United States v. Blanc , 245 F. App'x 271 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5104
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
YVE BLANC,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(7:06-cr-00402-HFF)
Submitted: August 10, 2007 Decided: August 27, 2007
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew J. Johnston, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Isaac Louis Johnson,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yve Blanc entered a conditional guilty plea to possession
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(2000), and was
sentenced to 63 months in prison. (JA 79-85). Blanc timely
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting he was
illegally detained and questioned, and that his vehicle was
searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Finding no error,
we affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005). The evidence is
construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
Blanc contends he was unlawfully detained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and that his consent to the search, while
voluntary, was the product of an illegal detention. Blanc argues
that because the evidence was the product of an illegal search, the
court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
Blanc’s vehicle was searched without a warrant. Such a
search is per se unreasonable absent the existence of a few narrow
exceptions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
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Voluntary consent to a search is such an exception. Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 396 (4th Cir. 2002).
Deputy Calderone lawfully stopped Blanc for speeding on
Interstate 85 in violation of South Carolina law. Observation of
any traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives an officer
probable cause to stop the driver. United States v. Hassan El, 5
F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993). A stop for a traffic violation,
“does not become unreasonable merely because the officer has
intuitive suspicions that the occupants of the car are engaged in
some sort of criminal activity.” Id. A routine and lawful traffic
stop permits an officer to detain the motorist to request a
driver’s license and vehicle registration, to run a computer check,
and to issue a citation. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353,
358 (4th Cir. 2000). To further detain the driver requires a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the investigating officer that
criminal activity is afoot. Id.. In determining whether there was
reasonable suspicion, the court must look at the totality of the
circumstances. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
Additionally, officers are permitted to draw on their experience
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about cumulative evidence. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002). Thus, a person’s behavior, though appearing innocent,
may raise questions justifying a detention when viewed in the
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totality and combined with the police officer’s knowledge and
experience. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2000).
Blanc alleges that Deputy Calderone unlawfully detained
him beyond the traffic stop with questions about his travel plans,
employment, the car rental, and contraband in the vehicle, because
Calderone had no reasonable suspicion to continue to question him.
Calderone articulated the following reasons why he suspected
criminal activity was afoot: (1) Blanc provided vague and
deceptive information about his visit to Charlotte and where his
girlfriend lived; (2) Blanc appeared evasive about his employment;
(3) Blanc was driving a rental car, rented in Houston, Texas, that
was overdue by three weeks, and drug traffickers frequently drove
rental cars; (4) in his experience in drug interdiction, Miami,
Atlanta, Charlotte, and Houston, all cities with which Blanc was
linked, were source cities for drug trafficking, and Interstate 85
was a major drug trafficking highway; and (5) Calderone’s partner,
Lt. Hightower, indicated he thought he smelled marijuana in Blanc’s
vehicle. Therefore, Calderone drew an inference based on these
observations and the cumulative evidence that Blanc was carrying
contraband.
At this point in the stop, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude it was not unreasonable for Deputy
Calderone to believe there was reasonable suspicion that Blanc was
engaged in criminal activity. However, Calderone did not arrest
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Blanc at this time, but instead, merely asked Blanc for consent to
search his vehicle. By his own admission Blanc gave his consent to
the search.
“A defendant who voluntarily consents to a search waives
his Fourth Amendment rights, and the police officer may conduct the
search without probable cause or a warrant.” United States v.
Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 875 (4th Cir. 1995). In assessing
voluntariness of the consent, the court examines the totality of
the circumstances including factors such as the characteristics of
the accused, his education and intelligence, the number of officers
present, along with the location and duration of the stop. United
States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996). Here, the
encounter remained consensual because Blanc voluntarily cooperated
with Deputy Calderone. See United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302,
309-10 (4th Cir. 2002). The stop was along the side of the
interstate and was no longer than necessary to run a license check,
write a ticket, and obtain information about Blanc’s travel plans.
There were two officers at the scene, neither drew a weapon, nor
was Blanc placed in handcuffs at any time. Deputy Calderone asked
Blanc if he could search his vehicle within eight minutes of the
stop. As the district court noted, nothing in the record indicates
that Blanc’s consent was involuntary. The circumstances were not
coercive, deceptive, or intimidating.
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We conclude Deputy Calderone possessed a reasonable
suspicion that Blanc was engaged in criminal activity and thus had
a right to detain Blanc. Once Blanc voluntarily consented to the
search of his vehicle, he waived his Fourth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the district court properly denied Blanc’s motion to
suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm Blanc’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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