United States v. Ladi Dawodu ( 1999 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 99-4039
LADI DAWODU, a/k/a Brian Sunshine,
a/k/a John Doe, a/k/a Craig
Muraskin,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-98-131)
Submitted: July 20, 1999
Decided: September 17, 1999
Before HAMILTON and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges,
and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Harry L.
Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to his guilty pleas, Ladi Dawodu was convicted of two
counts each of using false social security numbers in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (1994) and making false statements to financial
institutions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1994). On appeal,
Dawodu alleges that the district court erroneously enhanced his
offense level for obstruction of justice.1 Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.
The basic facts are undisputed. From December 1996 until May
1998, Dawodu used names, social security numbers, and other identi-
fying data he stole from various people to open fraudulent checking
and savings accounts at several banks in North Carolina. Dawodu
would deposit counterfeit and stolen checks into the accounts and
then withdraw cash, and he was able to obtain over $100,000 prior to
his arrest. He was arrested by airport police at the Piedmont Triad
International Airport after an officer recognized him from a wanted
poster. Dawodu identified himself as "Craig Muraskin" and produced
a North Carolina driver's license in that name. Officers also discov-
ered a California driver's license in the name of a different alias and
a sheet of paper containing several people's names, social security
numbers, dates of birth, and other identifying data. 2
Dawodu continued to use the name "Craig Muraskin" while in pre-
trial custody. He also refused to provide fingerprints or a handwriting
sample to a postal inspector, and he gave the inspector a false address,
social security number, date of birth, and other identifying data. In
addition, Dawodu initially refused to be interviewed by a pretrial ser-
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1 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998) ("USSG").
2 Dawodu attempted to destroy the sheet of paper at one point during
the interview with airport police.
2
vices officer, whose function was to determine Dawodu's eligibility
for bond and court-appointed counsel. Although Dawodu ultimately
consented to the interview, he continued to provide false information
concerning his name, address, and social security number. During his
arraignment, the district court addressed Dawodu several times as
"Mr. Muraskin." Although Dawodu did not expressly identify himself
as "Muraskin," he responded to the court's inquiries and did not
inform the court of his true identity. Dawodu eventually agreed to
plead guilty but did not inform the court of his correct name until his
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. Finally, Dawodu provided false informa-
tion to the probation officer assigned to prepare his presentence report.3
Dawodu alleges that the district court erred in finding that his con-
duct, both individually and collectively, constituted obstruction of jus-
tice. We disagree. A two-level enhancement for obstruction is proper
where a defendant provides "materially false information" to a judge,
magistrate, or probation officer. See USSG§ 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(f),
(h)); see also United States v. McDonald, 964 F.2d 390, 392-93 (5th
Cir. 1992) (finding that enhancement was warranted where defendant
used an alias before a magistrate judge during arraignment); United
States v. Montano-Silva, 15 F.3d 52 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding enhance-
ment proper where defendant provided false information to law
enforcement authorities); United States v. Magana-Guerrero, 80 F.3d
398, 401 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding enhancement where defendant
lied to pretrial services officer).
Contrary to Dawodu's assertions, the focus for these instances of
misconduct is on the materiality of the false representations; not
whether they significantly hindered the administration of justice. For
information to be material, it need only have the potential to affect the
issue under determination, including the term of incarceration or con-
ditions of release. See USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.6). In the present
case, the district court properly found that Dawodu's continuous use
of false information was material because it prevented the court from
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3 Dawodu gave the probation officer a nonexistent social security num-
ber and false information concerning his employment history. The proba-
tion officer eventually determined that Dawodu had no social security
number and had re-entered the country illegally after having been previ-
ously deported.
3
knowing with whom it was dealing. At the very least, had the court
known Dawodu's true identity and the fact that he had re-entered the
United States illegally, it could have affected the court's decisions
concerning bond or an upward adjustment under USSG§ 4A1.3, p.s.
(Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
We therefore find that Dawodu's misrepresentations to the district
court at arraignment, the pretrial services officer, and the probation
officer provided adequate support for the court's decision to enhance
Dawodu's base offense level for obstruction of justice. Because we
find that any one of these three instances of misconduct were suffi-
cient to apply the enhancement, we decline to address Dawodu's
claim that the district court improperly considered the totality of his
actions.4
Accordingly, we affirm Dawodu's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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4 Dawodu cites no authority for his position, nor can we find any. There
is nothing in the Guidelines which either requires or prohibits the consid-
eration of the cumulative effect of a defendant's actions. In addition, at
least one circuit has endorsed such an approach. See United States v.
Walcott, 61 F.3d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying enhancement based
on the totality of the circumstances even though individual acts may not
be sufficient).
4