United States v. Muhammad , 124 F. App'x 789 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4315
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMES WALI MUHAMMAD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (CR-03-15)
Submitted: March 18, 2005 Decided: March 29, 2005
Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Gretchen L. Taylor,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
Paul Joseph McNulty, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
Alan Mark Salsbury, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
James Wali Muhammad appeals from the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence of
thirty-six months’ imprisonment. Muhammad’s counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that, in her view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
raising the issue of whether the court’s sentence was plainly
unreasonable. Muhammad was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but did not do so. We affirm.
We review an order imposing a sentence after revocation
of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). Muhammad admitted the
charged violations; thus, a preponderance of the evidence
established that he committed the supervised release violations as
alleged. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2004). Counsel
argues on appeal, however, that Muhammad’s sentence of thirty-six
months’ imprisonment is plainly unreasonable.
Muhammad’s conviction for bank fraud, a Class B felony,
see 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000), exposed him to a maximum sentence of
three years upon revocation of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(e)(3). Accordingly, after revoking Muhammad’s supervised
release, the district court was statutorily authorized to impose an
active prison term of up to three years.
Although in this case the guidelines indicated a
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sentencing range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment,
as counsel concedes, the sentencing guideline range calculated under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2003) is purely
advisory. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Denard, 24 F.3d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1994). Because
Muhammad’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum under
§ 3583(e)(3), this court reviews the sentence only to determine
whether it is “plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)
(2000). Upon review of the record, we conclude that Muhammad’s
sentence of thirty-six months’ imprisonment is not plainly
unreasonable.
In accordance with the requirements of Anders, we have
reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This court
requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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