United States v. White , 209 F. App'x 293 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-4698
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    ROMI RAHEMM WHITE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
    District Judge. (CR-04-93)
    Submitted:   August 31, 2006             Decided:   December 11, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
    Attorney, Harry L. Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Romi Rahemm White appeals his sentence imposed after he
    pled guilty to possession of $9,740 in counterfeit currency, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 472
     (2000).      He challenges his sentence
    alleging that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment in
    calculating his criminal history points and in sentencing him under
    the mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme.         We affirm.
    In United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), the
    Supreme Court held that the mandatory manner in which the federal
    sentencing    guidelines   required   courts   to    impose      sentencing
    enhancements based on facts found by the court by a preponderance
    of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment.        
    Id. at 233-34
    .     “To
    establish that a Sixth Amendment error occurred in his sentencing,
    [a defendant] must show that the district court imposed a sentence
    exceeding the maximum allowed based only on the facts that he
    admitted.”    United States v. Evans, 
    416 F.3d 298
    , 300 (4th Cir.
    2005).
    White argues that the district court violated the Sixth
    Amendment in calculating his criminal history points.            White does
    not contest any of the facts of the prior convictions used to
    calculate his score. Because he alleges factual determinations are
    essential to the calculation of his criminal history category, he
    claims his guideline range should be calculated using the lowest
    criminal history category of I.
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    White’s challenge to his criminal history calculation
    under Booker is unavailing.   In Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
     (2005), the Supreme Court instructed that Sixth Amendment
    protections apply to disputed facts about a prior conviction that
    are not evident from “the conclusive significance of a prior
    judicial record.”   
    Id. at 26-28
    .   Here, White does not contest any
    facts about his prior convictions used to arrive at his criminal
    history score.   Indeed, the district court was not called upon to
    consider any facts regarding the convictions.     Thus, the court’s
    determination as to the criminal history category did not violate
    the Sixth Amendment.   See United States v. Collins, 
    412 F.3d 515
    ,
    521-23 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when
    nature and separateness of predicate offenses for career offender
    status were undisputed); cf. United States v. Washington, 
    404 F.3d 834
    , 843 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that district court’s reliance on
    disputed facts about prior conviction to determine that it was
    crime of violence violated Sixth Amendment).        Because White’s
    guideline calculation was based on facts admitted by him and not on
    judicial fact-finding, his sentence did not violate the Sixth
    Amendment.
    White also makes a summary challenge to his sentence
    based on the court’s mandatory application of the sentencing
    guidelines.   Although there is no Sixth Amendment error in this
    case, White was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing guidelines
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    scheme.   In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that, even in the
    absence   of   a    Sixth   Amendment     violation,    the   imposition     of   a
    sentence under the mandatory guidelines scheme was error.              Booker,
    543 U.S. at 267-68.         This court explained that sentencing under a
    mandatory scheme is “a separate class of error . . . distinct from
    the Sixth Amendment claim that gave rise to the decision in Booker,
    and it is non-constitutional in nature.”           United States v. Hughes,
    
    401 F.3d 540
    , 553 (4th Cir. 2005).               The court recognized that
    “[t]his error may be asserted even by defendants whose sentences do
    not violate the Sixth Amendment.”           
    Id.
     (footnote omitted).
    Because White raised a timely Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
     (2004), objection at sentencing, he has preserved his
    claim of statutory Booker error.           United States v. Rodriguez, 
    433 F.3d 411
    , 415-16 (4th Cir. 2006). Thus, this court reviews White’s
    claim for harmless error, which places “the burden . . . on the
    Government     to   show    that   such    an   error   did   not   affect    the
    defendant’s substantial rights.”           
    Id. at 416
    .    “The Government can
    make such a showing if the sentencing court indicated that it would
    not have imposed a lesser sentence under an advisory (rather than
    a mandatory) Guidelines regime.”                United States v. Sullivan,
    
    455 F.3d 248
    , 266 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Rodriguez, 
    433 F.3d at 416
    ) (King, J., concurring).
    Here, there is no indication that the district court
    would have imposed a lower sentence had the sentencing guidelines
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    been advisory.    We conclude, based on the court’s statements at
    sentencing, that imposition of White’s sentence under the mandatory
    guidelines scheme was harmless error.       See Sullivan, 
    455 F.3d at 266
    .
    We therefore affirm White’s sentence.        We dispense with
    oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal   contentions   are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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