvement in numerous drug
    transactions, either directly or indirectly. The probation officer attri-
    buted 237.47 grams of crack to McBee. This reflects twenty-three
    purchases by undercover officers totaling 128.2 grams; recovery of
    73.37 grams of crack during two searches of the residence out of
    which McBee and his confederates operated; the recovery of $1351
    in currency, which converts to 13.5 grams of crack (based on a price
    of $100 per gram); and officers' observation of approximately 22.4
    grams of crack--in addition to the crack purchased--during drug
    transactions. McBee initially disputed these findings. However, at
    sentencing, he acknowledged that the calculations were correct, and
    the district court adopted the probation officer's findings. McBee
    failed to present evidence that the findings were incorrect. Addition-
    ally, our independent review of the record satisfies us that the amount
    of crack attributed to McBee was not clearly erroneous.
    As required by Anders, we have examined the entire record in this
    case and find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm
    McBee's sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
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    and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    We deny counsel's motion to withdraw at this time. This court
    requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to peti-
    tion the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If his
    client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
    a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court to
    withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a
    copy thereof has been served on his client.
    AFFIRMED
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