United States v. Perez-Mendez , 162 F. App'x 207 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4151
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAMON A. PEREZ-MENDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-03-341)
Submitted: November 2, 2005 Decided: January 3, 2006
Before NEIMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Marc G. Hall, MCCALLY & HALL, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant.
Thomas M. Dibiagio, United States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Ramon A. Perez-Mendez appeals from his conviction and
sentence following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and
to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. On
appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment for lack of venue and denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. He also argues that the court erred
by enhancing his sentence based on its finding that he obstructed
justice and in not reducing his sentence for acceptance of
responsibility. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Perez-
Mendez’s conviction, but vacate the sentence and remand to the
district court for resentencing.
Perez-Mendez first argues that venue was not proper in
Maryland because the crime did not occur in Maryland. The
stipulated facts were that Perez-Mendez traveled with Roberto Luis
Rodriguez Cintron through Maryland while en route to Washington,
D.C., to meet a buyer from Maryland and deliver a quantity of
narcotics. This meeting was scheduled through phone conversations
both to and from Maryland. The Maryland buyer had twice previously
purchased narcotics from Perez-Mendez and Cintron and resold those
drugs in Maryland. These facts are sufficient to support venue in
Maryland. See United States v. Ramirez-Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816
(2d Cir. 1987) (upholding venue based on flight over district);
United States v. Shearer, 794 F.2d 1545, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986)
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(upholding venue based on travel through and flight over district);
United States v. Strickland, 493 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1974)
(finding venue proper in state based on phone calls to that state
in furtherance of conspiracy). We therefore affirm the denial of
Perez-Mendez’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue.
Perez-Mendez next argues that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
He contends that the Government “impliedly promised” him the
opportunity to provide assistance and possibly warrant a motion for
a downward departure at sentencing based on substantial assistance.
We note that, under the terms of the agreement, the Government was
not obligated under its plea agreement to file such a motion,
United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2000), and there
is no indication that it refused to make the motion based on an
unconstitutional motive. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,
185-86 (1992). Rather, the Government declined to file the
motion--and indeed declined to seek assistance from Perez-Mendez--
after it discovered that Perez-Mendez had provided false
information to the court and to the presentence investigator. See
United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding
government’s refusal to make § 5K1.1 motion where defendant had
provided substantial assistance and then jumped bail prior to
sentencing).
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Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion by the district
court in denying Perez-Mendez’s motion to withdraw the plea.
United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1996)
(providing standard); United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248
(4th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the key factor is whether the plea
hearing was properly conducted). We have carefully scrutinized the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy and find no error by the district
court in determining that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. See United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding that a properly conducted Rule 11 proceeding
“raise[s] a strong presumption that the plea is final and
binding”). Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Perez-
Mendez’s motion to withdraw his plea.
Next, Perez-Mendez challenges the district court’s
enhancement of his sentence based on obstruction of justice. Based
on the offense of conviction and the stipulated amount of drugs
that were reasonably foreseeable over the course of the conspiracy,
Perez-Mendez’s base offense level was 32. Two points were added
for obstruction of justice, resulting in an adjusted offense level
of 34, criminal history category II, and a sentencing range of 168
to 210 months. The district court imposed a 189-month sentence.
In the presentence report, the probation officer reported
that Perez-Mendez gave false information to the probation officer.
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The officer recommended that the court find that he obstructed
justice and also deny any reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Because Perez-Mendez did not object to the
enhancement at the sentencing hearing, the court was not required
to hold a hearing or to make specific findings before adopting the
recommendation in the presentence report. See United States v.
Love, 134 F.3d 595, 606 (4th Cir. 1998).
Perez-Mendez also asserts that the enhancement is in
violation of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
Because Perez-Mendez did not raise a Sixth Amendment objection to
the enhancement in the district court, our review is for plain
error. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.
2005).
The enhancement increased Perez-Mendez’s sentencing range
from 135 to 168 months at offense level 32 to 168 to 210 months at
offense level 34. We therefore find that Perez-Mendez’s 189-month
sentence was the result of plain error that affected his
substantial rights, because it resulted in a longer term of
imprisonment than the court could impose based solely on the facts
admitted by Perez-Mendez. Id. at 548. Because the district court
“impose[d] a sentence greater than the maximum authorized by the
facts found by the jury alone,” we conclude that the district court
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committed plain error that warrants correction.1 Hughes, 401 F.3d
at 546. Accordingly, we vacate Perez-Mendez’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.
The last issue raised on appeal is Perez-Mendez’s
challenge to the district court’s denial of a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. We find no clear error in this
determination. See United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 74 (4th
Cir. 1996) (providing standard). The record supports the
determination that Perez-Mendez provided a different name and date
of birth to the court and the presentence report investigator.
Additionally, he failed to disclose that he had previously been
deported. Perez-Mendez’s claim that these statements were due to
the language barrier is incredible, given that during the plea
hearing at which he made these statements, Perez-Mendez had the
assistance of an interpreter.
Having found that Perez-Mendez obstructed justice, the
court appropriately denied the acceptance of responsibility
reduction. “Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1
(Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily
indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for
1
As we noted in Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of course
offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the law and
procedure in effect at the time of [Perez-Mendez’s] sentencing.”
See generally Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)
(stating that an error is “plain” if “the law at the time of trial
was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal”).
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his criminal conduct.” USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.4); see United
States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding
denial of acceptance of responsibility where court found
obstruction of justice). We find that Perez-Mendez has failed to
show that his is an “extraordinary case[] in which adjustments
under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 [] apply.” USSG § 3E1.1, comment.
(n.4). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
acceptance of responsibility reduction.
In conclusion, we affirm Perez-Mendez’s conviction, but
vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court for
resentencing pursuant to Booker and Hughes.2 See Hughes, 401 F.3d
at 546 (citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65, 767). We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
2
Although the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory,
Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still “consult
[the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125
S. Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court should first
determine the appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines,
making all factual findings appropriate for that determination.
Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider this sentencing
range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a), and then impose a sentence. Id. If that sentence falls
outside the Guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons
for the departure as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c)(2). Id.The sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and
. . . reasonable.” Id. at 547.
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